Industrial evolution and national institutional advantage: a comparative analysis of the photovoltaic industry in Germany, China and South Korea by Lee, Kyoung Hoon
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION AND NATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE PHOTOVOLTAIC INDUSTRY IN 
GERMANY, CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KYOUNG HOON LEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
 
August 2011 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A number of alternative economic and economic geography theories have been 
developed to account for the divergence of national political economy and industrial 
dynamics. These include the varieties of capitalism, developmental state, neo-
Schumpeterian innovation, and Gerschenkronian catching-up theories. In this thesis I 
shall argue that in these theories a core and often shared concept of „institutional 
advantage‟ plays a central role in explaining different economic performances across 
nations. 
 
This concept is elaborated as a means of examining the causal relationships between 
institutional advantages and four necessary functions (market creation, capital 
mobilisation, process innovation and cost reduction) in the development of the 
photovoltaic (PV) industry of Germany, China, and South Korea. The development of 
these industries is examined in detail on the basis of empirical evidence in the form of 
archival and interview based data.  
 
Two main conclusions are reached. Firstly, domestic market creation is not a generally 
necessary condition for the development of a local PV industry at a national level. 
China‟s PV industry grew fast without a sufficient domestic market unlike in Germany. 
However, domestic market creation is important, because the domestic PV industry, 
national support policy and the domestic market are interrelated. Secondly, capital 
mobilisation is a core function in establishing the PV industry. In the 2000s, Korea 
failed to establish its local PV industry despite an institutional advantage in creating 
domestic markets, mainly due to the fact that it had an institutional disadvantage in 
mobilising capital. However, Germany and China succeeded in mobilising capital in 
their PV sectors, governments playing a decisive role in facilitating the raising of funds 
in both cases.  
 
This research contributes to a better understanding of the nature of industrial dynamics 
in the context of institutional configurations of a national political economy, broadening 
the usage of „institutional advantage‟ by applying this concept to comparative analysis 
on the national PV trajectories. Moreover, from the perspective of the social system, 
four necessary functions for the PV industry have been proposed and investigated.  
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
 
1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
It is argued that deploying renewable energy is one of the best ways to cope with 
climate change and to establish a sustainable energy system (IEA, 2008). In terms of 
potential, photovoltaic (PV) electricity is one of the most promising alternatives to the 
current fossil fuel-dominant energy system (De Vries et al., 2007; Resch et al., 2008). 
In order to deploy PV electricity, it is essential to develop a PV industry. Figure I-1 
shows the national PV growth trajectories in five representative countries
1
 in the 2000s.  
 
Figure I-1 National PV growth trajectories in the five countries between 2001 and 2009  
 
Source: BSW (2009; 2010), EPIA (2009; 2010), KNREC (2009), Roney (2010)  
 
Surprisingly, there have been significant differences across the five countries. In some 
countries, an increase in domestic demand seems to have led to an increase in domestic 
supply, whilst the production of solar cells has increased without sufficient domestic 
demand in other countries. Why did these differences occur? And how can they be 
                                                 
1
 Also, Spain, Italy, and Taiwan can be included in the representative countries. However, 
access to full data of these countries is limited for me, thus I have excluded them in this analysis. 
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explained? These questions are the starting point of this research.  
 
Theoretically, these differences seem to be explained by the concept of comparative 
advantage held by neoclassical economists. However, this concept cannot explain 
sufficiently the nature of industrial dynamics in the long-term (Lin and Chang, 2009). 
Rather, it seems to be more relevant to regard these differences as a sectoral example of 
diversity within capitalism. With regard to divergent capitalisms, there have been many 
attempts to analyse and categorise a range of market economies within comparative 
capitalism theories (Hollingsworth et al., 1994; Streeck, 1997; Whitley, 1999; Dore, 
2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Weiss, 2003; Morgan, 2005). The varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) approach seems to offer some of the most useful literature for solving the 
questions above. This is because it provides us with the concept of „comparative 
institutional advantage‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.37) which can be applied to analyse 
firms‟ different systematic activities and performances in the context of institutional 
arrangements
2
.   
 
Moreover, it is necessary to synthesise this national level approach with an industrial 
level perspective, because the focal point of this research is the evolution of an industry 
in the context of a national political economy. Thus, these differences also need to be 
investigated using an industrial dynamics approach such as an industry life cycle (ILC) 
theory. 
 
So far not much research has been carried out with a view to bridge institutional 
configurations of national political economies and industrial dynamics using the 
concept of institutional advantage. Thus, I believe that this research can contribute to 
broadening the concept of „institutional advantage‟ and understanding comprehensively 
the nature of „industrial dynamics‟.   
 
 
                                                 
2
 The „ecological modernisation‟ approach has attempted to integrate economic development 
and environmental protection (Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). Furthermore, Gibbs (2006) attempts 
to link the ecological modernisation and regulationist approaches. On the whole, I fully agree 
with the point that economic geographers should pay more attention to environmental debates 
(Gibbs, 2006), but this thesis focuses more on the comparative analysis of national PV industrial 
dynamics from the perspective of the varieties of capitalism approach rather than from the 
perspective of „ecological modernisation‟ or Gibb‟s suggestion. 
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2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this research is to reveal and understand the causal relationships between 
institutional configurations and various national PV trajectories. In order to achieve this 
aim, my overarching research question is as follows: 
 
What are the main factors underlying the differences between national PV growth 
trajectories? 
 
More specifically, two sub-questions have been introduced to devise a conceptual 
framework. 
 
(1) If the concept of ‘institutional advantage’ is relevant in analysing these 
differences, how then can the concept explain them?  
(2) What is a linking concept between national institutional configurations and PV 
industrial dynamics? 
 
In order to clarify how institutional advantages influence the emergence and evolution 
of the PV industry, I have assumed that four necessary functions (market formation; 
capital mobilisation; process innovation; and cost reduction) facilitate the development 
of the PV industry. These four necessary functions are the intermediary concept 
between institutional advantage and the development of the PV industry. This 
assumption is based on Van de Ven and Garud‟s (2000) three functional subsystems for 
an emergence of an industry and Jacobsson and Bergek‟s (2004) four features of the 
formative period of renewable energy industries. I will discuss in detail later (II.3.2.4 p. 
35, III.3.3 pp. 47-48, and III.4.3 pp. 55-56). 
 
Thus, within the context of the above conceptual framework this study adopts the 
following hypothesis: 
 
One country’s PV industry is able to grow faster than that of another country, 
because it has institutional advantages which are relevant to the four functions.  
 
Therefore, testing this hypothesis and explaining the causal relationship between 
institutional advantages and the four functions are the main objectives of this research. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This section summarises the methods used in this research. I will explain the methods in 
detail in chapter IV. 
 
In seeking to answer these research questions, firstly, I chose three cases (Germany, 
China and South Korea) in accordance with the „polar type‟ selection (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p. 537). As shown in Figure I-1, Germany‟s PV production increased alongside the 
growth of the domestic PV market, whilst China‟s PV production grew without 
sufficient domestic PV demand. In South Korea (henceforth Korea), despite an initial 
strong growth in domestic PV demand, the PV industry was not established. Thus, in 
the main chapters (V, VI, VII and VIII) I will explain these differences using, in turn, a 
within-case analysis and a cross-case analysis.  
 
Secondly, data were collected by both archival research and interviews in order to 
understand and explain the three cases. These two data sources were cross-checked 
because they had a complementary relationship. The most challenging aspect of the 
research was the field work. In the Korean case, data collecting was less difficult 
because I was able to take advantage of my connections with government officials and a 
common language. However, this was not the case in Germany and China. In Germany, 
major PV companies such as Q-Cells were very reluctant to meet researchers
3
. However, 
mainly due to the support from the Korean-German Chamber and the UK ESRC (the 
Economic and Social Research Council) project, I was able to successfully carry out my 
fieldwork. In China, language was a problem in meeting with some interviewees and I 
was therefore accompanied by an interpreter. Finally, I was able to conduct 48 
interviews (Korea: 25, China: 15, and Germany: 8) despite time and budget constraints.      
 
Due to these detailed case studies, I believe this research can contribute to empirical 
knowledge about China and Korea‟s PV industries because very little previous research 
has been carried out concerning the PV sector in these two countries.   
 
                                                 
3
 However, major PV companies published annual reports, because these companies were listed 
on the stock market. Thus, these annual reports compensated for the difficulty of interviewing in 
Germany. 
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4. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to start by outlining a brief history and the 
industrial structure of the PV sector. This is because it is easier to understand the 
industrial dynamics of the PV sector, when you know the historical background and the 
particular structure of the PV industry.    
 
 
4.1 Brief History of the PV Sector 
 
The discovery of the photovoltaic effect opened the PV sector in terms of scientific 
knowledge in 1839 (Wolf, 1972). After that, early PV cells were invented in various 
designs, as I will describe in detail later (V.3.1.1). In 1954, the invention of the first 
modern silicon solar cells began the first phase of solar cells diffusion, as shown in 
Figure I-2. From 1958, the first commercial PV market started with the space satellite 
market (the second phase) (Wolf, 1972). After the oil crisis in the 1970s, many PV 
experiments were carried out in order to develop alternative energy sources (the third 
phase). In the 1980s, off-grid PV markets for special use such as PV lamps for railroad 
stations and PV systems for lighthouses gradually increased (the fourth phase). Finally, 
from the late 1990s, on-grid PV markets started (the fifth phase). These five phases of 
solar cell markets are illustrated in Figure I-2.   
  
Figure I-2 Five phases of solar cells diffusion 
 
Source: Jacobsson et al., 2004, p. 8 
The five phases: (1) Pioneering terrestrial applications; (2) Space Age; (3) Oil crises & solar vision; (4) 
Commercial off-grid markets; and (5) Roof-top programmes 
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4.2 Industrial Structure of the PV Sector 
 
The main actors
4
 in the PV sector are illustrated in Figure I-3. Seen as a whole, the 
industrial structure of the PV industry can be divided into two sides: a supply side and 
demand side. On the supply side, PV cell and module manufacturers are provided with 
production equipment by equipment suppliers. The value chain of PV modules is 
composed of poly silicon (raw materials), wafers (intermediate goods), cells 
(intermediate goods) and modules (finished goods). A PV system is mainly made up of 
PV modules and inverters. These PV systems are installed by installers (usually builders) 
or developers. Finally, PV electricity generators (usually large scale power plants or 
small scale roof-tops) sell their PV electricity to utilities at feed-in rates (usually this 
price is higher than the average wholesale price of electricity under the feed-in tariff 
scheme). A main focus of this research is on the growth of PV cell or module 
manufacturers (bold characters in Figure I-3). 
 
Figure I-3 Main actors in the PV sector 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Given the definition of an industry in line with the social system perspective, research 
institutes, financial systems and policy makers should be included in these main actors (see 
II.3.1). However, in this sub-section, these actors are excluded for the reasons of clarity.  
7 
 
5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapters II, III and IV are theoretical parts, while 
chapters V, VI and VII are empirical parts. Finally, chapter VIII discusses the 
comparison of the three cases and chapter IX concludes this thesis. Each chapter can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
Chapter II: Literature Review 
In this chapter, existing literature of relevance to the research questions is explored. In 
particular, varieties of capitalism, developmental state theories, national systems of 
innovation and catching-up theories are examined in national level approaches, while 
industry life cycle theories and Pavitt‟s Taxonomy are explored in industrial level 
approaches. Then, I attempt to link national level approaches and industrial level 
approaches through two concepts: comparative advantage and comparative institutional 
advantage. 
 
Chapter III: Conceptual Framework 
Based on the literature review, this chapter attempts to develop a new conceptual 
framework. Two major concepts are at the heart of this conceptual framework: 
institutional advantage and necessary functions in the development of the PV industry. 
After devising a preliminary conceptual framework, I clarify the object of comparative 
analysis: the crystalline-silicon cell industry in Germany, China and Korea in the 2000s. 
Then, I suggest a more specified conceptual framework with four necessary functions: 
demand-pull policy; capital mobilising; process innovation; and cost reduction.  
 
Chapter IV: Methodology 
In this chapter, I delineate the data collection and analysis methods that underline this 
research. In particular, I explain how I selected the three cases and the unit of 
comparative analysis. In addition, I explain the main data collecting methods (archival 
and documentary sources and interviews) and data analysis methods (a within-case 
analysis and a cross-case analysis).  
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Chapter V, VI and VII: The PV Industry in Germany, China and Korea 
These three chapters investigate the development of the PV industry in the context of 
national political economy. In each chapter, firstly, the political economy and distinctive 
institutional configurations of each country are discussed. Secondly, it is explained how 
these institutional configurations influenced the development of the PV industry. Lastly, 
I attempt to analyse inter-relationships between institutional advantage and the four 
necessary functions within each case.  
 
 
Chapter VIII: Comparison of the Three Cases 
This chapter identifies causal relationships between institutional advantages and 
necessary functions for the development of the PV industry through the comparison of 
the three cases. By doing so, two main conclusions are drawn. One is that market 
creation was not a generally necessary condition in the development of the PV industry. 
The other is that capital mobilisation was a core function in developing the PV industry. 
 
Chapter IX: Conclusions 
In this last chapter, I clarify the main arguments and outline the contributions, 
implications and limitations of this thesis. Firstly, I summarise the theoretical arguments 
and key findings. Then, the theoretical and empirical contributions are discussed and 
implications for the three countries are drawn. Finally, I deal with the limitations and 
conclude this thesis suggesting further research. 
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CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this research is to identify the main factors underlying the differences 
between national growth trajectories of the PV industry in three countries. To explain 
these trajectories no single theoretical framework will suffice. In this context the aim of 
this chapter is twofold. The first is to consider a number of possible theoretical 
perspectives. More specifically I shall consider national level and industrial level 
approaches that might contribute elements of an explanation. The second is to link these 
two approaches and ultimately to develop a new conceptual framework for this research. 
The conceptual framework will be explained in the next chapter. 
 
In this chapter, I shall first explore the „varieties of capitalism (VoC)‟ approach and the 
„developmental state‟ theories. The former deals with a divergent economic 
performance across developed countries, whereas the latter emphasises the role of 
government rather than market mechanisms in the late industrialisation in East Asia. 
Moreover, the former argues that the divergence may be regarded as the consequence of 
the different „comparative institutional advantages’ between political economies (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). In addition, I shall explore the „national systems of innovation 
(NSI)‟ approach and the „catching-up‟ theories. The former views the divergence across 
nations in terms of innovation, while the latter focuses on catching-up processes of 
backward countries. 
 
Secondly, I shall examine the definition of an industry, then explore the industry life 
cycle theories and Pavitt‟s taxonomy. The former investigates the emergence, growth 
and decline of an industry, while the latter classifies various industries by sectors.  
 
Lastly, I shall explore the two concepts which link national and industrial level 
approaches: comparative advantage and comparative institutional advantage. The 
former provides a neoclassical economic reason why a particular country specialises in 
a certain industry, while the latter provides alternative explanations as to why a certain 
country achieves better performance in specific types of activities than others.   
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2. NATIONAL LEVEL APPROACH 
 
In relation to national economic growth or performance, at large, there have been two 
different perspectives: one is the neoclassical economic approach; and the other is an 
alternative approach such as institutional, evolutionary or Schumpeterian theories, etc 
(Dunford, 2010b). In simply terms, while the former focuses mainly on resource 
allocation and the role of markets, the latter concentrates on growth and development 
and also pays attention to the role of other institutions such as the state or national 
systems. Instead of dealing with big debates between the two perspectives
5
, I will 
explore the latter approach in this section because it is more appropriate to analyse 
industrial dynamics in the context of the national political economy.    
 
Within this perspective, I will examine four approaches: the varieties of capitalism 
(VoC), the developmental state theories, the national systems of innovation (NSI), and 
the catching-up theories. Whereas the VoC approach deals with cases of developed 
countries
6
, the developmental state theories consider mainly developing countries, 
especially the success of East Asian countries. I will also investigate some models 
which attempt to explain China‟s development. The NSI approach explores the 
similarities and differences across nations in terms of technological innovation, while 
the catching-up theories examine how backward countries catch up with forerunner 
countries.  
 
 
2.1 Varieties of Capitalism 
 
2.1.1 Basic Viewpoints of the Approach 
 
When it comes to the comparative analysis of national economic performance, we can 
divide it into two different perspectives: one emphasises convergence tendencies, the 
                                                 
5
 However, I will explore briefly the debate on the economic growth of East Asia in the second 
half of twentieth century in the developmental state theories section, because the debate is 
deeply associated with the developmental state theories. 
6
 Although the varieties of capitalism approach deals with the cases of western developed 
countries, it argues that it can be applied to understand developing countries (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). 
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other, divergence tendencies (Dunford and Smith, 2000). It is necessary to begin with 
national level theories which pay attention to the divergence across nations in order to 
examine the differences of the national growth trajectory of the PV industry.  
 
The VoC approach is one of the divergent capitalism perspectives, because it is more 
interested in differences and divergence across nations than similarities and 
convergence (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Basically, it analyses the institutional similarities 
and differences among the developed political economies after World War II. As a 
study of comparative capitalism, it regards „firms‟ as the crucial actors who deal with 
coordination problems with other actors within political economy: it adopts „a relational 
view of the firm‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 6). 
 
In this approach, „institutions‟ are one of the key concepts to develop its logic. 
Following North (1990), this approach defines „institutions as a set of rules, formal or 
informal, that actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material 
reasons‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 9). I will discuss this concept in detail in the next 
chapter (III.3.1).   
 
After clarifying the meaning of the institutions, very important viewpoints can be 
deduced from this approach. Firstly, the institutional configuration is one of the major 
determinants of the firm‟s behaviour. This approach argues that differences of the 
institutional configuration in the political economy „generate systematic differences in 
corporate strategy‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 16) across nations, especially liberal 
market economies and coordinated market economies.
7
 In other words, firms are 
embedded in a nation-specific institutional structure, thus their activities and 
performance can be largely influenced by the national institutional framework. I will 
describe this categorisation of market economies in the next sub-section (II.2.1.2). 
                                                 
7
 Hall and Soskice (2001) provide a simple evidence for their argument. “For instance, the data 
that Knetter (1989) has gathered are especially interesting. He finds that the firms of Britain, a 
typical LME [liberal market economy], and those of Germany, a CME [coordinated market 
economy], respond very differently to a similar shock, in this case an appreciation of the 
exchange rate that renders the nation‟s goods more expensive in foreign market. British firms 
tend to pass the price increase along to customers in order to maintain their profitability, while 
German firms maintain their prices and accept lower returns in order to preserve market 
share.”(Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 16) 
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Secondly, the concept of „comparative institutional advantage‟ can be used to explain 
the different patterns of specialization of production or products across nations. Hall and 
Soskice (2001) suggest this concept to explain „why particular nations tend to specialize 
in specific types of production or products‟ (p. 37). This concept is also explored 
thoroughly in the next sub-section (4.2), because it is one of the major concepts of the 
conceptual framework.  
 
These two viewpoints are essential for analysing the German, Chinese and Korean cases: 
the systemic influence on local firms of national institutions and the concept of 
comparative institutional advantage. Thus, this approach is the starting point for this 
research. Furthermore, this approach offers a categorisation of national political 
economies along with the pattern of firms to resolve the coordination problems. This 
categorisation, which will be dealt with below, is suitable for examining the German 
political economy. 
 
 
2.1.2 Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies 
 
The VoC approach divides national political economies into two ideal types of 
economies: a liberal market economy (LME) and a coordinated market economy (CME). 
Hall and Soskice (2001) explain this typology as follows: 
 
In liberal market economies, firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and 
competitive market arrangements. […] In coordinated market economies, firms depend 
more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavors with other actors 
and to construct their core competencies (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 8).  
 
In other words, firms tend to solve coordination problems mainly through market 
mechanisms in a context of competition and formal contracting in LMEs, while firms 
work mainly through non-market institutions such as „powerful business or employer 
associations, strong trade unions, extensive networks of cross-shareholding, and legal or 
regulatory systems designed to facilitate information-sharing and collaboration‟ (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001, p. 10) in CMEs. Furthermore, these concepts provide a broader 
institutional context so that other comparative analysis can be undertaken more 
13 
 
effectively. For example, varieties of corporate governance such as „the shareholder and 
stakeholder models‟ are closely related to the taxonomy of LME and CME (Vitols, 
2001). In Germany, which is regarded as a representative case of CMEs, the stakeholder 
model prevails more than the shareholder one; whilst in the UK, which is regarded as a 
representative case of LMEs, the opposite is true (Vitols, 2001).  
 
In line with the example, the comparative analysis within the context of LMEs and 
CMEs can be applied to the varieties of renewable energy policy regime. A feed-in 
tariff scheme, which relies more on non-market mechanisms than on market ones, is 
compatible with CMEs, whilst a tradable certificates or renewable portfolio standard, 
which are regarded as market-oriented schemes, are compatible with LMEs. In fact, the 
feed-in tariff has been adopted in Germany, whereas the renewable portfolio standard 
has been adopted in most of the states of America and the tradable certificate was 
adopted in the UK.
8
 
 
However, it should be noted that there are some limits to the VoC approach when 
applying to this thesis. Firstly, the comparative setting of the thesis is not a comparison 
between LMEs and CMEs, because China and Korea can also be categorised as CMEs 
in that two economies have a tendency to rely more on non-market institutions than on 
market mechanisms, as I will discuss later. Thus, even though the model of CMEs can 
identify fully the features of the German economy, it should be applied to the analysis 
in the context of comparison between Germany, China, and Korea. Secondly, the model 
of CMEs is unlikely to be sufficient to explain the political economies of China and 
Korea, thus it is necessary to explore other approaches such as the development state 
theories in the next sub-section (2.2). Lastly, although technology transfer and 
innovation are one of the main issues in this study, in particular in China and Korea 
because of their developmental characteristics, this approach is unlikely to deal with this 
issue fully. Thus, these innovation and catching-up issues will be explored in sub-
sections 2.3 and 2.4.   
 
 
2.2 Developmental State Theories 
                                                 
8
 The tradable certificate scheme was changed to the feed-in tariff scheme in the UK in 2010 
(EPIA, 2010). 
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2.2.1 Free Market versus Developmental State 
 
There has been much debate on how to account for the rapid economic growth of East 
Asia in the second half of the twentieth century (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; World 
Bank, 1993; Stiglitz and Yusuf, 2001; Chang, 2006; Pirie, 2008; Yin and Chang, 2009). 
In simply terms, one side of the debate are neoclassical economists; the other side are 
the revisionists or alternative theorists.  
 
According to neoclassical economists, the fast economic growth of East Asia is 
attributed to the establishment of free market and free trade mechanisms in their 
economic systems (World Bank, 1993)
9. In other words, the East Asian governments‟ 
attempts to „get the price right‟ resulted in low relative price distortions and efficient 
allocation of resources. Moreover, the governments supported industries on the basis of 
comparative advantage and made efforts to integrate domestic production markets into 
international markets (Yin and Chang, 2009). Thus, local industries struggled to survive 
under the international market force and those who were based on their comparative 
advantage accomplished global competitiveness. 
  
However, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) disagree with the neoclassical theorists on 
the basis of their case studies, Korea and Taiwan, respectively. They argue that the role 
of the state was more important than that of the market in the process of late 
industrialisation in East Asia. In the Korean case, Amsden (1989) argues that the 
Korean government „set relative prices deliberately “wrong” in order to create profitable 
investment opportunities‟ (p. 14). Even though this type of government intervention 
created rents, the Korean government utilized them as performance-based incentives, 
                                                 
9
 The World Bank report (1993) argues that its „market-friendly view‟ lies between the 
neoclassical and revisionist views (p. 84). However, in view of the broader picture, the market-
friendly view can be included within the neoclassical view in that it argues that government 
intervention should not go beyond market mechanisms. Furthermore, Paul Krugman (1997) 
argues that Asian growth was „mainly a matter of perspiration rather than inspiration – of 
working harder, not smarter‟ (cited in Yusuf, 2001, p. 5). In other words, total factor 
productivity (TFP) „made a negligible contribution to growth in much of industrializing East 
Asia. The principal drivers of growth were primarily physical capital followed by human capital‟ 
(Young, 1994; Kim and Lau, 1994 cited in Yusuf, 2001, p. 15). However, Stiglitz (2001) points 
out technical issues of growth accounting and argues that „the total factor productivity debate is 
much ado about nothing‟ (p. 512). I agree with Stiglitz and will follow his view in this thesis.  
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exercising discipline over the private sector (Amsden, 1989).    
 
In addition, Wade (1990) criticises the theory of comparative advantage in that it 
„covers only the effects of once-and-for-all changes in trade restriction. It does not 
specify a casual mechanism linking realization of comparative advantage of higher 
growth
10 ‟ (p. 14). He acknowledges the East Asian political arrangements as 
authoritarian corporatism (Wade, 1990). This characteristic of political regimes 
provided the basis for market guidance. The regimes guided the market using a set of 
economic policies which resulted in higher levels of productive investment than would 
have occurred with free market policy (Wade, 1990).   
 
Furthermore, Pirie (2008) argues that the Korean developmental state should be 
analysed in the context of supranational political and economic structures such as the 
Cold War security system and the Japanese-dominated regional economy. In addition, 
he stresses that Korea‟s developmental process was a „national capitalist development‟ 
(p. 2) rather than simply a growth or development (Pirie, 2008).  
 
 
2.2.2 China‟s Development Models 
 
Up until now, it seems that no single theory or model can explain the success of China‟s 
development process entirely. Thus, I will explore three main issues related to China‟s 
development: a transition economy through gradualism, a rural industrialisation by local 
corporatism, and foreign direct investments with a significant involvement of overseas 
Chinese
11
. As a whole, these three issues are more compatible with the developmental 
state theory than the neoclassical economic theory, because they tend to give more 
weight to non-market mechanisms than to market ones. 
 
                                                 
10
 The relationship between industrial upgrading and comparative advantage is dealt with in a 
recent debate (Lin and Chang, 2009). Lin argues that industrial upgrading should conform to 
current comparative advantage, whilst Chang disagrees with him in that the East Asian 
experience was not compatible with his argument (Lin and Chang, 2009).    
11
 Indigenous companies, especially large SOEs which were supported by the state via strategic 
policies, also played a part in China‟s economic development (Nolan, 2001; Zeng and 
Williamson, 2007). However, I will focus on these three issues because these issues are 
distinctive characteristics of China‟s development compared to other East Asian cases. 
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2.2.2.1 Transition Economy: Shock Therapy versus Gradualism 
 
A transition from a planned economy to a market economy has been one of the main 
issues surrounding economic reforms in China, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. However, the economic ways were totally different between China and Eastern 
Europe and Russia: gradualism
12
 in China; shock therapy in Eastern Europe and Russia 
(Lin et al., 1996; Buck et al., 2000).   
 
In particular, economic reform in Russia was comprehensive, top-down and overnight. 
Above all, rapid industrial privatisation was implemented through the „voucher 
privatization of manufacturing firms‟ in order to „achieve the State‟s withdrawal from 
industry and to achieve a rapid, irreversible switch to private ownership and control‟ 
(Buck et al., 2000, p. 380).  
 
By contrast, the approach of economic reform in China was „piecemeal, partial, 
incremental, and often experimental‟ (Lin et al., 1996, p. 201). Rather than privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), „the Chinese government permitted a variety of 
ownership forms, including firms collectively owned by local governments, foreign-
invested firms and new private start-ups‟ (Buck et al., 2000, p. 381).  
 
The gradualist characteristic of the reform processes of China has some common 
characteristics with the developmental state theories. As I discussed above, the political 
arrangements of developmental state was argued as authoritarian corporatism (Wade, 
1990). In fact, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained central control and avoided 
democratic reforms of political institutions unlike in Russia (Buck et al., 2000). Thus, 
gradual reform processes in China may be attributed partly to the authoritarian feature 
of the Communist Party regime
13
. Furthermore, the gradual reform approach has 
preferred various combinations of institutional mechanisms to the market ones.    
 
                                                 
12
 This characteristic of China‟s economic reform is well expressed by the Deng Xiaoping's 
famous phrase of „groping for stones to cross the river (Mo zhe shi tou guo he)‟ (Nolan, 2004, p. 
1). 
13
 On the other hand, it is argued that the main causes of the gradualist characteristic of China‟s 
reform were pre-reform conditions, culture and political, social and economic institutions (Buck 
et al., 2000).   
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2.2.2.2 Local State Corporatism: Rural Industrialisation 
 
The developmental state theories seem to be applied to China‟s economic growth 
without many modifications because the state, the central and local governments, played 
a major role in the process of industrialisation
14. However, in the context of China‟s 
industrialization, it is argued that a local-level analysis is more appropriate than a 
national-level analysis, because local political and economic institutions were more 
helpful for local firms than the central ones under the decentralised political and 
economic system (Oi, 1995; Oi, 1999; Thun, 2006).   
 
In fact, a rural industrialisation is one of the distinctive features of China‟s 
industrialisation: township and village enterprises (TVEs) have contributed much to the 
economic growth of China (Oi, 1999; Lin and Yao, 2001), as I will discuss in detail in 
the chapter of the Chinese case. Neoclassical economists might argue that rapid 
economic growth in rural areas is attributable to the huge amount of labour input or the 
introduction of market forces after the economic reform. However, the „local state 
corporatism‟ model argues that the rural industrialisation was basically a kind of local 
state-led development (Oi, 1995; Oi, 1999).   
 
Based on the legacy of the Maoist system, local officials who had a high degree of 
discipline promoted rapid economic development of their localities under the economic 
reform (Oi, 1999).  
 
Working within a strong bureaucratic system, local government at the country, township, 
and village levels used its official position and administrative resources to foster the 
development of local enterprises, first collectively owned firms and eventually private 
ones as well. At the township and village levels, cadres used their administrative authority 
to mobilize resources within their communities to fund collectively owned rural industry 
directly, redistributing capital and pooling risks (Oi, 1999, p. 96). 
                                                 
14
 Peter Nolan (2004) argues that the role of the state has been critical in China‟s economic 
growth:  
 
My own view is that the reason China has been so successful is that despite great strains and 
numerous policy shortcomings, the state has continued to play a critical role in maintaining social 
stability, resolving problems of market failure, regulating the distribution of income, wealth and 
life opportunities, and regulating the way in which China interacts with the global economy (Nolan, 
2004, p. 3). 
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More importantly, the fiscal reforms of China have provided local officials with 
incentives to encourage faster economic growth of their localities than others (Oi, 1999).  
 
However, in terms of the difference between free market and developmental state, local 
state corporatism
15
 is much closer to the latter than the former, because it emphasises 
the role of local cadres such as local government officials and communist party officials 
rather than that of market forces.  
 
 
2.2.2.3 The Overseas Chinese Model  
 
The overseas Chinese
16
 economy, mainly in Taiwan and Hong Kong, relied heavily 
upon small family-owned businesses. The behaviour of overseas Chinese firms can be 
characterised as autocratic patriarchal management, fast response to changing global 
market niches, overseas family connections and returnees from study or work abroad 
(Hobday, 1995). 
 
Hobday (1995) describes how to function the overseas Chinese-style personal 
connections, so-called guanxi, in the global economy as follows:  
 
Today‟s worldwide guanxi enable Chinese businesses to match consumer demand in the 
US with production in China and Taiwan. Typically, the patriarch controls the finances 
from Hong Kong or Taiwan. His „number-one-son‟ manages the factory in China, 
Thailand or Malaysia. Having been to a university in the US, „number-two-son‟ may well 
work in California, assessing new computer innovations (Hobday, 1995, p. 22). 
 
                                                 
15
 When the range of locality is extended to city or provincial level, local state corporatism is 
similar to developmental state cases in terms of size of economy. For example, the GDP of 
Guangdong Province (USD 515 billion) was more than half of that of Korea (USD 929 billion) 
in 2008 (NBSC, 2009).  
16
 Mackie (1992) admits that it is problematic to define the concept of „overseas Chinese‟ as „all 
people of Chinese descent outside China, regardless of their nationality, status or length of 
sojourn abroad‟ (Mackie, 1992, p. 41). Some researchers use the term broadly including 
Chinese descendents in Southeast Asia such as Thailand and Indonesia, however, I will use the 
term more narrowly in this thesis for the reason of simple and concise explanation, that is, 
overseas Chinese economy is mainly regarded as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
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More importantly, the overseas Chinese economy has played a key role in the uprising 
of the mainland Chinese economy since the economic reform. In particular, Chinese 
diaspora capital acted as a „“matchmaker” that facilitated the encounter of foreign 
capital and Chinese labor, entrepreneurs, and government officials‟ (Arrighi, 2007, p. 
351). Furthermore, Arrighi (2007) argues that the overseas Chinese economy has 
benefited from access to the mainland Chinese economy compared with foreigners as 
follows: 
 
The overseas Chinese, […], could bypass most regulations, thanks to familiarity with 
local customs, habits, and language, to the manipulation of kinship and community ties – 
which they strengthened through generous donations to local institutions – and to the 
preferential treatment that they received from CCP [Chinese Communist Party] officials 
(Arrighi, 2007, p. 352).  
 
Therefore, the overseas Chinese model explains how the overseas Chinese economy is 
due to rapid industrialisation of the mainland China. 
 
 
2.3 National Systems of Innovation 
 
2.3.1 Basic Viewpoints of the Approach 
 
Another comparative approach to explain the divergence across nations is the national 
systems of innovation (NSI) approach which has been developed by neo-
Schumpeterians. The emergence of the NSI approach goes back to the works of 
Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992), and Nelson (1993) (Shin, 1996). This approach 
examines the institutions and mechanisms supporting technical innovation and 
economic performance in various countries (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Compared 
to the VoC approach, the NSI approach highlights how technical innovations occur 
within the national context and how national systems differ from each other in view of 
innovation. Thus, innovation is one of the key concepts of the NIS approach. 
 
Even though it is not easy to define the concept of innovation
17
, it is necessary to clarify 
                                                 
17
 Another way to approach the concept of innovation is to classify the types of innovation. 
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what innovation is in order to set the boundaries of this research. According to the text 
book definition of innovation, the concept of innovation can be described as „the first 
attempt to carry [a new product or process] out into practice‟ (Fagerberg et al., 2005, p. 
4). With regard to „the first attempt‟, it can be interpreted as the first firms to bring a 
new product to market or adopt a new process in production. However, in order not to 
limit this thesis to the behaviour of leading firms in the world or to the most advanced 
scientific researches, it is necessary to interpret the concept of innovation in a 
comprehensive sense. From this perspective, Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) suggest the 
concept of innovation can be broader as follows: 
 
[W]e interpret the term rather broadly, to encompass the processes by which firms master 
and get into practice product designs and manufacturing processes that are new to them, if 
not to the universe or even to the nation (p. 4). 
   
In line with this perspective, the OECD „Oslo manual‟ divides innovation into three 
categories: innovations new to the world; innovations new to the market; and 
innovations new to the firm (Bell, 2009, p. 12). In this thesis, I have followed this 
broader definition of innovation so that I can include latecomer firms in developing 
countries as well as leading firms in developed countries. 
 
On the other hand, the nature of innovation needs a systemic approach in that innovation 
is the result of complex relations and interactions between actors such as firms, 
customers and research institutes. These relations and interactions can be „characterized 
by reciprocity, interactivity, and feedback mechanisms in several loops‟ (Edquist, 1997). 
Focusing on the interactive feature of innovation, Lundvall (1992) argues that 
„interactive learning‟ between user and producer is the focusing device of the NSI 
approach toward a theory. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Schumpeter refers to examples of innovation as follows: new products, new methods of 
production, new sources of supply, the exploitation of new markets, and new ways to organize 
business (Fagerberg, 2005, p. 6). Concerning the first two of these, Schmookler argues that the 
distinction between product innovation and process innovation: the former is creation or 
improvement of products, the latter is how to produce in better way (Fagerberg, 2005, p. 7). In 
view of the continuity of innovation process, the concept can be divided into radical innovation 
and incremental one: this means continuous improvements, while the other means the 
introduction of a totally new product or process (Fagerberg, 2005, p. 7-8). 
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The systemic nature of innovation can be understood well by contrasting it to the linear 
model
18
. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) point out that the linear model has serious defects 
in interpreting innovation. Some innovation derives from scientific research, however, 
most of the innovation of firms comes from efforts to respond to market demand. 
Furthermore, the linear model cannot explain the many feedbacks and loops within the 
innovation process (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).   
 
Generally, a system is constituted by a number of actors or elements and by the 
relationships or interactions between the elements (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). 
According to the NSI literature, main actors of innovation systems can be identified as 
follows: first of all, firms are main actors because most of innovations are originated by 
the firms; secondly, universities and research institutes play a major role in innovation 
because science and technology is one of the sources of innovation; thirdly, users or 
customers are also main actors considering „user-producer interactive learning‟; Lastly, 
governments and government agencies are actors because they facilitate innovations 
(Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993).   
 
Lastly, it is worth examining the concept of a national system in the NSI approach. As 
business and technology become transnational, the meaning of national borders in 
innovation literature becomes blurred. However, due to the range of technology policies, 
national education systems, national institutions, etc., there are still significant national 
differences which affect how technical advance proceeds (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993).  
 
However, the NSI approach is unlikely to provide a general conceptual framework to 
apply for comparative empirical research (Shin, 1996). Even though Lundvall (1992) 
suggests „interactive learning‟ as a theoretical device for comparative studies, Nelson 
(1993) posits careful description, comparison and understanding of cases before 
theorizing and then proving the theory as follows: 
 
Nelson does not deny the need for a theory or a common thread to synthesise case studies. 
But it is a remote objective at this stage when careful empirical studies have not been 
                                                 
18
 „Basically, „„the linear model‟‟ is based on the assumption that innovation is applied science. 
It is „„linear‟‟ because there is a well-defined set of stages that innovations are assumed to go 
through. Research (science) comes first, then development, and finally production and 
marketing‟ (Fagerberg, 2005, p. 8). 
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sufficiently accumulated. He, […], assumes that the principal task of researchers is to 
concentrate on descriptions of individual phenomena and compare similarities and 
differences across countries, before they arrive at a more general understanding. On the 
other hand, Lundvall, […], emphasises the importance of theory for understanding. He 
argues that any theory is basically a „focusing device‟ which „brings forward and exposes 
some aspects of the real world, leaving others in obscurity‟. And he proposes „interactive 
learning‟ as his focusing device for understanding the NSI (Shin, 1996, p. 34).    
 
Therefore, it can be said that the general conceptual framework of the NSI approach „is 
still at an exploratory stage (Shin, 1996, p. 37). Thus, I will examine other theories 
further in order to compensate these limitations.  
  
 
2.3.2 The Latecomer Firm Model in East Asia 
 
Hobday (1995) puts forward the East Asian latecomer firm model which shows the 
institutional mechanisms of technological learning by latecomer firms. He examines 
how latecomer firms of four East Asian countries (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) manage to catch up with leading firms of more advanced countries in the 
electronics sector. His main focus is the interactions between latecomer firms and 
multinational companies (MNCs) at the firm-level
19
.  
 
To begin with, Hobday (1995) defines the latecomer firm as „a manufacturing company 
(existing or potential) which faces two sets of competitive disadvantages in attempting 
to compete in export markets‟ (p. 33). One is a technological disadvantage which results 
from isolation from the main international sources of technology and R&D. The other is 
a marketing disadvantage because the latecomer firm is dislocated from the mainstream 
international markets. However, latecomer firms have substantial cost advantages over 
leading firms. 
 
In order to overcome the technological barrier, latecomer firms learn and acquire 
foreign technology through various institutional channels. Hobday (1995) sets out 
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 Although the latecomer firm model focuses on the firm-level, I will include this model in the 
national level approach, because it provides meaningful insights into understanding the 
catching-up process of electronics sector within the East Asian national context. 
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technology acquisition channels of latecomer firms as shown in Table II-1. 
 
Table II-1 Mechanisms of foreign technology acquisition by latecomer firms 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Joint ventures 
Licensing 
Original equipment manufacture (OEM) 
Own-design and manufacture (ODM) 
Sub-contracting 
Foreign and local buyers 
Informal means (overseas training, hiring, returnees) 
Overseas acquisition/equity investments 
Strategic partnerships for technology 
Source: „Innovation in East Asia‟ (Hobday, 1995, p. 35)  
 
One of the most important institutional channels for East Asian latecomer firms was 
original equipment manufacture (OEM
20
). Under OEM, a latecomer firm produced 
goods in accordance with the precise specification of a foreign MNC. Then, the foreign 
MNC sold the product under its own brand name using its own distribution channels. 
Thus, the latecomer firm was able to overcome marketing barriers without investing in 
marketing and distribution. Moreover, the foreign partner usually helped the latecomer 
firm in selection of capital equipment and the training managers, engineers and 
technicians of the latecomer firm. Therefore, OEM functioned as a training school for 
latecomer firms, enabling latecomer firms to acquire basic capacity to assimilate 
manufacturing and design technology. Sooner or later, latecomer firms gained more and 
more control over their production processes. For example, they were able to design 
their own products and begin to research and develop new products and process 
innovation. Finally, they had competitive R&D capabilities and reached the same level 
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 „OEM is a specific form of subcontracting that evolved out of the joint operations of TNC 
[transnational company] buyers and NIE [newly industrialising economy] suppliers. Under OEM, the 
finished product is made to the precise specification of a particular buyer (or TNC) who then markets the 
product under its own brand name, through its own distribution channels. OEM takes a variety of forms 
and has evolved considerably since the 1960s. … The term OEM began to be used in the 1950s by US 
computer makers who used East Asian suppliers to produce equipment for them. It was later adopted by 
US TNCs in the 1960s, which used local firms to assemble and test semiconductors. Today, the term has 
acquired a variety of meanings (some use OEM to refer the local supplier). To avoid confusion, … , the 
term OEM refers to the subcontracting system in which firms cooperate, rather than to the buyer or 
supplier of equipment‟ (Hobday, 2000, p. 133). 
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as leaders in terms of technological capability (Hobday, 1995). 
 
Hobday (1995) argues that the innovation pattern of East Asian latecomers is different 
from that of Western leaders. As traditional models of innovation indicate, a typical 
sequential order of innovation activities of leading firms is R&D, product innovation 
and process innovation, however, that of East Asian latecomers is the reverse, i.e 
assembly first, then incremental improvements of process, and finally R&D. 
 
Although the implications of Hobday‟s arguments are considerable, his study cannot 
encompass the whole national system in the context of East Asian countries because he 
largely focuses on firm-level learning. Therefore, this point will be explored in the 
catching-up theories as below.  
 
 
2.4 Catching-up Theories 
 
2.4.1 Basic Viewpoints of the Approach 
 
While the VoC approach focuses on the „comparative institutional advantage‟ across 
nations, the catching-up theories are interested in the process of building up „new 
institutional instruments‟ which are able to narrow the gap between forerunner and 
latecomer economies. Overall, the catching-up theories can be divided into two main 
streams: one is Abramovitz‟s general approach; the other is Gerschenkron‟s specific 
approach (Shin, 1996). 
 
Abramovitz (1979; 1986) proposes a universal concept of „social capability‟ in order to 
explain general process of catching-up (cited in Shin, 1996). He identifies a country‟s 
social capability as „technical competence, for which […] years of education may be a 
rough proxy, and its political, commercial, industrial, and financial institutions, which I 
characterized in more qualitative ways‟ (Abramovitz, 1989, pp. 222-223). Using this 
concept, he argues that „a country‟s potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is 
backward without qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward but 
socially advanced‟ (Abramovitz, 1989, p. 222). Furthermore, he attempts to explain the 
post-war catching-up process of OECD follower countries, regarding the high level of 
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social capability as a cause for catching-up (Shin, 1996).  
 
However, there are some limitations to Abramovitz‟s catching-up theory. Firstly, the 
concept of social capability is too ambiguous to apply other empirical research (Shin, 
1996). Secondly, if „the process of enlarging social capability is separated from that of 
technological catching-up, the former can be regarded as a general precondition for the 
latter across time and space‟ (Shin, 1996, p.15). However, some examples of catching-
up such as the East Asian new industrialised economies (NIEs) do not fit with 
Abramovitz‟s argument.  
 
By contrast, Gerschenkron adopts an explanatory schema rather than proposing some 
universal concepts (Shin, 1996). He points out the half-truth of the view of 
„prerequisites‟ for economic development, furthermore, he argues that „the great spurt 
of industrial development occurred despite the lack of these „prerequisites‟‟ 
(Gerschenkron, 1963 cited in Shin, 1996, p. 21). Rather, the very existence of a more 
advanced country provides latecomers with what amounts to prerequisites for the 
development of the forerunner (Shin, 1996). Therefore, „the central focus of 
Gerschenkron‟s analysis of late industrialisation is on the question of how those often 
„missing‟ prerequisites in latecomers are created or substituted for through specific 
institutional responses‟ (Shin, 1996, p. 22). For example, the Korean chaebol-led 
catching-up process can be understood in terms of substituting institutions along the 
development path. 
 
In principle, Gerschenkron‟s comparative schema, a three-country paradigm, mainly 
derived from the historical experience of Germany and Russia‟s catching-up with 
Britain in the latter half of the nineteenth century, utilising an organising concept of the 
„degree of backwardness‟ (Gerschenkron, 1962). In the process of catching-up, 
latecomers attempted to devise functional substitutes for the institutions of the 
forerunner, such as „investment banks‟ in Germany and „the state‟ in Russia 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). 
 
When it comes to the tension between theory and reality, Gerschenkron‟s schema is 
neither a universal proposition nor a descriptive history, but locates somewhere between 
them. „Its strength is in demonstrating different strategic factors across countries; its 
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weakness lies in the limits of its application‟ (Shin, 1996, p. 24). Thus, it mainly 
explains a differentiated system of a different latecomer in a different time. As it applies 
to the East Asian catching-up experiences, the Gerschenkronian-type catching-up 
strategy is likely to fit for the Japanese and Korean cases. It can be regarded as a 
„substituting strategy‟ in that the strategy of latecomers is establishing substitutes for the 
„prerequisites‟ of development in order to compete with forerunners (Shin and Chang, 
2003). However, this is not the case for some East Asian countries such as Singapore 
and Taiwan, as I will discuss below (II.2.4.2). Thus, another type of catching-up 
strategy is needed like a „complementing strategy‟ to explain latecomers‟ attempts to 
develop mainly through exploiting complementary relations with forerunners rather 
than attempting to directly compete with them (Shin and Chang, 2003). 
 
 
2.4.2 East Asian Catching-up Models 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the catching-up strategy can be divided into two strategies in 
relation to the relationship between latecomers and forerunners: one is a substituting 
strategy; the other is a complementing one.   
 
Shin and Chang (2003) put forward „the East Asian catching-up models‟ based on this 
categorisation. They assume that the comparative analysis between the US, Japan, and 
Korea is suitable for applying the three-country paradigm suggested by Gerschenkron. 
They argue that Japan and Korea adopted the Gerschenkronian substituting strategies, 
„focusing on building internationally competitive „local‟ industries‟ (Shin and Chang, 
2003, p. 11) in order to compete with leading industries in more advanced economies. 
 
In particular, they focus more on the Korean case, an „extremely backward‟ country 
compared to Japan. They pay attention to three main players in Korea: the government, 
commercial banks and the chaebols, the Korean version of family-owned conglomerates. 
In a developmental stage, the Korean government nationalised commercial banks and 
controlled their preferential loans to firms under its industrial policy. Shin and Chang 
(2003) describe the substitution strategy in Korea as follows:  
 
The state designated strategic industries and picked up companies or business groups to 
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undertake the task of building these new industries whilst providing them with subsidies 
and protections. The state-banks-chaebol nexus thus became the central feature of the 
Korean economic system (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 13). 
 
This is illustrated in Figure II-1. The state-banks-chaebol nexus played the role of 
substituting institutions similar to the German investment banks and the Russian state in 
the late nineteenth century in Europe. In other words, these special institutions 
mobilised resources to realize a catching-up strategy in the process of economic growth 
in Korea. Thus, it can be regarded as the specific institutions in the Korea‟s catching-up 
process. 
 
Figure II-1 Korea‟s nationalistic model 
 
Source: „Restructuring Korea Inc.‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 14) 
 SMEs (Small Medium-sized Enterprises) 
 MNCs (Multi-National Companies) 
 
By contrast, the pattern of catching-up in Singapore and Taiwan is to some extent 
different from the Gerschenkronian substituting strategy. Singapore and Taiwan also 
can be regarded as „extremely backward‟ countries compared to Japan in the second 
half of the twentieth century. However, they underwent industrialisation mainly through 
exploiting complementary relations with bigger forerunner countries rather than 
attempting to directly compete with them (Shin and Chang, 2003). The emergence of 
the Taiwanese or Singaporean complementing strategy, which was rare in the nineteenth 
century, is mainly influenced by „the acceleration of globalisation in the latter half of 
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the twentieth century‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003. P. 19). 
 
In Singapore, economic development largely relied on foreign MNCs. The Singaporean 
government was not likely to be very interested in competing with its forerunners. 
Instead, it provided the MNCs with qualified „complementary assets‟ (Teece, 1986) 
such as infrastructure, human capital, fiscal incentives, etc. in order to attract FDI in 
Singapore (Shin and Chang, 2003). As MNCs were located in Singapore, the barriers to 
accessing advanced technologies and of financing industrialisation for local firms were 
lowered. As a result, the MNCs „enabled Singapore to export and to systematically 
acquire technology‟ (Hobday, 1995, p. 136). On the other hand, Government-linked 
companies (GLCs), which are public enterprises in Singapore, did businesses in which 
MNCs were not interested. These characteristics of the Singaporean model are 
illustrated in Figure II-2. Compared with other East Asian countries, the main feature of 
Singapore‟s economic development is „the most internationalist route for 
industrialisation‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 17).  
 
Figure II-2 Singapore‟s internationalist model 
 
Source: „Restructuring Korea Inc.‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 17) 
 
The Taiwanese developmental path lies somewhere between the Korea‟s nationalistic 
one and the Singapore‟s internationalist one. In contrast to the Korean case, industrial 
development relied heavily on SMEs in Taiwan (Hobday, 1995). In contrast to the 
Singaporean government, the Taiwanese government attempted to protect local 
industries through public enterprises and the guanxiqiye (local business groups) in the 
initial stage of industrialisation. But it changed the orientation of industrial policy from 
import-substitution industrialisation to attracting MNCs in order to compensate for the 
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lack of big local companies. In addition, „the Taiwanese private companies, the 
guanxiqiye or the SMEs, seldom attempted to compete directly with their forerunners in 
Japan or in the US‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 18). Moreover, the Taiwanese 
government played a major role in matching local companies and MNCs in the form of 
Joint Ventures (JVs) where venture capital was needed such as in the semiconductor 
sector. As a result, the Taiwanese industrial structure is currently based on complex 
relationships between four major players: the public enterprises, the guanxiqiye, the 
MNCs, and the SMEs. These relationships between four players are shown in Figure II-
3. In short, the feature of the Taiwanese economic development summarises as „a semi-
internationalist path of catching-up‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 18).  
 
Figure II-3 Taiwan‟s semi-international model 
 
Source: „Restructuring Korea Inc.‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 18) 
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3. INDUSTRIAL LEVEL APPROACH 
 
Basically, the unit of analysis of this study is an industry under the national political 
economy, so I will begin with a definition of an industry. In addition, because the focal 
point of the research is the evolution of industry, I will take an industrial dynamics 
perspective by examining the industry life cycle (ILC) theories. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the evolution of industry may be significantly different across sectors. 
Thus, I will also deal with Pavitt‟s taxonomy in the last part of this section. 
 
 
3.1 Definition of an Industry 
 
In order to understand the evolution of industry, it might be reasonable to start with this 
question: what is an industry? Traditionally, industrial economists regard an industry as 
a group of firms that produce similar goods and services. In line with this, Porter (1980) 
defines an industry as „the group of firms producing products that are close substitutes 
for each other‟ (p. 5). From this perspective, the dynamics of industry is explained by a 
natural selection process or economic competition. For example, if the rate of return of 
capital of an industry is higher/lower than a perfectly competitive floor rate of return, 
firms enter into/exit from this industry
21
 (Porter, 1980). This product-class view of 
industry focuses on market mechanisms or price competition, and is likely to be 
appropriate to explain the competitive position of a firm in relatively stable periods of 
an industry (Munir and Phillips, 2002). In this sense, this type of definition of an 
industry is suitable for neoclassical economic theories. 
 
However, as Schumpeter (1975) pointed out, due to the importance of technological 
competition rather than price competition in the initial stage of industry emergence, this 
product-class view does not capture the dynamics of industry at a time of change 
(Munir and Phillips, 2002). Thus, a more encompassing definition of an industry is 
needed in order to explain fully industrial dynamics. In other words, „the traditional 
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 In other words, „[i]nvestors whose long-term returns are below this “free market” return will 
invest elsewhere, and firms habitually earning less than this return will eventually go out of 
business. Rates of return higher than this floor rate will stimulate the inflow of capital into an 
industry either through new entrants or through additional investment by existing competitors‟ 
(Van de Ven and Garud, 1989, p. 198). 
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definition of an industry needs expansion not only to include competing firms, but also 
many other actors that perform all the functions necessary to develop and 
commercialize a technological innovation‟ (Van de Ven and Garud, 1989, p. 201). Thus, 
they suggest two levels of analysis in order to explain industry emergence: „(1) the 
motivations and activities of individual firms or entrepreneurs, and (2) the collective 
level of multiple actors who interact and socially construct an industry‟ (Van de Ven 
and Garud, 1989, p. 202). 
 
Therefore, Van de Ven and Garud (2000) suggest that an industry be regarded as a 
social system as follows:  
 
[A]n industry [should] be viewed as a “social system” which governs, integrates, and 
performs all of the functions required to transform a technological innovation into a 
commercially viable line of products or services delivered to customers (p. 492).  
 
As an industry is defined as a social system, Parson‟s (1964) functional differentiation 
of subsystems can be applied to analysing industry emergence (cited in Van de Ven and 
Garud, 1989). Functions of different subsystems of an industry will be discussed in the 
next chapter (III.3.3 p. 31).   
 
In short, while Porter‟s definition of an industry emphasises firms, Van de Ven and 
Garud‟s definition encompasses other main factors, i.e., research institutes, financial 
systems, and policy makers as well as firms. Thus, I will follow Van de Ven and 
Garud‟s perspective because it is more appropriate in explaining the evolution of the PV 
industry than the product-class view.  
 
 
3.2 Industry Life Cycle Theories 
 
3.2.1 Vernon‟s Theory 
 
Industrial dynamics is one of the main issues of the ILC theories, because they deal with 
the emergence and evolution of industry (Klepper, 1997). They explicitly consider a 
time sequence as one of the dimensions, so they analyse how an industry emerges, 
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grows and disappears.  
 
When we trace back to Vernon, he (1966) explains the relationship between a product 
cycle and international trade and investment. He classifies the phases of a product cycle 
as new products, maturing products, and standardised products in accordance with a 
degree of standardisation (Vernon, 1966). In the early stage of a new product, it may be 
standardised at a very low level. As its market grows, a certain degree of standardisation 
usually takes place. Finally, the standardisation of the product reaches an advanced level 
(Vernon, 1966).  
 
In the view of the location of an industry, as the standardisation of the product proceeds, 
the possibility of locating the industry on the less-developed countries grows. This 
aspect of Vernon‟s product cycle theory influenced the flying geese model22 (Kojima, 
2000), which explains the shift of mature industries from Japan to other East Asian 
countries. 
 
 
3.2.2 Utterback‟s Theory 
 
In view of the relationship between the pattern of innovation within a firm and the stage 
of development of industry, Utterback and Abernathy (1975) suggest an integrated 
theory of innovative process which can be divided into development of production 
processes and development of products.  
 
They introduce the concept of „dominant design’ which means „the one that wins the 
allegiance of the marketplace, the one that competitors and innovators must adhere to if 
they hope to command significant market following‟ (Utterback, 1994, p. 24). In other 
words, „a dominant design is one whose major components and underlying core 
concepts do not vary substantially from one product model to the other, and the design 
                                                 
22
 This model starts with Japan‟s economic superiority in the East Asia. It describes that Japan 
developed first, and played a major role in driving economic and technological development of 
the region. As wages rose and the currency appreciated in Japan, industries were shifted from 
Japan to four NICs, then to the second-tier ASEAN economies and China (Hobday, 1995). This 
explanation on the relocation of matured industries in the East Asia was influenced by Vernon‟s 
product cycle theory (Kojima, 2000). 
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commands a high percentage of the market share‟ (Afuah and Utterback, 1997, p. 185). 
Before the dominant design of product is established, various designs of product 
compete in the marketplace. Thus, firms‟ strategies emphasise product innovation. 
When some product design becomes dominant; a de facto product standard, firms focus 
more on process innovation rather than product innovation (Utterback, 1994). Historic 
examples are the QWERTY keyboard in the typewriter industry and the IBM PC in the 
personal computer market (Utterback, 1994). Therefore, the emergence of dominant 
design
23
 marks a divide in the pattern of innovation.  
 
Furthermore, Utterback (1994) suggests a three-phase model of an ILC: fluid, 
transitional, and specific phases. In the fluid phase, there is a lot of uncertainty in the 
technology, market, and product design, thus various products exist and product 
innovation is vibrant. In the transitional phase, a dominant design appears and the focus 
of firms shifts from product innovation to process innovation. Finally, in the specific
24
 
phase, the product is highly standardized and largely undifferentiated, and the 
production process becomes larger scale and usually uses specialized equipments. These 
relationships between the pattern of innovation and the developmental stage of industry 
are depicted in Figure II-4. 
 
Figure II-4 Utterback‟s three-phase model 
 
                                                 
23
 On the other hand, pointing out the impreciseness of the notion of a dominant design and the 
inextricable linkage between product and process innovation, Klepper (1996) proposes a new 
explanation for the industry life cycle. Focusing on the entry and exit of firms, market structure 
and technological change, he identifies the regularities of industry evolution. However, I will 
not deal with his theory because it is unlikely to be relevant to this thesis.  
24
 Utterback uses „the term “specific” rather than “mature” as is used here because the 
manufacturing of assembled products aims over time at producing a very specific product at a 
high level of efficiency‟ (Utterback, 1994, p. 96). 
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Source: „Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation‟ (Utterback, 1994, p. 91) 
 
 
3.2.3 Van de Ven and Garud‟s Theory 
 
Formally, the ILC theories mainly focused on the regularities and features of each stage. 
However, this seems insufficiently to explain how new industries emerge in the 
formative period. With this in mind, Van de Ven and Garud (2000) propose a new 
conceptual framework in order to analyse industry emergence referring. This is known 
as the accumulation theory of change in which they conceptualise each stage as follows: 
 
Initiation is the time when entrepreneurs decide to form a business venture (if 
successfully launched will become the birthday of the business unit), and takeoff is the 
time when the unit can exist without the external support of its initiators and continue 
growing “on its own”. The period between initiation and takeoff could be called startup, 
where the new unit must draw its resources, competence, and technology from the 
founding leaders and external sources in order to develop the proprietary products, 
create a market niche, and meet the institutional standards established to legitimate the 
new unit as an ongoing economic enterprise. (Van de Ven and Garud, 2000, p.492) 
 
Moreover, Van de Ven and Garud (2000) add „the gestation period‟ before the initiation 
one in explaining the sequence of industry development. The gestation period being 
when „basic knowledge is created‟ through basic science research (Van de Ven and 
Garud, 2000, p.518).  
 
In summary, the stages of ILC theories can be compared as shown in Table II-2. 
 
Table II-2 Comparison of the stages of ILC theories 
Author First stage Second stage Third stage Key concept 
Vernon New product Mature 
product 
Standardized 
product 
The degree of 
standardization 
Utterback Fluid phase Transitional 
phase 
Specific phase Dominant design 
Van de Ven 
and Garud 
Initiation 
(prior stage: gestation) 
Start-up Take-off The accumulation 
theory 
Source: Author 
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3.2.4 Jacobbson‟s Model 
 
There have been some attempts to extend the ILC approach to the energy sector, 
especially the renewable energy sector (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Jacobsson and 
Lauber, 2006). To begin with, it should be noted that there are distinctive features of the 
energy sectors compared to other sectors: a huge scale of energy system; a difficulty of 
market formation for new energy sector; and a strong relationship between the energy 
sector and institutional arrangements (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). Thus, a formative 
phase of a renewable energy sector may be long, and a transformation of the energy 
sector from a fossil fuel dominant system to a renewable one may be a highly political 
process (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
 
Due to the relatively longer formative period and political sensitiveness of the 
renewable energy sector, it is important to identify the distinctive characteristics of it as 
follows:  
 
We will emphasize four features of this process: market formation, the entry of firms and 
other organizations, institutional change and the formation of technology-specific 
advocacy coalitions (a particular form of network) (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, p. 819). 
 
These four features have strong causal interrelationships, thus, Myrdal‟s virtuous circles 
can be set in motion at a certain level of them (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). For 
example, the development of the German wind and PV industries can be explained by 
the virtuous circles of the four features (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).   
 
 
3.3 Pavitt‟s Taxonomy 
 
Pavitt and Rothwell (1976) point out that Utterback and Abernathy‟s ILC theory ignores 
significant differences across sectors. Subsequently, Keith Pavitt (1985) develops a 
taxonomy which refers to the sectoral patterns of technical changes. Pavitt‟s taxonomy, 
which has been used as a powerful concept to understand the differences across sectors 
in terms of technological trajectories, can be summarised as follows: 
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He [Pavitt] proposes four types of sectoral patterns of innovative activities: supplier-
dominated sectors (textiles, services), in which new technologies mainly come embodied 
in new components and equipment, and the diffusion of new technologies and learning 
takes place through learning by doing and using; scale-intensive sectors (automobiles, 
steel), in which process innovation is relevant and the sources of innovation are both 
internal (R&D and learning by doing) and external (equipment producers) and 
appropriability is through secrecy and patents; specialized suppliers (such as equipment 
producers), in which innovation is focused on performance improvement, reliability and 
customization, the sources of innovation are both internal (the tacit knowledge and 
experience of skilled technicians) and external (user-producer interaction), and 
appropriability comes mainly from the localized and interactive nature of knowledge; and, 
finally, science-based sectors (such as pharmaceuticals, electronics and so on) which are 
characterized by a high rate of product and process innovations, internal R&D and 
scientific research done at universities and public research laboratories and appropriability 
means of various types, ranging from patents to lead times, learning curves and secrecy 
(Malerba, 2004, p. 13).   
 
Pavitt‟s taxonomy has some implications for economic policy makers. For example, 
when a certain sector is promoted by a certain country, it should be considered whether 
the features of the innovation process of the sector is appropriate to the country‟s 
strengths (Malerba, 2004). In this sense, the main ideas of Pavitt‟s taxonomy can be 
applied to identify the features of the PV industry as examined later
25
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Furthemore, based on Pavitt‟s taxonomy, Malerba (2004) argues sectoral systems of 
innovation approach. He explains that a sectrol system has three building blocks: knowledge 
and technology; actors and networks; and institutions. Although this approach fits for the 
concept of industry as a social system, I will not deal with this approach because it is complex 
to apply to the conceptual framework in this thesis. 
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4. LINKING NATIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL APPROACHES 
 
In this section, I will attempt to link the national and industrial level approaches using 
the two bridging concepts: comparative advantage and comparative institutional 
advantage.  
 
4.1 Comparative Advantage 
 
In the neoclassical economics, international trade analyses have been based not on the 
absolute advantage, but on the concept of „comparative advantage‟, which was 
introduced by David Ricardo in The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 
(1817) (cited in Appleyard et al., 2008).  
 
Early in the twentieth century, the concept was evolved by Heckscher (in 1919) and 
Ohlin (in 1933) in terms of factor endowments (cited in Appleyard et al., 2008). The 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem means that „the country with abundant capital will be able to 
produce relatively more of the capital-intensive good, while the country with abundant 
labour will be able to produce relatively more of the labour-intensive good‟ (Appleyard 
et al., 2008, p. 130-131). In this theorem, the concept of comparative advantage links a 
relative factor abundance of national economy and a factor-intensive industry. This is 
shown in Figure II-5. 
 
Figure II-5 Linking a national economy and an industry by comparative advantage
26
 
 
Source: Author 
                                                 
26
 Ricardo assumes a two-nation (England and Portugal) and two-good (wine and cloth) model, 
and the Heckscher-Ohlin‟s model assumes a two-nation, two-good and two-factor (e.g., labour 
and capital) model (Appleyard et al., 2008), but I use one nation here for simplicity.  
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However, the theory of comparative advantage cannot provide sufficient explanation to 
technological catching-up or the building process of technological capability, especially 
on the late industrialisation and industrial upgrading in East Asia in the second half of 
the twentieth century (Chang, 2007)
27
. In other words, it seems to pay more attention to 
a static situation than dynamics in long-term. In reality, comparative advantage of a 
certain country can be changed. For instance, an active government‟s intervention can 
change its resource endowments, and then this change can result in the change of 
comparative advantage. Indeed, the developmental state theory attempts to explain this 
mechanism (II.2.2 p. 14). Also, the new economic geography points out that „[most] of 
the resources on which development depends are result of previous human activity‟ 
(Dunford and Greco, 2006, p. 38). Thus, resource endowments can be created 
historically and can be changed by human activities. Furthermore, in terms of „revealed 
comparative advantage‟, it is argued that China‟s comparative advantage has seemed to 
be changed from low-technology goods to higher-technology ones through analysing its 
trade data (Li, Dunford and Yeung, 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to find an 
alternative concept to link national economic development and industrial dynamics in 
the long-term.  
 
4.2 Comparative Institutional Advantage 
 
The VoC approach is critical of the theory of comparative advantage
28
, and then it 
offers the concept of „comparative institutional advantage‟ (Hall and Sosckice, 2001) as 
follows:   
 
We still need a theory that explains why particular nations tend to specialize in specific 
types of production or products. We think that such a theory can be found in the concept 
of comparative institutional advantage. The basic idea is that the institutional structure of 
a particular political economy provides firms with advantage for engaging in specific 
types of activities there. Firms can perform some types of activities, which allow them to 
produce some kind of goods, more efficiently than others because of the institutional 
                                                 
27
 Furthermore, Chang (2007) points out that the assumptions of „the same technology‟ and 
„perfect factor mobility‟ are unrealistic (p. 70-71).  
28
 Hall and Soskice (2001) refer to „the expansion of intra-industry trade and increases in the 
international mobility of capital‟ (p. 36). 
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support they receive for those activities in the political economy, and the institutions 
relevant to these activities are not distributed evenly across nations (Hall and Soskice, 
2001, p. 37). 
 
This concept may be applied not only to firms‟ production activities, but also to firms‟ 
fund raising and upgrading technological capacity. Furthermore, the range of this 
concept can be extended from firms‟ activities to industrial dynamics or industrial 
upgrading. If a certain country aims at industrial upgrading more relevant to its 
comparative institutional advantage, the possibility of success of the industrial 
upgrading will increase. Thus, varieties of national trajectories of a certain industry can 
be explained by the relationships between comparative institutional advantage and 
characteristics of the industry. 
 
Furthermore, the VoC approach argues that the concept is not „absolute advantage‟ but 
„comparative advantage‟ as follows: „[w]e seek institutional features that might confer 
comparative advantage and, thus, be better suited to explaining cross-national patterns 
of product or process specialization‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 38). I agree that the 
concept of institutional advantage is far from absolute advantage, thus I will apply this 
concept to the cross-national comparison in this study. Furthermore, I will discuss the 
concreteness of institutional advantage in the next chapter (conceptual framework 
chapter).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has discussed the literature survey of this study. For the literature review, 
three approaches have been explored: a national level, an industrial level, and concepts 
which link these two levels.  
 
Firstly, in the national level approach, the taxonomy of capitalism such as liberal market 
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs), the role of 
developmental states in late industrialisation in East Asia and China, the role of 
institutions in national systems of innovation (NSI), and differentiated institutional 
instruments in the catching-up processes of backward countries have been examined. 
 
Secondly, an industry, which can be interpreted as a social system, is argued to have 
evolutionary patterns and stages by industry life cycle (ILC) theories. In particular, 
renewable energy industry is argued to have a long formative phase by Jacobbson. On 
the other hand, Pavitt points out the different patterns of innovation across sectors.   
 
Lastly, linking concepts between national and industrial level approaches have been 
discussed. Comparative advantage, which is the basis of neoclassical trade theory, has 
limitations to explain industrial dynamics, while comparative institutional advantage is 
identified as one of organising concepts in that it may result in different economic 
performance across nations and sectors. Based on this concept, a preliminary conceptual 
framework will be constructed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER III CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a new conceptual framework for this research and 
to examine some questions concerning comparative analysis. 
  
Firstly, I shall explore briefly the tension between theory and reality. Then, based on the 
literature review in the previous chapter, three major concepts will be dealt with: 
institutions; institutional advantage; and necessary functions in development of an 
industry. The last concept will bridge institutional advantage of a nation and evolution 
of a certain industry. After clarifying the meaning of the major concepts, I shall attempt 
to suggest a preliminary conceptual framework. The central argument based on the 
conceptual framework is as follows: a certain industry grows faster in a particular 
country than others, because this country had dynamic institutional advantage (and 
comparative) in providing the necessary conditions in the development of the industry. 
 
However, a preliminary conceptual framework needs to be modified, because it does not 
yet reflect the characteristics of the PV industry. After clarifying the object of this 
research, I shall suggest a more specified conceptual framework with four necessary 
functions in the development of the c-Si cell industry in the 2000s: demand-pull policy; 
capital mobilisation; process innovation; and cost reduction.  
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2. TENSION BETWEEN THEORY AND REALITY 
 
In the late nineteenth century, there was a methodological debate between the German 
Historical School and the Austrian Theoretical School: the former argued empirical 
apriorism, while the latter argued a dualism between theory and history (Shin, 1996). In 
other words, the former tried to reach a general theory through descriptive researches, 
whereas the latter regarded theory as something separated from historical complexities 
(Shin, 1996).  
 
Based on this debate, Max Weber (1949) constructed an interpretative sociology: „the 
understanding of social phenomena is attained and enlarged only through an ongoing 
process of constructing an ideal type and interpreting social phenomena‟ (cited in Shin, 
1996, p. 42). For Weber, the aim of research is not finding a general theory separated 
from reality, but understanding the concrete causal relationships in reality (Shin, 1996). 
Moreover, understanding one causal relationship in reality does not necessarily entail 
the expectation of similar causal relationship in the future. In line with this, an ideal 
type can be a preliminary conceptual framework for research (Shin, 1996), thus it is not 
a theory. In this sense, instead of constructing a theory, some concepts are able to 
interpret adequate casual relationships in reality. Through these processes, knowledge 
can be advanced „by elucidating the degree of approximation to which a particular 
historical phenomenon can be classified in terms of one or more of these concepts [ideal 
types]‟ (Weber selected in Runciman, 1978 cited in Shin, 1996, p. 42). This explanation 
is illustrated in Figure III-1. 
 
Figure III-1 Weber‟s interpretative sociology 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
43 
 
However, I do not fully agree with Weber‟s thought, especially his thoughts about 
capitalism, but his idea about „the formulation of ideal-type constructs‟ (Giddens, 1971, 
p.141) gives this study some insights relating to creating a conceptual framework. An 
ideal type is not ideal in a normative and exemplary sense. Moreover, an ideal type is 
neither a hypothesis nor description (Giddens, 1971). Instead, an ideal type „is 
constructed by the abstraction and combination of an indefinite number of elements‟ 
(Giddens, 1971, p. 141). In other words, „[a]ny descriptive concept can be transformed 
into an ideal type through the abstraction and recombination of certain elements‟ 
(Giddens, 1971, p. 142). In this sense, an ideal type lies between empirical descriptions 
and general theories.   
 
In this point, an ideal type is similar to a conceptual framework. It is necessary to create 
a conceptual framework for comparative research in order to compare and analyse 
different cases coherently. The conceptual framework enables this research to go 
beyond descriptions of cases. However, the aim of introducing the conceptual 
framework is not building a theory in this research. Explanations using the conceptual 
framework are somewhere between empirical descriptions and general theories. In this 
sense, the conceptual framework is a kind of idea-constructs.  
 
From this perspective, firstly, I will explore major concepts which are elements of the 
conceptual framework. Then, I will suggest a preliminary conceptual framework to 
understand causal imputation between national political economy and industrial 
evolution using the concept of institutional advantage.  
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3. MAJOR CONCEPTS 
 
3.1 Institutions 
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the definition of „institutions‟, 
because it is too broad, and sometimes ambiguous, to apply to the analysis in this study. 
To begin with, according to the dictionary (Oxford Dictionary, 2004), institution means: 
„(i) a large organization for the promotion of science, education, etc.; (ii) an established 
law or custom; and (iii) the action of instituting‟ (p 736). It defines that a meaning of 
institution includes an organization. 
 
However, according to Douglass North, „[i]nstitutions are the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction‟ (1990, p. 3). Moreover, he (1990) suggests a distinction between 
„institutions‟ and „organisations‟ as follows: 
 
A crucial distinction in this study is made between institutions and organizations. […] 
Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players. The 
purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the objective of the team 
within that set of rules is to win the game – by a combination of skills, strategy, and 
coordination; by fair means and sometimes by foul means (North, 1990, p. 4-5).  
 
From this perspective, the new institutional economics articulates the differences 
between institutions and organisations as follows: 
 
Institutions are the written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that humans devise 
to reduce uncertainty and control their environment. These include (i) written rules and 
agreements that govern contractual relations and corporate governance, (ii) constitutions, 
laws and rules that govern politics, government, finance, and society more broadly, and 
(iii) unwritten codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and belief. Organizational 
arrangements are the different modes of governance that agents implement to support 
production and exchange. These include (i) markets, firms, and the various combinations 
of forms that economic actors develop to facilitate transactions and (ii) contractual 
agreements that provide a framework for organizing activities, as well as (iii) the 
behavioural traits that underlie the arrangements chosen (Menard and Shirley, 2005, p. 1). 
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However, some scholars argue that organisations should be considered as institutions
29
, 
attempting to bring together organisational and institutional approaches of innovation 
(Aoki, 2000; Coriat and Weinstein, 2002). Furthermore, it is argued that disciplinary 
background relates much to these different definitions (Weiss, 2003). For example, 
economists such as North and Williamson focus on the rule-bound notion of institution, 
while political scientists pay more attention to the importance of organisational 
arrangements (Weiss, 2003).   
 
With regard to the dichotomy between institutions and organizations, the VoC approach, 
basically, follows North‟s crucial distinction as follows:    
 
Following North (1990: 3), we define institutions are a set of rules, formal or informal, 
that actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons, and 
organizations as durable entities with formally recognized members, whose rules also 
contribute to the institutions of the political economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 9). 
 
Thus, the VoC approach identifies main institutions as markets, hierarchies, and non-
market mechanisms such as „powerful business or employer associations, strong trade 
unions, extensive networks of cross-shareholding, and legal or regulatory systems 
designed to facilitate information-sharing and collaboration‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 
10).  
 
However, from the point of view of the new institutional economics, markets, business 
associations, trade unions, etc. are categorised into „organisational arrangements‟ not 
„institutions‟ as described above. In fact, the VoC approach admits that the distinction is 
applied to their researches loosely from time to time (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 9). 
Because of this, the concept of institutions seems to include „organisational 
arrangements‟ in the VoC approach. 
 
In this study, I will follow the perspective of the VoC approach because it recognises 
                                                 
29
 Aoki (2000) attempts to categorise main economic institutions as follows: „(i) markets and 
money; (ii) the legal and political framework of the state; (iii) contracts and (private order) 
organizations; and (iv) cultural belief and social norms‟ (cited in Coriat and Weinstein, 2004, p. 
327).   
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the difference between institutions and organisations. Moreover, sometimes it 
categorises organisational arrangements into institutions, because institutions and 
organisations contribute to each other within the political economy. Thus, sometimes 
they are so close to each other, it is not meaningful to distinguish between them strictly. 
For example, on the one hand, a chaebol is a large family firm in Korea, on the other 
hand, a chaebol system can be interpreted as a unique corporate institutional 
arrangement in Korea. Furthermore, „organizations provide a structure to human 
interaction‟ (North, 1990, p. 4). Thus, organisational arrangements also have a 
systematic influence on economic actors in a national political economy. Therefore, the 
concept of institutions covers organisational arrangements explicitly in this research.     
 
 
3.2 Institutional Advantage 
 
Within the concept of „comparative institutional advantage‟, as discussed earlier (II.4.2), 
I will here investigate the concreteness of institutional advantage.  
 
Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) uses the term „institutional instruments‟ in order to 
explain the industrialisation of Germany and Russia in the nineteenth century. Different 
from the process of industrialisation in England, industrial investment banking was 
devised as an institutional instrument for capital mobilisation in the moderately 
backward country, Germany, while the state played the role of institutional instruments, 
acting as a mobilise of financial resources, in the extremely backward country, Russia 
(Gerschenkron, 1962).  
 
Unlike England with no established investment banking system at that time, the German 
investment banking can be interpreted as an „institutional advantage‟ which enabled 
Germany to invest in heavy industry such as the steel industry on a large scale. Thus, 
Germany could catch up with the English in the steel sector by achieving economies of 
scale in the nineteenth century (Gerschenkron, 1962).  
 
According to Gerschekron‟s explanation as above, the investment banking system and 
the state were unique institutions which were relevant to each nation‟s industrialisation 
processes, respectively. Furthermore, it is argued that „the state-bank-chaebol nexus‟, 
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„foreign MNCs and government-linked companies‟, and „the public enterprises, the 
guanxiqiye, the MNCs, and the SMEs‟ played the role of institutional instruments in the 
late industrialisation of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, respectively (Shin and Chang, 
2003), as discussed earlier (II.2.4.2 p. 26). Thus, institutional advantage can be regarded 
as differentiated systems at a specific time and in a particular nation. In other words, 
institutional advantage is concrete only in a specific time and in a particular nation. It is 
not a general prerequisite for any economy to establish a certain industry. This 
uniqueness of institutional advantage can be justified by Gerschenkron‟s perspective 
and its explanations. 
 
In summary, I attempt to draw on two significant elements of the concept of 
institutional advantage
30
. Firstly, the institutions of a particular nation can provide an 
industry with more advantages to grow than that of other nations, as argued by the VoC 
approach. Secondly, institutional advantage is specific to a certain industry, a certain 
period and a particular nation, as pointed out by Gerschenkron.  
 
 
3.3 Necessary Functions in the Development of an Industry 
 
Even though two main elements of institutional advantage may be present, there is a 
need to introduce lower level analysis to clarify the research. Thus, I will attempt to 
draw some intermediate concepts which bridge institutional advantage and development 
of an industry.  
 
A key link appears to rest with necessary functions for creation of an industry. 
Institutional advantage of a nation may affect the emergence and growth of a certain 
industry within the country. How does it affect the emergence and growth? Its 
institutions function better in facilitating the development of the industry than others. 
Thus, it is very important to identify what functions are required to facilitate the 
emergence and evolution of the industry.     
 
                                                 
30
 It is not the aim of this thesis to devise the general definition of „institutional advantage‟ 
which can apply to all the cases, because it is beyond the scope of this thesis and the ability of 
mine. Thus, I admit the limitation of this thesis with regard to the generalisation of the 
definition of „institutional advantage‟.  
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Based on the social system approach (Parsons, 1951), Van de Ven and Garud (2000) 
suggest three functional subsystems in order to „provide analytical guidance for 
investigating the emergence of an industry‟ (p. 493): an instrumental subsystem, a 
resource procurement subsystem, and an institutional subsystem. They explain the three 
subsystems as follows: an instrumental subsystem includes functions such as applied 
R&D, manufacturing and assembly, and marketing and distribution; a resource 
procurement subsystem includes basic scientific or technological knowledge, financing 
and a pool of competent human resources; and an institutional subsystem includes „(i) 
establishing governance structures and procedures for the overall industry and (ii) 
legitimising and supporting the industry‟s domain in relation to other industrial, social, 
and political systems‟ (Van de Ven and Garud, 2000, p. 493).    
 
In addition, Jacobbson and Bergek‟s model (II.3.2.4 p. 35) identifies four features of the 
formative period of renewable energy industries (Jacobbson and Bergek, 2004). 
 
These two views hold significant implications for understanding the necessary functions 
of industrial evolution, especially renewable energy industries. In this sense, I use and 
reorganise their subsystem categorisation and four features of the formative period in 
order to explain the necessary functions for industrial evolution, with specific regard to 
the renewable energy industry
31
. Therefore, I suggest the necessary functions to be as 
follows: 
  
(1) Market formation: institutional functions forming initial markets through 
government policy and legal systems, for example, demand-pull policy 
 
(2) Resource mobilising: mobilising financial and competent human resources 
 
(3) Innovation: providing basic scientific or technological knowledge, developing 
and commercializing products and services mainly by applied R&D, 
manufacturing  
 
 
                                                 
31
 Generally, the renewable energy industry has positive externalities, thus, government subsidy 
or market creation is very important to overcome the „market failure‟. 
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4. INTERPRETATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
4.1 A Preliminary Conceptual Framework  
 
A conceptual framework is a logical abstraction from descriptions and combination of 
major concepts, lying between empirical descriptions and general theories, as discussed 
in section 2. The conceptual framework consists of two basic elements: a particular 
nation and a certain industry. The concepts which bridge between a nation and an 
industry are institutional advantage and the necessary functions in development of an 
industry. Because a particular country had an institutional advantage in providing 
necessary functions for a certain industry, the industry grew faster in this country than 
other countries. This forms the main argument for this thesis. Thus, I will investigate 
cases within this conceptual framework, as shown in Figure III-2.    
 
Figure III-2 A preliminary conceptual framework 
 
Source: Author 
 
Firstly, if a nation has an institutional advantage in forming a market for a certain 
industry, this industry may grow faster in this nation than others. For example, Germany 
has introduced the feed-in tariff for wind electricity since the 1990s, as a result the wind 
industry has made a great success in Germany (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
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Secondly, if a nation has an institutional advantage in mobilising resources for a certain 
industry, this industry may be developed further in this nation than others. As 
Gerschenkron (1962) points out, the investment bank enabled the German iron and steel 
industry to catch up with the British counterpart in the nineteenth century.    
 
Lastly, if a nation has an institutional advantage in innovation for a certain industry, this 
industry may be a leading one in the world. For example, as Freeman (1995) points out, 
mainly due to the differences between national systems of innovation, there were big 
gaps of economic performance between Japan and the Soviet Union or between East 
Asian countries and Latin American countries.   
 
This conceptual framework is a kind of lens to look into each case, reality. However, 
this conceptual framework is a preliminary one, because it does not yet reflect the 
characteristics of a specific reality, the PV industry. If a preliminary conceptual 
framework is modified by concrete features of research object, it will become a more 
specified one. Thus, I will clarify the characteristics of the PV industry and the scope of 
this research, and then a more specified conceptual framework will be suggested in the 
next sub-sections.  
 
 
4.2 Object of Analysis 
 
4.2.1 PV Technology Families 
 
As a whole, there are three technology families in the PV industry
32
: crystalline silicon 
(c-Si); thin film; and others (Boyle, 1996). Crystalline silicon solar cells accounted for 
about 90 per cent of the world PV market in 2007
33
, thin films and others around 10 and 
0.1 per cent, respectively (Photon International, March 2008, cited in EPIA and 
Greenpeace, 2009). This is shown in Table III-1 and Figure III-3. 
 
 
                                                 
32
 To be more exact, these technology families are not of a PV industry but of a PV cell 
industry. However, the PV system can be categorised by the technology of PV cell, thus I use 
the term in this way. 
33
 In 2009, c-Si cells accounted for 78 per cent of the PV market (EPIA, 2010).  
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Table III-1 Three technology families in the PV industry 
Technology family Solar cells Market share in 2007 
Crystalline silicon Mono c-Si, Multy c-Si, Ribbon c-Si 89.6 % 
Thin film Amorphous-Si (a-Si), CdTe, CIS, etc. 10.3 % 
others Multi-junction, Dye sensitized, Organic, etc.  0.1 % 
Source: Boyle, 1996 
 
Figure III-3 PV technology market shares in 2007 
 
Source: Photon International, March 2008 cited in EPIA and Greenpeace, 2009, p. 16 
 
I will not deal with all the technology families because their technological bases and 
stages are different from each other, focussing solely on the crystalline silicon 
technology because it is the dominant form of technology in the PV market.  
 
 
4.2.2 PV Technological Trends 
 
With regard to the period of comparison of the three cases, I will focus on the time since 
the late 1990s
34
, as the new generation of PV firms have appeared since then. Moreover, 
the PV market has begun to increase substantially in the world market, mainly in the 
European market, since the late 1990s.  
It is said that the crystalline silicon technology has achieved maturity since the late 
1990s, as shown in Figure III-4 (blue squares in Figure III-4). According to Utterback‟s 
                                                 
34
 However, I will deal with the whole period of the PV industry in each case chapter, because 
the features of the PV industry in the 2000s are closely related to that of the previous PV 
industry in each country. 
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ILC theory, after the emergence of a dominant design, technology becomes mature, 
product innovation decreases while process innovation increases, and cost reduction 
becomes much more important. In fact, according to interviews, process innovation and 
cost reduction were ones of the key ways to achieve the global competitiveness of c-Si 
cell manufacturing in this period. 
 
Figure III-4 Technological trends of PV technology 
 
Source: Kurtz, 2009 
 
 
4.2.3 PV Value Chain 
 
In a crystalline silicon PV industry, as a whole, there are five phases of value chain: 
poly silicon, ingot, wafer, cell, and module chains, as shown in Figure III-5. Each phase 
of the value chain has different features as listed in Table III-2. In terms of a minimum 
efficient scale, the upper stream is in the value chain, the larger it is. Thus, a poly silicon 
chain is the largest one, while a solar module chain is the smallest one. Moreover, the 
poly silicon, ingot, wafer and solar cell chains are capital-intensive, whereas a solar 
module chain is labour-intensive.   
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Figure III-5 Value chain of crystalline-silicon PV industry 
Poly silicon   Ingot   Wafer   Solar Cell   Solar Module 
 
≫ 
 
≫ 
 
≫ 
 
≫ 
 
Source: KNREC, 2009 
 
Table III-2 Features of each value chain 
 
Poly 
silicon 
Ingots Wafers Cells Modules 
Minimum efficient 
scale 
Very high high low 
Factor-intensive Capital-intensive 
Labour-
intensive 
Added value 42 % 13 % 13 % 18 % 14 % 
Number 
of firms 
in 2010 
Korea 3 7 7 11 18 
China    At least 100 At least 300 
Germany    More than 200 
Source: KNREC (2009), ECJRC (2010), BSW (2010) 
 
I will focus on the solar cell chain, because it is the heart of technological innovation in 
the PV industry and it creates a higher value than other chains except the poly silicon 
chain. The solar cell industry needs a large scale of production capacity in order to 
achieve economies of scale. In fact, according to interviews, it is said that the basic 
capacity for economies of scale is a 300MWp of annual production capacity. This 
requires more than 200 billion KW (approx. 200 million USD) excluding land costs in 
2009. 
 
In terms of Pavitt‟s taxonomy (1984), scale-incentive sectors are characterised as 
follows: sources of technology are mainly equipment suppliers; users are sensitive to 
price rather than performance; cost cutting is the main focus in production; and process 
innovation has more weight than product innovation. In this sense, the taxonomy 
provides this research with significant insights relevant to the c-Si cell industry in the 
2000s. Because cost reduction and process innovation is a main factor of innovation of 
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the c-Si cell industry, it is essential to have a look at the production process of c-Si cells. 
 
The production process of c-Si cells is standardised as a series of eight processes, as 
listed in Table III-3. According to interviews, some companies add more processes to 
the standard process in order to increase the efficiency of solar cells. However, it is said 
that the additional processes are not cost-efficient, thus the standard process is highly 
dominant in c-Si cell mass production.  
 
Table III-3 Production processes of c-Si cells 
Name of process explanation illustration 
Wafer  
 
1.Surface 
etching/Texturing 
-Etching saw damage of surface 
 
-Texturing the surface in order 
to receive more sunlight  
2.Phosphor doping/ 
Diffusion 
- P-N junction formation by 
doping 
 
-Thermal treatment for diffusion  
3.Phosphor-silicate 
glass etching 
Remove the phosphor-silicate 
glass on the surface when 
doping 
 
4.Anti-reflex coating 
Coating on front surface in 
order to reduce the reflection of 
sunlight 
 
5.Metallization 
Silk screen printing for 
formation of front and back 
metal electrodes 
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6.Firing 
Reduce the resistance between 
metal electrodes and surfaces 
using thermal treatment 
 
7.Laser isolation Detach p-n electrode using laser 
 
8.Cell test & 
classification 
Classify the cells in terms of 
efficiency using a sun simulator 
 
Source: the web site of Millinet Solar (a Korean solar cell company) 
(http://www.millinetsolar.com/product/product03.asp) 
 
 
4.3 A Specified Conceptual Framework 
 
Formally, I drew a preliminary conceptual framework on the basis of the literature 
review in sub-section 4.1. Still, the conceptual framework seems to be abstract, because 
it was constructed before clarifying the object of this research. Thus, it is necessary to 
move the conceptual framework closer to the locus of this research. 
 
What I consider it necessary to modify are the essential functions for industrial 
evolution, because the industry which I will investigate is narrowed down to the c-Si 
cell industry in the 2000s. Firstly, the market formation of the PV industry is 
substantially affected by a demand-pull policy such as the feed-in tariff scheme. Thus, 
market formation can be replaced by the demand-pull policy. Secondly, with regard to 
resource mobilising, capital is more important than any other resource, considering the 
capital-intensive characteristic of the industry and economies of scale. Thirdly, process 
innovation is much more important than product innovation, as pointed out by the ILC 
theory and Pavitt‟s taxonomy. Lastly, it should be noted that cost reduction is one of the 
main issues of the industry in the context of global competition. Even though cost 
advantage is one of the main implications of the comparative advantage theory, it is also 
affected by institutional advantage such as education systems or investment grants. 
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Therefore, I add this function into a set of specified necessary functions. These modified 
necessary functions are shown in Table III-4.      
 
Table III-4 The specified necessary functions
35
 for the c-Si cell industry in the 2000s 
Necessary functions in a preliminary 
conceptual framework 
Specified necessary functions for c-Si cell 
industry in the 2000s 
Market formation Demand-pull policy 
Resource mobilising Capital mobilising 
Innovation Process innovation 
- Cost reduction 
Source: Author 
  
Thus, the specified conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure III-6. The comparison 
of the causal relationships between the growth trajectory of the c-Si cell industry in the 
2000s and the institutional advantages of Germany, China, and Korea will be examined 
in terms of the demand-pull policy, capital mobilisation, process innovation, and cost 
reduction in the chapter on comparison (chapter VIII). 
 
Figure III-6 The specified conceptual framework 
 
Source: Author 
 
                                                 
35
 Sometimes, the four necessary functions are not clearly separated and are overlapped each 
other. For example, process innovation and cost reduction are related to each other. However, 
cheap labour and land costs can be included in the cost reduction function not in the process 
innovation one. 
57 
 
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has discussed the conceptual framework of this study. Through the 
literature review in previous chapter, major organising concepts are identified as 
institutional advantage and necessary functions in development of an industry. Based on 
these concepts, a preliminary conceptual framework has been constructed with three 
necessary functions: market formation; resource mobilisation; and innovation. 
 
In order to reflect the features of research object to the conceptual framework, I have 
clarified the characteristics of the PV industry and narrowed down the PV industry to 
the c-Si cell industry in the 2000s. Thus, a more specified conceptual framework is 
suggested with more specified four necessary functions: demand-pull policy; capital 
mobilisation; process innovation; and cost reduction. 
 
In the empirical chapters (V, VI and VII) and comparison chapter (VIII), this specified 
conceptual framework will be used as an analysing tool. 
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CHAPTER IV METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, I shall outline the comparative setting and the data collection and 
analysis methods that underpin this study. More specifically, I shall explain how I 
selected the three cases and the unit of comparative analysis. Then, I shall explain the 
main data collecting methods (archival and documentary sources and interviews) and 
data analysis methods (a within-case analysis and a cross-case analysis).  
 
1. COMPARATIVE SETTING 
 
1.1 Selection of the Cases 
 
With regard to selection of a case, Eisenhardt (1989) states that:  
 
The cases may be chosen to replicate previous cases or extend emergent theory, or they 
may be chosen to fill theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types. While 
the cases may be chosen randomly, random selection is neither necessary, nor even 
preferable (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537). 
 
In order to choose cases not at random but within a theoretical framework, I will refer 
back to my initial research question. The question being: 
 
What are the main factors underlying the differences between national PV growth 
trajectories? 
 
The candidate nations for the selection are the five representative countries whose PV 
trajectories were illustrated in Figure I-1 (see I.1 p. 1). 
 
These five countries can be classified in two ways: one is by the degree of success of 
the PV industry; the other is by the degree of PV market formation, which is one of the 
necessary functions for industry creation that are theorised in the conceptual framework 
for this thesis. PV production can be a proxy for industry sucess, while demand-pull 
policy can be a proxy for market formation. These are shown in Table IV-1.  
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Table IV-1 Categorisation of five countries 
 
Demand-pull policy 
Strong Moderate Weak 
Success of 
domestic PV 
industry 
Great Germany - China 
Moderate - Japan, USA - 
Small Korea - - 
Source: Author 
 
In accordance with the polar type selection that Eisenhardt mentions above, firstly, 
Germany and China can be selected, because they are in contrast to each other in terms 
of demand-pull policy. The demand-pull policy of Germany has been strong, whereas 
that of China has been weak, although both of them made a great success of establishing 
a PV industry. Secondly, Germany and Korea can be chosen, because they are 
substantially different from each other in terms of the degree of success of their 
domestic PV industries. The success of the German PV industry has been great, whilst 
that of Korea has not, nevertheless both of them have implemented a strong demand-
pull policy. The three nations, Germany, China and Korea, therefore provide useful 
comparative cases. 
 
In each case, I will analyse its national political economy and its PV industry since its 
industrialisation. Thus, the period of the German case which I will examine is the time 
since the late nineteenth century, that of the Chinese case is since the 1950s, and that of 
the Korean case is since the 1960s.  
 
 
1.2 Unit of Comparative Analysis: the c-Si Cell Industry in the 2000s 
 
Clarifying the unit of analysis is one of the fundamental problems in research design 
(Yin, 2009). Considering the time and budget constraints of this research project, I 
cannot compare all PV value chains, all PV technologies, and the whole period of PV 
industries in the three nations. Thus, I need to narrow down the analysis to a comparison 
of the evolution of the PV industries within these three nations. The object of analysis 
was discussed in the previous chapter (III.4.2 pp. 50-54). I will focus on the cell value 
chain, crystalline-silicon cell technology and the period of the 2000s in the comparison 
chapter (VIII). 
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2. DATA COLLECTING 
 
In general, a good case study uses multiple sources of evidence because of the 
advantage of triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). In this respect, Yin (2009) 
suggests six sources of evidence in case study research: documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. In line 
with this, I have made an effort to use as many sources as possible. Given the time and 
budget constraints of this study, I have relied largely on archival and documentary 
sources and interviews.    
 
The relationship between archival and documentary sources and interviews is 
complementary in this study. In general, archival and documentary sources provide 
stable, exact and broad information but are not associated with the research questions 
directly, whereas interviews can give accurate information related to the research but 
can be biased in specific situations (Yin, 2009). Thus, it is important to balance and 
cross-check between them.   
 
 
2.1 Archival and Documentary Sources  
 
The main archival and documentary sources of the study are listed in Table IV-2. The 
important documentary and data sources differ case by case, because well described 
documents and well-operated databases belong to different kinds of actors according to 
the specific cases. 
 
Table IV-2 Archival and documentary sources of this thesis 
Source Germany Korea China 
Government 
(press release, 
White paper, 
data base, 
reports, etc.) 
-BMU (Federal ministry for 
the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety) 
-BMWA (Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour) 
-ECJRC (European 
Commission Joint Research 
Centre) 
-MER (Ministry of Energy 
and Resources) 
-MOCIE (Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and 
Energy) 
-MKE (Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy) 
-NDRC (National 
Development and 
Reform Committee) 
-NBSC (National 
Bureau of Statistics of 
China) 
Agencies 
(data base, 
reports, etc.)  
Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland 
GmbH 
-KNREC (Korea New & 
Renewable Energy Centre) 
-KEEI (Korea Energy 
REDP (Renewable 
Energy Development 
Project) under NDRC 
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Economics Institute) 
Industrial 
association 
(data base, 
reports, etc.) 
-BSW (German PV Industry 
Association) 
-EPIA (European PV Industry 
Association) 
Korea PV Industry 
Association 
Jiangsu Province PV 
Industry Association 
Company Annual reports, web sites Web sites Annual reports, web 
sites 
Magazine Photon International, Renewable Energy World, Renewable Energy Focus, Solarbuzz 
Conference 
proceedings 
-IEEE Transactions on 
Electron Devices  
-EC PV Pilot Projects 
-Power Sources Symposium 
- 
SNEC (Shanghai New 
International Expo 
Centre) International 
PV Power Generation 
Conference 
Newspaper 
- 
-Korea Energy News 
-Energy & Environment 
News 
China Daily 
Similar 
empirical 
studies 
Lauber and Mez (2004), 
Jacobbson and Lauber (2006) none 
Marigo (2009) 
Source: Author 
 
In the German case, previous studies describe the evolution of the German PV industry 
very well. Thus, I will refer to many parts of them in this thesis. As for the history of the 
German PV industry, several conference proceedings are very relevant for the 1970s 
and 1980s, whereas companies‟ annual reports provide a good source from the 1990s 
onwards. With regard to databases, BSW and EPIA have excellent ones.  
 
In the Korean case, few researches have studied the Korean PV industry. Furthermore, 
few companies‟ annual reports have been released, because most of the PV cell firms 
are business parts of the chaebols. Thus, I have explored the main government 
ministries‟ press releases from 1997 to 2010, White Papers from 1999 to 2009, and 
newspapers from 2000 to 2011. On the other hand, KNREC (Korea New and 
Renewable Energy Centre) has a lot of data, for example, the census survey on all PV 
companies from poly silicon to modules. Thus, I have relied heavily on its reports and 
data in the research. 
  
In the Chinese case, Marigo‟s (2009) PhD thesis seems the first in-depth research on 
China‟s PV industry and has paved the way for this study to begin research of the 
Chinese case. REDP‟s (Renewable Energy Development Project) reports have helpful 
content to aid understanding of the Chinese PV industry between the 1980s and 1990s. 
Moreover, companies‟ annual reports can describe the situation from the 2000s onwards, 
because most of them are listed in the New York Stock Exchange or the Nasdaq.  
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2.2 Interviews 
 
In conducting interviews, I have attempted to access insightful information relating to 
the research questions and to compensate for blank spaces in the archival and 
documentary research. For example, little information about the Korean PV companies 
was accessible in the form of documents or archives. Thus, I have relied heavily upon 
interviews in order to obtain information about the Korean PV firms.   
 
In fieldwork and telephone interviews, I have adopted a semi-structured interview
36
  
approach because of its flexibility balanced by structure (Gillham, 2005). In other words, 
the interviews „remain open ended and assume a conversational manner‟ (Yin, 2009, p. 
107), but they also need to follow a certain set of questions related to the research topic.  
    
In detail, the semi-structured interview follows general principles as follows:  
 
- the same questions are asked of all those involved; 
- the kind and form of questions go through a process of development to ensure their 
topic focus; 
- to ensure equivalent coverage (with an eye to the subsequent comparative analysis) 
interviewees are prompted by supplementary questions if they haven‟t dealt 
spontaneously with one of the sub-areas of interest; 
- approximately equivalent interview time is allowed in each case (Gillham, 2005, p. 
70) 
 
In practice, I made a set of main questions (see Appendix 1) and conducted interviews 
(see Appendix 2). Table IV-3 provides details of the number of interviews and nature of 
interviewees for each country. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 There are three types of interview: a structured interview, a semi-structured interview, and an 
unstructured interview; or a survey-type interview, a focused interview, and an in-depth 
interview (Yin, 2009).  
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Table IV-3 Interviews in this research 
 Number of interviewees 
Method (period) Difficulties → Solutions 
firms 
Policy 
makers 
others 
Germany 3 1 4 
-First field trip and Intersolar 
exhibition (May 2009) 
-second field work (May 2011) 
Lack of budget → 
participation in the UK 
ESRC project 
Korea 16 6 3 
Telephone and email  
(from May 2009 to June 2010) 
No time to visit → 
advantage of government 
officials 
China 9 1 5 Field work (July 2010) 
-Contacting interviewees 
→ introduced by the 
„Jiangsu PV association‟ 
-Language → interpreter  
Source: Author 
 
Some difficulties were encountered in carrying out interviews with companies in the 
three different countries. First of all, it was most difficult to access German companies. 
For instance, major PV companies such as Q-Cells were very reluctant to meet 
researchers. However, this did not affect this study much because I was able to access 
annual reports of these companies. In addition, due to support from the Korean-German 
Chamber and the UK ESRC (the Economic and Social Research Council) project, I 
carried out the German field work successfully. In China, language was an issue. Some 
interviewees did not speak English, thus I was accompanied by an interpreter. 
Fortunately, Jiangsu PV association introduced me to contact points of major PV 
companies such as Suntech, Trina Solar and Solarfun. By contrast, it was not difficult to 
interview Korean PV companies because I was able to take advantage of my 
connections with government officials. This advantage compensated the lack of archival 
data of the Korean PV companies. Overall I was able to carry out 48 interviews (Korea: 
25, China: 15, and Germany: 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
3. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
After the collection of data, the next step for the research is „how the evidence is to be 
analyzed‟ (Yin, 2009, p. 127). However, there are few fixed formulas for researchers to 
guide their data analysis. „Instead, much depends on an investigator‟s own style of 
rigorous empirical thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of evidence and 
careful consideration of alternative interpretations‟ (Yin, 2009, p. 127). Therefore, I 
have attempted two types of analyses in order to deal with the research questions 
comprehensively: a within-case analysis and a cross-case analysis.  
 
Firstly, the within-case analysis is largely composed of two parts. The first part of each 
case briefly delineates the history of the national political economy. The second part 
describes the emergence and evolution of the PV industry in the context of the national 
economy in each case. Through these descriptions, I have made an effort to understand 
each element in detail and provide an empirical basis for the next analysis, a 
comparative analysis. In fact, chapter V (the German case), chapter VI (the Chinese 
case), and chapter VII (the Korean case) follow this type of data analysis. These three 
chapters are descriptive rather than explanatory
37
. 
 
Secondly, a cross-case analysis is a comparative analysis. Based on the descriptive case 
analysis, I have attempted to explain the casual relationships between institutional 
advantage and the national growth trajectories of the PV industry. In other words, I will 
compare the degree of relevance between institutional arrangements of the three 
countries and four necessary functions for the PV industry: market formation; capital 
mobilisation; process innovation; and cost reduction. This method of analysis is applied 
in chapter VIII (Comparison of the three cases). By contrast, with the within-case 
analysis, this chapter is explanatory rather than descriptive.  
 
 
                                                 
37
 Hart (1998) categorises the goals of research by three research types: exploratory, descriptive, 
and explanatory researches. The goal of descriptive research is „to understand a common or 
uncommon social phenomenon by observing the detail of the elements that make it a 
phenomenon in order to provide an empirical basis for valid argument,‟ whereas that of 
explanatory research is „to explain the cause or non-occurrence of a phenomenon; to show 
causal connections and relationships between variables of the types „if A then B‟; to suggest 
reasons for events and make recommendations for change‟ (Hart, 1998, p. 47). 
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CHAPTER V PV INDUSTRY IN GERMANY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the evolution of the PV industry in Germany. In 
particular, I shall outline the evolution of the industry and explain how its evolution 
reflects four drivers: market formation, capital mobilisation, process innovation, and 
cost reduction. These drivers are in part a reflection of Germany‟s underlying social 
market model of economic development and its underlying political economy. In order 
to explain the development of the industry, it must therefore be put in the context of the 
political economy of contemporary Germany. The chapter will therefore start with a 
discussion of the political economy of Germany and its historical foundations.  
  
Firstly, in section 2, I shall explain in brief the history of the German political economy. 
In the nineteenth century, the investment banking system and cartels were distinctive 
characteristics of the industrialisation in Germany. Since then, also, the tradition of 
cooperation between universities, research institutes, and industries has become strong 
in Germany. After World War II, the social market economy was established in West 
Germany. Through economic growth and development, the contemporary German 
economy can be regarded as a representative model of the coordinated market economy 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Since German unification in 1990, it has affected significantly 
„the German model‟ and the political economy of Germany (Wiesenthal, 2003; Streeck, 
2009). 
 
Secondly, in section 3, I shall examine the development of the PV sector in the context 
of the German political economy. Up until the 1950s, many German scientists were 
involved in the advance of basic science related to PV technology. Between the 1960s 
and 1990s, the German PV industry started alongside the emergence of the space-
satellite market. After the two oil shocks, many R&D projects and demonstrations for 
PV systems were supported by public funds. In particular, after the Chernobyl accident, 
creation of PV markets took place, especially by local activist groups. In the 2000s, the 
German PV industry took off and grew fast, mainly led by growth of the domestic PV 
market. 
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Lastly, in section 4, I shall attempt to show how Germany‟s institutional configuration 
and the four main drivers impact on the PV sector: inter-relationships between 
institutional advantage and the four functions (market formation, capital mobilisation, 
process innovation, and cost reduction). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
2. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GERMANY 
 
2.1 The Industrial Revolution and between the Two World Wars 
 
In the nineteenth century, the German economy changed from an economy based on 
agriculture to one dominated by industry, faster than any other economy on the 
European continent during the time of industrial revolution (Berghahn, 1982). Indeed, 
industrialisation in Germany was rapidly catching-up with Britain‟s level of 
industrialisation. Two main industries were important in Germany‟s industrialisation at 
this time: one was the coal industry; the other was the iron and steel industry. In fact, 
the outputs of coal and steel had risen more than fourfold and tenfold respectively 
between 1880 and 1913 in Germany, outpacing those of Britain (Berghahn, 1982). 
Furthermore, new industries such as the chemical and electrical industries accelerated 
the process of industrialisation in Germany. In fact, the German chemical industry 
produced three-quarters of the world‟s synthetic dyes and German electrical products 
amounted to about half of world‟s trade in these goods by 1913 (Henderson, 1975). 
 
Many factors had contributed to the success of German industrialisation at this time: the 
economic and social achievements of Bismarck, the growth of cartels, the influence of 
credit banks, and scientific and technical progress
38
 (Henderson, 1961). Among these, 
the banks and cartels can be singled out as the most significant institutional factors 
facilitating German industrialisation. Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) argues that the 
German bank was the most important institutional instrument of industrialisation in a 
relatively backward Germany in the nineteenth century, significantly different from the 
role played by banks in England, as follows: 
 
Between the English bank essentially designed to serve as a source of short-term capital 
and a bank designed to finance the long-run investment needs of the economy there was a 
complete gulf. The German banks, which may be taken as a paragon of the type of the 
universal bank, successfully combined the basic idea of the crédit mobilier with the short-
term activities of commercial banks. […] A German bank, as the saying went, 
                                                 
38
 The examples of scientific and technical progress were „Werner von Siemens‟ electric 
dynamo, Otto‟s gas engine, Daimler‟s petrol engine, Diesel‟s heavy oil engine, the Haber-Bosch 
process for the fixation of the nitrogen in the air by electrolysis, and the discovery of alizarin 
dyes by Caro‟ (Henderson, 1961, p. 65).  
68 
 
accompanied an industrial enterprise from the cradle to the grave, from establishment to 
liquidation throughout all the vicissitudes of its existence. Through the device of formally 
short-term but in reality long-term current account credits and through development of the 
institution of the supervisory boards to the position of most powerful organs within 
corporate organizations, the banks acquired a formidable degree of ascendancy over 
industrial enterprises, which extended far beyond the sphere of financial control into that 
of entrepreneurial and managerial decisions (Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 13-14). 
 
The German banks expanded their roles from the short-term activities of commercial 
banks to the long-term investment of the crédit-mobilier type. They mobilised capital 
and concentrated it on the main heavy industries such as iron and steel in order to solve 
the problem of capital scarcity. For example, they took up blocks of shares in order „to 
secure the confidence of the investing public,‟ furthermore, they were „often represented 
on the boards of directors of business firms‟ (Henderson, 1961, p. 62). According to 
Gerschenkron, the investment banking system was „perhaps the greatest organizational 
innovation in the economic history of the century‟ (Gerschenkron, 1970, p. 102 cited in 
Shin, 1996). Moreover, during this period numerous mergers took place in the German 
banking sector. Thus, the six major banks were established by 1908: the Reichsbank, 
the Deutsche Bank, the Discount Company, the Schaaffhausen Bank, the Darmstadt 
Bank, and the Commercial Company of Berlin (Henderson, 1961). 
 
Another important institution which played a major role in the catching-up process of 
German industrialisation was the cartel
39
. At this time, the cartel was a kind of 
association of firms in cooperation rather than in competition with each other. 
Sometimes they were developed from previous unions of employers. However, more 
importantly, the German banks influenced the expansion of the German economy 
mainly through the establishment of mergers and cartels of various industries 
(Henderson, 1961). They „refused to tolerate fratricidal struggles among their children‟ 
(Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 15). Rather, „they were at all times quick to perceive profitable 
opportunities of cartelization and amalgamation of industrial enterprises (Gerschenkron, 
1962, p. 15). At the time, the four main types of cartel agreements were as follows: 
sharing the market, fixing prices, fixing the total amount of production, and sharing 
                                                 
39
 The great firms and banks drew more closely together in associations known by various 
names – „interest groups‟, „pools‟, „rings‟, „trusts‟, „syndicates‟, and „cartels‟ (Henderson, 1975). 
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profits (Henderson, 1961). Through forming the cartel, German industries could survive 
within the depression period and expand against cut-throat international competition. In 
fact, the number of cartels in Germany increased from four in 1865 to nearly four 
hundred in 1905 (Henderson, 1961). 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, Germany experienced the two World Wars. In 
this period, the German economy fluctuated severely between boom and depression and 
also underwent extreme political and social instability
40
. Although there were many 
factors which influenced the German political economy during this period, this research 
will deal with two main features: the uprising of the working class and improvements in 
science and technological capability. After the Revolutions of 1918 and 1919, the power 
of the trade union increased and a tradition of cooperation between employers and 
employees was established as a form of collective bargaining in order to avoid strikes 
and lock-outs. In fact, the Works‟ Council Bill, which provided for the employees‟ 
representatives to be consulted about working conditions in firms, was ratified in 1920 
(Berghahn, 1982). This bill required firms with more than 20 employees to carry out the 
election of employee‟s representatives, and these representatives „had to be consulted 
about working conditions, proposed redundancies and welfare questions‟ (Berghahn, 
1982, p. 68).  
 
On the other hand, there were big achievements in science and technology before and 
during the two World Wars
41
. The improvements in science and technological capability 
in the twentieth century mainly resulted from the establishment of higher education in 
the nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, many technical colleges 
(technische hochschule) were founded, mainly by private companies such as Siemens, 
Bosch, and Zeiss (Chang, 1998). They conducted a lot of „applied research‟ in 
cooperation with science-based industries, while universities mainly focused on „pure 
science‟ (Tuchman, 1997). Moreover, Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt was 
established as an independent research institute by the government in 1887 in order to 
                                                 
40
 In this period, German society experienced the First World War between 1914 and 1918, the 
Revolutions of 1918 and 1919, hyperinflation in 1923, the Great Depression in 1933, the Third 
Reich between 1933 and 1945, and the Second World War between 1939 and 1945 (Berghahn, 
1982).   
41
 Besides quantum and nuclear physics on which the atomic bomb was based in the Second 
World War, machine guns, TNT, the submarine, the airplane, and tanks were invented or 
improved during the First World War (Habeck, 2000). 
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conduct pure research and satisfy the long-term needs of industry (Tuchman, 1997). 
From 1912, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft), currently the 
Max Planck Society, was founded which contributed to improvements in modern 
physics and chemistry (Tuchman, 1997). However, the political situation in Germany 
was unlikely to contribute further to the development of science and technology under 
National Socialism and during World War II. From 1933, when National Socialism 
seized power in Germany, hundreds of scientists emigrated from Germany to foreign 
countries (Gimbel, 1990). During the Third Reich, German science deteriorated and was 
destroyed by political ideology and fascism (Tuchman, 1997).  
 
 
2.2 Social Market Economy: the Second Half of the 20th Century 
 
After the Second World War, West Germany recovered very fast and its economic 
growth was outstanding. As shown in Figure V-1, the trend of post-war economic 
growth was very steep (Buchheim, 1999). In fact, the average annual growth rate was 
about 8 per cent in the 1950s, as shown in Figure V-2 (Owen Smith, 1994). After 1973, 
however, the average annual growth rate declined to 2.74 and 2.21 in the 1970s and 
1980s, respectively, as shown in Figure V-2.  
 
Figure V-1 Long-term growth of real GNP per head in (West) Germany, 1850-1995 
(unit: Mark, 1913 prices) 
 
Source: Buchheim, 1999, p. 304 
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Figure V-2 West German growth rate of GNP (Gross National Product) 
 
Source: Owen Smith, 1994, p. 9 
 
There were many factors that contributed to „the German economic miracle‟ such as the 
Currency Reform of 1948, the Marshall Plan and the introduction of Western-style 
industrial capitalism by Erhard. However, this research will focus on the nature of 
„social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtshaft)‟ because most significant peculiarities 
of the modern German economy stem from the basic philosophy of this concept, in 
particular, when compared to the Anglo-Saxon economy. Furthermore, the social 
market economy was the first introduction of a Western-style market mechanism into 
the German economy which experienced strong government intervention under 
Bismarck, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich and had distinctive economic 
traditions such as cartels, investment banks, and works councils. Therefore, the social 
market economy can be interpreted as a complex historical compromise between liberal 
capitalism, social and Christian democracy, and traditionalism (Streeck, 1997). 
 
The notion of social market economy can be described as being based upon the four 
principles as follows:  
 
The first is the definition of competition employed in the model; the second is the 
appropriate role for state intervention; the third is the place for anti-cyclical measures; 
while the fourth principle is concerned with the all-important ethical and political aspects 
of neo-classical liberalism (Denton et al. 1968 cited in Owen Smith, 1994, p. 17).  
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Firstly, the definition of competition is different from the Anglo-Saxon model. It 
emphasises „workable competition‟ rather than „perfect competition‟ (Owen Smith, 
1994). In other words, „what matters is not the degree to which perfect competition 
exists, but the opportunity for the free and untrammelled exercise of competitive 
energies‟ (Denton et al. 1968 cited in Owen Smith, 1994, p. 17). Secondly, active 
government interventions are regarded as a necessity in order to facilitate workable 
competition in the social market economy model, because the market economy is prone 
to monopolisation. State interventions are needed as a form of anti-trust policies, 
whereas barriers to competition are seen as being erected by government in the Anglo-
Saxon approach (Owen Smith, 1994). Thirdly, a strict control of the money supply was 
introduced as a stabilisation policy. The German monetary experience such as 
hyperinflation in 1923 had a strong influence on maintaining price stability. Lastly, 
according to Müller-Armack, the system provided by the social market economy 
produced greater „personal responsibility and individual freedom‟ (Müller-Armack, 
1978). Efficient production and personal freedom were the keystones of a socially 
balanced order. Thus, not only economic policy but also social policy is an essential 
part of the principles of social market economy. 
 
Germany‟s reconstruction and „the economic miracle‟ in West Germany were mainly 
attributable to „the development of a new style of German economic policy‟, namely the 
social market economy (Müller-Armack, 1978, p. 325). This new market economy 
resulted in a way of thinking that „it should be possible under the conditions of a free 
order to find an arrangement satisfying the social needs of our time‟ (Müller-Armack, 
1978, p.325). Thus, the modern German economic order was established on the basis of 
the concept of the social market economy.   
 
 
2.3 Contemporary German Economy 
 
2.3.1 Coordinated Market Economy 
 
Modern political economists have focused on understanding institutional similarities 
and differences in developed countries and the relationships between these institutional 
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differences and economic performance (Hollingsworth et al., 1994; Hall and Soskice, 
2001). In particular, the VoC approach attempts to establish a typology in terms of „five 
spheres in which firms must develop relationships to resolve coordination problems‟: 
industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm 
relations, and internal structure (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 6-7). From this perspective, 
it draws two types of ideal political economy: a liberal market economy (LME) and a 
coordinated market economy (CME). Firms mainly depend on markets and hierarchies 
in order to resolve coordination problems with other actors in the former, whereas they 
depend more heavily on non-market relationships than markets and hierarchies in the 
latter (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
The German political economy can be identified as one of the most representative 
economies of the CMEs from the viewpoint of the VoC approach. The distinctive 
characteristics of the German political economy can be explained as below in 
accordance with the five spheres. Firstly, in terms of corporate governance and the 
relationship between firms and external providers of finance, Germany can be described 
as a „stakeholder model‟, in contrast to the UK‟s „shareholder model‟42 (Vitols, 2001). 
Because the stock market is less influential on corporate governance in the stakeholder 
model, „patient capital‟ enables firms to invest in long-term projects and retain a skilled 
workforce notwithstanding economic downturns in Germany. Moreover, most German 
firms have a tendency to pursue not only profitability but also market share and 
employment security (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Secondly, in terms of the internal 
structure of the firm, stakeholders can participate in major decision making, unlike in 
Anglo-Saxon firms. Due to the dual board system of German corporate law, employee 
representatives, as well as major shareholders are included on supervisory boards. So, 
they are able to share information and participate in the management of the firm. Thus, 
in Germany, consensus decision-making is a more common way to reach major 
decisions than unilateral actions by a CEO (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Thirdly, in terms 
of industrial relations, wage settings are normally achieved through industrial-level 
                                                 
42
 The two models can be explained as follows: „the „shareholder‟ model, in which the 
maximization of shareholder value is the primary goal of the firm and only shareholders enjoy 
strong formalised links with top management; and the „stakeholder‟ model, in which a variety of 
firm constituencies – including employees, suppliers and customers, and the communities 
companies are located in – enjoy „voice‟ in the firm and whose interests are to be balanced 
against each other in management decision-making‟ (Vitols, 2001, p. 337). 
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bargaining between trade unions and employer associations in order to prevent poaching 
from a highly skilled labour force. This collective bargaining also helps to limit the 
inflationary effects of wage settlements. On the other hand, works councils function as 
complementary institutions at the company level by „providing employees with security 
against arbitrary layoffs or changes to their working conditions‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 
p. 25). Fourthly, in terms of education and training systems, a publicly subsidized 
training system tends to provide firms with workers who have highly industry-specific 
or firm-specific skills. Partly due to these systems, long-term labour contracts are 
common in Germany. The German employer associations limit circumvention of this 
system by pressuring major firms to take part in this scheme (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Lastly, in terms of inter-company relations, the German firms tend to focus on product 
differentiation and niche production rather than direct product competition with other 
firms within the same industry. With regard to technology transfer, they tend to rely on 
various institutions such as joint researches and strong industry associations rather than 
movements of scientific and engineering personnel. Thus, in Germany, closer inter-firm 
relationships are nurtured in contrast to those within Anglo-Saxon economies (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001).   
 
The VoC approach is based on the comparative scheme between CMEs and LMEs, it is 
also important to understand the peculiarity of the German capitalism. Until the 1980s, 
the German model was able to keep a strong international competitiveness with high-
wage and high-skill employment and with low inequality through cooperative 
upgrading of skills, work organisation, technology and products (Streeck, 1997). In 
other words, the German industries chose the way of quality-competitive production, 
ruling out price-competitive production. However, under the conditions of German 
unification and globalisation, the German model has struggled to keep its 
distinctiveness as a CME (Streeck, 1997; Vitols, 2001). For instance, due to the recent 
changes in the institutions involved in corporate governance in Germany within the 
context of globalisation, the German stakeholder model was adjusted by adding the 
„negotiated shareholder value‟ principle43 (Vitols, 2001). However, as far as the VoC 
                                                 
43
 The recent changes happened in the areas of company law and financial regulation. Due to 
these changes, the demands of international investors are highlighted, however, „consensus on 
changes is generally reached before implementation through negotiation among top managers 
with different functional responsibilities and between top managers and employee 
representatives‟ (Vitols, 2001, p. 340). 
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approach is concerned, these institutional changes are not fundamental but incremental 
because institutions derive from deeply rooted historical traditions (Vitols, 2001). 
 
 
2.3.2 The Impact of German Unification 
 
When the collapse of communism started in Eastern Europe from 1989, unification 
between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) took place on 3 October 1990 (Wiesenthal, 2003). This unification seems have 
been beneficial for Germany, but it has negatively affected „the German model‟ and the 
political economy of Germany (Wiesenthal, 2003; Streeck, 2009).  
 
The process of German unification happened faster than expected mainly due to the 
following four reasons: international security considerations of the Kohl government; 
initial uncertainties about the pathway of unification; the weakness of East German civil 
society and politics; and Western electoral and political-economic interests (Wiesenthal, 
2003). As leading German economists and opposition leaders had warned, the cost of 
unification was substantial largely due to the rapidity with which it took place. One 
example was the currency reform in which the East German Mark was exchanged one-
to-one with the West German Mark. This reform resulted in economic disaster (Streeck, 
2009) and has been evaluated as follows: „[t]his amounted to an overnight appreciation 
of the local currency by about 400 per cent, rendering almost all East German economic 
activity instantly uncompetitive with western products and services‟ (Wiesenthal, 2003, 
p. 40). As a consequence, many sectors collapsed and unemployment rose dramatically 
in East Germany. In fact, the unemployment rate was around 20 per cent in the 1990s in 
East Germany (Wiesenthal, 2003).  
 
In order to compensate for these layoffs, huge transfer payments were provided for the 
east. In fact, „[c]umulative total net financial transfers from the west between 1990 and 
2002 reached 800 billion euros‟ (Wiesenthal, 2003, p. 42). Moreover, the German 
government put in place major subsidy programmes to support the economic 
development of East Germany. Due to the state-subsidised investment, some sectors 
such as the chemical industry were reconstructed in East Germany (Wiesenthal, 2003). 
Furthermore, new industries emerged, and one of them was the PV industry. This will 
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be explained in sub-section 3.3.2.5.  
 
Not only western money, but also West German institutions transferred to East 
Germany: local governments (Länder), the education system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education), research institutes such as Fraunhofer institute, and public agencies 
such as LEG (the state development corporation). In particular, five new Länders in 
East Germany „had the extraordinary advantage of being able to draw on economic 
resources from the formerly West German and now all-German public budgets and 
social security funds‟ (Wiesenthal, 2003, p. 40). Furthermore, new Länders were given 
more discretion, because „Germany‟s „spatial-federal‟ system endows its local 
governments (Länder) with considerable autonomy and a prominent role in federal 
policy implementation‟ (Anderson, 1996).        
 
On the other hand, German unification changed the status of Germany in European 
integration. In particular, with regard to European Union Structural and Cohesion Funds, 
the EU council designated the new Länder as the first German objective 1
44
 region in 
1994 (Anderson, 1996). The regions of objective 1, which are defined as 
underdeveloped regions, have a priority in terms of the allocation of financial resources. 
Thus, the designation of the new Länder as objective 1 meant that Germany became not 
only an EU paymaster but also a structural funds recipient. In fact, the new Länder 
received 13.6 billion ECU by allocation of these structural funds between 1994 and 
1999 (Wishlade, 1996, p. 49). These funds also encouraged generous investment 
incentives in East Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 „Objective 1‟ is an underdeveloped region defined as follows: the region whose „[p]er capita 
GDP measured in terms of purchasing power parity is less than 75 per cent of the Community 
average, and other regions whose per capita GDP is close to that of regions under 75 per cent 
and whose inclusion is justified by special circumstances‟ (Wishlade, 1996, p.34). 
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3. EVOLUTION OF THE PV INDUSTRY IN GERMANY 
 
According to industry life cycle (ILC) theories, there are regular patterns in emergence 
and growth of a new industry. More specifically, Van de Ven and Garud (2000) argue 
that three periods of an industry‟s life cycle should be analysed in examining the way in 
which a new industry emerges and evolves: 
 
Initiation is the time when entrepreneurs decide to form a business venture (if 
successfully launched will become the birthday of the business unit), and takeoff is the 
time when the unit can exist without the external support of its initiators and continue 
growing “on its own”. The period between initiation and takeoff could be called startup, 
where the new unit must draw its resources, competence, and technology from the 
founding leaders and external sources in order to develop the proprietary products, 
create a market niche, and meet the institutional standards established to legitimate the 
new unit as an ongoing economic enterprise. (Van de Ven and Garud, 2000, p.492) 
 
Moreover, Van de Ven and Garud (2000, p.518) add „the gestation period‟ before the 
initiation phase when they explain the sequence of industry development. The gestation 
period is the time when basic knowledge is created through basic scientific research 
(Van de Ven and Garud, 2000). This stage categorization is very significant when 
analysing the emergence and evolution of the German PV industry, because Germany 
was one of the first countries to develop its PV industry. 
 
From this perspective, I shall divide the history of the German PV industry into three 
periods: gestation, initiation and start-up periods. The gestation period started from the 
19
th
 century to the 1950s, the initiation period between the 1960s and 1997, the start-up 
period from 1998, and the take-off period will come when the grid parity is 
accomplished in Germany or in other critical global markets. 
 
 
3.1 Gestation Period: 19th Century - 1950s 
 
This sub-section will deal with a relatively long scientific history of the PV cells. 
Compared with the Chinese and Korean PV industry, the German PV industry was 
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deeply involved in the invention of the early PV cells and advancing basic science 
relating to PV technology. Thus, the structure of this part is different from other two 
empirical chapters. 
 
 
3.1.1 Brief History of the Early PV Cells45 
 
When it comes to the history of PV cells, it goes back to Becquerel‟s discovery of the 
„photovoltaic effect‟46 in 1839 (Wolf, 1972; Palz, 1978; Green, 1990; Boyle, 1996; 
Goetzberger, 2003; Nelson, 2003). Edmond Becquerel, a French physicist, found that a 
battery‟s voltage (a wet-cell type) increased when its silver or platinum plates were 
exposed to light (Boyle, 1996). Figure V-3 illustrates his discovery.  
 
Figure V-3 Diagram of apparatus described by Becquerel (1839) 
 
Source: „Photovoltaics: Coming of Age‟ (Green, 1990) 
 
After this discovery, a significant effort was made to advance scientific knowledge 
                                                 
45
 This part covers not only the German experience but also those of the UK, France, and the 
US, because all these countries were deeply involved in the invention of the early PV cells in 
the gestation period of the PV industry. Moreover, having a look at the early PV cells is helpful 
to understand the principle of PV effect and the advance of basic science related to the PV cells.   
46
 The basic principle of photovoltaic effect of a silicon solar cell can be explained as follows. 
„Light can be considered to consist of a stream of tiny particles of energy, called photons. When 
photons from light of a suitable wavelength fall within the p-n junction [positive- and negative-
type semiconductor], they can transfer their energy to some of the electrons in the material, so 
„promoting‟ them to a higher energy level. Normally, these electrons help to hold the material 
together by forming so-called „valence‟ bonds with adjoining atoms, and cannot move. In their 
„excited‟ state, however, the electrons become free to conduct electric current by moving 
through the material. In addition, when electrons move they leave behind holes in the material, 
which can also move‟ (Boyle, 1996, p. 98). 
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concerning PV cells within forerunner countries such as the UK, Germany, France, and 
the US between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century (Palz, 1978). 
At this time, the materials which mainly attracted the attention of scientists and 
engineers were not silicon but selenium and Cu2O, because the metallurgy of 
semiconductor materials had not advanced enough to make silicon mono-crystals of 
high purity (Palz, 1978).  
 
In 1873, Willoughby Smith, an English electrical engineer, discovered the 
photoconductivity of the element selenium (Wolf, 1972). In 1876, William Adams, a 
professor of natural philosophy at King‟s College in London and his student, Richard 
Day, observed that selenium produced electricity when it was exposed to light (Wolf, 
1972; Nelson, 2003). According to Green (1990), their demonstration paved the way to 
develop PV cells with solid-state material. Figure V-4 illustrates their PV cell. 
 
Figure V-4 Sample geometry used by Adams and Day (1876) for the investigation of 
the photoelectric effects in selenium 
 
Source: „Photovoltaics: Coming of Age‟ (Green, 1990) 
 
Also, in 1883, Charles Fritts, an American inventor, devised the first „thin film‟ type of 
solar cell which was formed by coating selenium with an extremely thin layer of gold 
(Wolf, 1972; Green, 1990; Nelson, 2003). It is illustrated in Figure V-5. 
 
Figure V-5 Thin film selenium cell demonstrated by Fritts in 1883 
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Source: „Photovoltaics: Coming of Age‟ (Green, 1990) 
 
After Wilhelm Hallwachs, a German physicist, observed the photosensitivity of copper 
cuprous-oxide structures in 1904 (Wolf, 1972), Grondahl, a professor in the US, devised 
a copper-cuprous oxide photovoltaic cell in 1927, shown in Figure V-6 (Wolf, 1972; 
Green, 1990). 
 
Figure V-6 Early Grondahl-Geiger copper cuprous oxide photovoltaic cell 
 
Source: „Photovoltaics: Coming of Age‟ (Green, 1990) 
 
In the 1940s and 1950s, silicon solar cell technology made significant progress in the 
US. Following the development of high purity silicon, in 1941, Russell Ohl, an 
American engineer, invented a silicon grown-junction photovoltaic cell, even though its 
energy conversion efficiency
47
 was below one per cent (Wolf, 1972; Green, 1990). 
Finally, in 1954, Pearson, Fuller and Chapin of the Bell Telephone Laboratories 
invented the first modern silicon solar cell with an efficiency of six per cent (Wolf, 1972; 
Smits, 1976; Green, 1990; Boyle, 1996; Nelson, 2003). It is shown in Figure V-7. It was 
                                                 
47
 Conversion efficiency means that how much of the incoming insolation can be transferred 
into electricity. For example, if the conversion efficiency of a solar cell is 20%, it can generate 
electricity as the same amount of 20% of the incoming solar radiation (Greenpeace and EPIA, 
2009).  
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said that this invention „opened the first real prospects for power generation using 
photovoltaics and accordingly aroused considerable interest‟ (Green, 1990, p. 3). In 
other words, this silicon-type of solar cell can be interpreted as the emergence of a 
„dominant design‟ among competing types of solar cells from the viewpoint of ILC 
theory (Utterback, 1994). Evidence of this is that the market-share of silicon solar cell 
technology has been higher than any other cell technology since their invention. 
  
Figure V-7 Schematic early silicon solar cells 
 
Source: „History of Silicon Solar Cells‟ (Smits, 1976) 
 
 
3.1.2 Advances in Basic Science Relating to PV Technology 
 
According to Pavitt (2005), although science „remains an insufficient guide to 
technological practice,‟ (p. 97) scientific advances can facilitate the opening of new 
avenues in applied research and provide technical solutions. Basic science relating to 
PV cell technology, in particular that of physics, advanced much in Germany between 
the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
There were many examples of scientific advances in Germany relating to the 
improvement of PV cell technology as follows. In 1874, Ferdinand Braun, a German 
physicist, discovered „semiconductor point-contact rectifier effect‟ which was the first 
written description of a semiconductor diode (Wolf, 1972). In 1900, Max Planck, a 
German physicist, identified the quantum nature of light. Prior to his discovery, light 
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was thought to be a continuous electromagnetic wave (Nelson, 2003). Then, in 1905 
Albert Einstein explained the „photoelectric effect‟, in which electrons are emitted from 
matter as a consequence of its absorption of energy from light (Nelson, 2003). In 1931, 
H. Dember, a German professor, discovered electron diffusion theory (Wolf, 1972), and 
L. Bergmann, a German physicist, reawakened selenium devices which were superior to 
copper based devices (Green, 1990). Walter Schottky, a German physicist, and Neville 
Mott, an English physicist, developed the theory of metal-semiconductor barrier layers 
during the 1930s (Wolf, 1972; Green, 1990; Nelson, 2003). 
 
However, under the Third Reich and after World War II, the political situation in 
Germany was detrimental to further development of basic science relating to PV cells. 
Since 1933, when the National Socialists seized power in Germany, hundreds of 
scientists emigrated from Germany to foreign countries (Gimbel, 1990). Furthermore, 
after World War II, the „Paperclip Project, which provided for both military and 
commercial exploitation of German scientists and technicians in the United States,‟ 
(Gimbel, 1990, p. 37) resulted in the emigration of many German scientists and 
engineers to the US. Because of this evacuation of German scientists and engineers, and 
the postwar commercial-industrial exploitation programme known as „the Field 
Information Agency, Technical (FIAT)
48‟ (Gimbel, 1990, p. 60), it inevitably took a 
relatively long time to resume German research. 
 
Apart from the time before and after the Second World War, why did basic science 
advance so fast in Germany between the late nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century? One of the possible answers can be found in German science and 
higher education systems such as universities and research institutes, as I describe in 
subsection 2.1. In the nineteenth century, many technical colleges (technische 
hochschule) and independent research institutes such as the Physikalisch-Technische 
Reichsanstalt were founded (Tuchman, 1997). Furthermore, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society 
                                                 
48
 There are many examples of how companies in the US exploited technology of German companies. 
One was the Bosch condenser machine. “Reportedly it [the Bosch condenser machine] would save the US 
condenser industry “millions of dollars a year” by producing condensers that were 50 percent smaller and 
40 percent cheaper than those produced in the United States…. Henderson, working as a scientific 
consultant for FIAT, went to the Robert Bosch, GmbH, facility in Stuttgart, made the investigations, 
wrote a six-page FIAT report – which the Publication Board eventually sold for 10¢ a copy in the United 
States – and had one of the twelve-ton machines shipped to the United States to be used as a sample for 
research and study. The sample machine was allocated by OTS to Western Electric Company and Bell 
Telephone Laboratories for demonstration to the public” (Gimbel, 1990, pp.103-104). 
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(Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft) had a major role in improvements in modern physics and 
chemistry (Tuchman, 1997). However, during the Third Reich, German science 
deteriorated and was destroyed (Tuchman, 1997). Meanwhile, in line with the re-
establishment of German scientific society, the „Max Planck Society‟ (MPS) was 
founded in 1948 (MPS, 2010). In the next year, „Fraunhofer Society‟ was founded (FS, 
2010). Both of them have played a major role in the development of basic science and 
technology of the PV sector in Germany. 
 
In short, it is hard to disagree that Germany was one of the world forerunners during 
this period in terms of basic science and technological capability relating to PV cells, 
despite the fact German scientific research of PV cells had difficulty in advancing 
during and after World War II. These advantages in technological capability in 
Germany were set to pave the way in developing the German PV industry over the next 
periods.   
 
 
3.2 Initiation Period: 1960s – 1997 
 
3.2.1 Emergence of the First Generation of PV Firms: 1960s 
 
3.2.1.1 The First PV Market: A Space Satellite Market49 
 
After the invention of the silicon solar cell, the Bell Telephone Labs went further with 
the first demonstration of silicon solar cells as a power source for a rural telephone 
amplifier in the mid-1950s (Wolf, 1972; Smits, 1976). Figure V-8 shows us the first 
experimental application. However, the total cost of electricity from a silicon solar cell 
system was much more expensive than that of conventional power (Wolf, 1972; Smits, 
1976). In fact, the price of silicon solar cell was between 100 and 300 USD/Wp
50
 in the 
1960s (Wolf, 1972). Thus, the ambitious dream of the Bell Telephone Labs failed, and 
the commercialization of solar cells was regarded as a business of the distant future 
(Wolf, 1972; Smits, 1976). 
                                                 
49
 This part describes mainly the American PV market because it accounts for almost all the PV 
market at that time.  
50
 The price of silicon solar cells is between 1 and 2 USD/Wp in 2010 (Solarbuzz, 2011).  
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Figure V-8 The first experimental application of a „Solar Battery‟ in the 1950s 
 
Source: Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs Website (http://www.alcatel-
lucent.com/wps/portal/bell-labs, accessed on 10
th
 February 2010) 
 
Unexpectedly, a new market for solar cells emerged in 1958: a space satellite market. 
Vanguard I, shown in Figure V-9, which used silicon solar cells to power its back-up 
transmitter, opened the space age for solar cells in March 1958 (Wolf, 1972; Smits, 
1976). Beyond the engineers‟ expectations, the solar cells on Vanguard I worked for 
over six years, compared with the few-weeks lifetime of chemical batteries (Wolf, 
1972). Furthermore, because the weight of solar cells was much lighter than any other 
power source, applying solar cells for space satellites was a tremendous success (Palz, 
1978). 
 
Figure V-9 The first use of solar cells for a satellite: Vanguard I 
 
Source: „History of Silicon Solar Cells‟ (Smits, 1976) 
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Due to the satellite market, the silicon solar cells market increased rapidly until 1962, 
reaching 70kWp per year in 1968 (Wolf, 1972). From then, the rate of growth in the 
silicon solar cells market was sluggish until 1975 (Palz, 1978). Although the size of the 
satellite market was extremely small from the perspective of current market volume, the 
satellite market paved the way for commercialization of silicon solar cells. 
 
 
3.2.1.2 The First Generation of PV Firms 
 
Faced with the US export restrictions on the European Space Agency, „Telefunken 
(AEG-Telefunken)‟ and „Siemens‟ began to develop silicon solar cells in the 1960s 
(Jacobbson et al., 2004). They were the first firms to produce solar cells in Germany. 
According to a US report intended to help US scientists and engineers become aware of 
European solar cell activities, they were able to produce silicon solar cells comparable 
to the United States standards (Curtin and Eakins, 1971). This report described AEG-
Telefunken and Siemens in the following terms: 
 
The AEG-Telefunken cells are manufactured at their modern facility at Heilbronn, near 
Stuttgart. They have a research and development facility included with their production 
facility. The research and development facility also has its own pilot production line. Cover 
slipping and solar panel work is done at the Wedel facility near Hamburg. Both Dr. Richard 
Epple, Research and Development Director, and Dr. Reinhard Gereth, Senmiconductor 
Department Head, have had extensive experience in the United States. […] Siemens has 
manufactured solar cells for the German/French satellite DIAL which was launched in 
March 1970. They are presently producing cells for the German spacecraft AEROS (Curtin 
and Eakins, 1971, pp. 595-596).  
 
Furthermore, AEG-Telefunken supplied the US and European satellite programmes 
with more solar cells than other European firms such as SAT of France and Ferranti of 
the UK (Curtin and Eakins, 1971). In short, German first movers in the PV sector, 
AEG-Telefunken and Siemens, seemed to start well in view of sales and technological 
capability during the space age of solar cells. 
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3.2.2 Research & Development and Demonstrations: 1970s-1980s 
 
3.2.2.1 Oil Shocks and Searching for Alternative Energy Sources 
 
During the 1960s, the price of oil was so cheap that many western European countries, 
such as Britain, France and West Germany, could replace traditional energy sources 
such as coal with oil (Sutcliffe, 1996). However, after the first oil shock occurred in 
1973 they made an effort to diversify away from oil to other energy sources
51
 
(Ikenberry, 1986). In Germany, energy diversification mainly led to huge amounts of 
government funding for research and development of alternative energy sources. Up 
until the late 1980s, R&D for alternative energy focused more on hard coal and nuclear 
power than on renewable energy resources, as shown in Figure V-10 (Jacobsson and 
Lauber, 2006). 
 
Figure V-10 Energy R&D in Germany 1974 – 2002 (prices in 2002) 
 
 
Source: IEA (2003) Energy Technology R&D Statistics, cited in Jacobsson and Lauber 
(2006) 
 
Although the size of the R&D fund for renewable energy was relatively small, in 1974 
                                                 
51
 The US, Western European countries and Japan set similar energy security goals as follows: 
„diversification of oil sources away from the Middle East, diversification away from oil to other 
types of energy, and conservation measures to lower absolute levels of energy consumption‟ 
(Ikenberry, 1986). 
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the German government supported R&D for renewable energy for the first time (Lauber 
and Mez, 2004). Moreover, between 1975 and 1999, the amount invested in German 
government Research, Development and Demonstration (RDD) programmes for solar 
cells was not much less than that invested by other leading countries such as the US and 
Japan, as shown in Figure V-11 (Jacobbson et al., 2004).  
 
Figure V-11 Public solar cell research, development and demonstration funding in 
OECD 1975-1999 (in million 1999 US $) 
 
Source: „Transforming the Energy System – the Evolution of the German Technological 
System for Solar Cells‟ (Jacobbson et al., 2004) 
 
In addition to government funding, firms‟ spending on PV R&D was also increased 
year by year. As shown in Figure V-12, the part financed solely by industry was on the 
rise, accompanied by the increase in government funding for industrial projects and 
universities. This indicates that firms began to be interested in the solar sector, 
recognising potential future markets and investing in the commercialization of solar 
cells (Pfisterer and Bloss, 1989).  
 
Figure V-12 Industry‟s expenditure and BMFT support for PV R&D during 1975-1987 
(DM values in millions) 
 
Annual PV budgets are constantly increasing. This can be seen from 
Fig. 1, which also shows the three categories of financing (from top to 
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Source: „Photovoltaic Activities in the Federal Republic of Germany‟ (Pfisterer and 
Bloss, 1989) 
BMFT: The Federal Ministry for Research and Technology 
 
Furthermore, from 1979, many demonstration programmes were initiated by the 
Commission of the European Communities (Palz, 1982). At that time, the biggest one 
was the project of 300kWp PV pilot plant on Pellworm Island, Schleswig-Hostein in 
Germany (Palz, 1982; Jacobbson et al., 2004). This project was co-funded by the 
Commission of the European Communities, the federal ministry for research and 
technology (BMFT) of West Germany and AEG-Telefunken, using AEG-Telefunken‟s 
solar cells (Palz, 1982). Figure V-13 shows us pictures of the PV plant of Pellworm. In 
particular, AEG-Telefunken and Siemens played an active role in supplying solar cells 
and installation plants not only in Germany but also in other European countries, as 
shown in Table V-1. Until the mid-1990s, more than 70 demonstration programmes 
were implemented, accompanied by a two-year monitoring programme (Jacobbson et 
al., 2004). 
 
Figure V-13 The 300kW PV pilot plant on Pellworm Island 
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Source: „Photovoltaic Power Generation‟ (Palz, 1984, p.31 and 34) 
 
Table V-1 PV pilot projects in the European Community in the early 1980s 
Site (nation) 
Capacity 
(kW) 
Funding bodies 
(contribution, %) 
Project leader 
Island of Pellworm 
(Germany) 
300 
CEC (41), BMFT (47), 
AEG-Telefunken (12) 
AEG-Telefunken 
Vester Bögebjerg near 
Korsoer (Denmark) 
100 
CEC (31), BMFT (30), 
Denmark‟s ministry (23), 
Siemens 
90 
 
Siemens (10), etc.  
Kythnos Island 
(Greece) 
100 
CEC (16), BMFT (18), 
Siemens (51), etc. 
Siemens 
Fota Island, Cork 
(Ireland) 50 
CEC, BMFT, Ireland‟s 
ministries, AEG-
Telefunken, etc. 
AEG-Telefunken 
and University 
College Cork 
Terschelling Island 
(Netherlands) 50 
CEC (31), BMFT (28), 
Netherlands‟ ministry (19), 
etc. 
Holec NV and 
AEG-Telefunken 
Source: „Photovoltaic Power Generation‟ (Palz, 1982) 
CEC: the Commission of the European Community 
 
Between 1977 and 1989, overall, 18 universities, 39 firms and 12 research institutes 
took part in these RDD programmes in Germany (Jacobbson et al., 2004). As a result, a 
great deal of scientific and engineering knowledge and know-how were created and 
accumulated mainly in the field of crystalline-silicon cells (Jacobbson et al., 2004). 
Moreover, based on the existing high technology of solar cells for space application, the 
demonstration programmes opened up a new era of large-scale terrestrial use of solar 
cells beyond the space age. When you compare one terrestrial pilot plant, e.g., 300kWp, 
with the annual size of the whole space satellite market, e.g., around 100 kWp in the 
1970s, in terms of capacity, it is not difficult to understand that the terrestrial market 
based on large-scale plants can be regarded as the momentum for the evolution of the 
PV industry. In fact, more solar cells have been sold in the terrestrial market than the 
space market since 1975 (Palz, 1978). However, at that time, most of the large-scale 
plants were constructed on islands in order to supply remote areas with electricity and 
were off-grid generation systems not on-grid ones (Palz, 1982). This means market 
expansion was limited by geographical and technical factors, as I will discuss in the 
next sub-section.     
 
 
3.2.2.2 Problems due to the Lack of PV Markets 
 
During this period, a big demand creator for PV was the large-scale pilot plant 
programme, as I describe in the previous sub-section (3.2.2.1). Due to these 
programmes, solar cell markets began to develop separately from the small space 
satellite market. Still, the market of large-scale pilot plants had inherent limitations for 
growth. Geographically, these programmes were designed to electrify remote rural areas 
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such as islands and highlands where it was difficult to access the power grid. Unlike 
developing countries with a huge land mass such as China, there were few rural areas 
without access to a power grid in Germany at that time. Technically, the solar PV 
system was an off-grid type which was not able to connect to the power grid directly. 
Thus, potential in this type of market for solar cells was not substantial.  
 
Another significant problem to solve in order to create PV markets was the higher price 
of PV electricity than those of other energy sources. Due to the effort of engineers and 
manufacturers, the price of silicon modules dropped from several hundred USD/Wp in 
the 1960s to below 20 USD/Wp in the 1970s and to below 10 USD/Wp in the 1980s, as 
shown in Figure V-14 (Jacobbson et al., 2004). These improvements were remarkable 
successes in terms of cost reduction in the PV system. However, the price of solar PV 
electricity was still more than ten times as high as that of coal electricity at that time.  
 
Figure V-14 Silicon solar module price 
 
Source: „Transforming the Energy System – the Evolution of the German Technological 
System for Solar Cells‟ (Jacobbson et al., 2004) 
 
 
As a consequence, the growth of the PV market was retarded in this period. In fact, the 
accumulated PV installed reached only 1.5 MWp in Germany by 1990 (Jacobbson et al., 
2004). Furthermore, the big boost for the large-scale power plants ended with the 
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changes of support policies by the Reagan administration in the USA. Thus, the rate of 
growth of the global PV market was only 13% per year in the period from 1983 to 1996 
(Jacobbson et al., 2004). At this time, the commercial off-grid power market was the 
only dominant form of the PV market, especially in developing countries such as China. 
 
 
3.2.3 Attempts to Create PV Markets: 1980s-1990s 
 
3.2.3.1 The Chernobyl Accident and Environmental Movements 
 
After the first oil shock in 1973, a few solar energy organisations appeared in Germany. 
The German Society for Solar Energy (DGS) and the German Solar Energy Industries 
Associations (BSW: Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft) were ones of these organisations 
(Jacobbson et al., 2004). At that time, as I mention in sub-section 3.2.2.1, the R&D 
funding available for nuclear energy was much greater than the funding available for 
renewable energy. Before 1986, public opinion in Germany was divided on the question 
of nuclear power. However, the Chernobyl nuclear accident had a deep impact on the 
whole of German society, especially on the parts related to the transformation of the 
energy system. Firstly, after it happened in 1986, opposition to nuclear power increased 
and reached over 70 per cent of public opinion by 1988 (Lauber and Mez, 2004). 
Secondly, some political parties, in particular, the social democrats (SPD) and the Green 
party, began to commit themselves to phasing out nuclear power
52
 (Lauber and Mez, 
2004). Lastly, more active and powerful organisations for solar PV energy were 
founded: Förderverein Solarenergie (Solar Promotion Association) and Eurosolar
53
. 
The former, a kind of non-government organisation, developed the concept of „cost 
covering payment‟ for electricity generated by renewable energy technology, which was 
later applied to various feed-in laws (Jacobbson et al., 2004). The latter was the first 
organisation, a group of politicians, which promoted a vision of a 100 per cent 
renewable energy supply (Wüstenhagen and Bilharz, 2006). 
                                                 
52
 When the so-called red-green coalition became the ruling party in 1998, they legislated the 
phasing out law. 
53
 Eurosolar „is an organization for campaigning within the political structure in contrast to the 
conventional pressure groups that lobby politicians. Eurosolar has 65 members from all political 
parties within the German Parliament, excluding Liberals, and 800 politicians at all levels in 
Germany (Federal, Ländern, local)‟ (Jacobbson et al., 2004, p. 15). 
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3.2.3.2 1,000 Roof Programme, Feed-in Law and the Aachen Model 
 
In the theoretical chapter above, the creation of markets was identified as one of the 
most important drivers of institutional advantage for the development of the PV 
industry. Responding to increasing interest in solar energy, three significant attempts 
aimed at creating solar PV markets were initiated in Germany: the 1,000 roof 
programme, the Electricity Feed-in Law of 1990, and local-level activities such as the 
Aachen model. Firstly, in 1989 the German Federal Ministry of Research launched 
market creation programmes for renewable energy, specifically, a 100 MWp wind 
programme and the 1,000 roof programme (Lauber and Mez, 2004). The 1,000 roof 
programme was a success and led to the installation of 2,250 grid-connected roof-
mounted installations with a capacity of 5.3 MWp by 1993 (Lauber and Mez, 2004). In 
relation to solar technology, this on-grid system led to the development of new inverters 
which related directly to the development for the standard and conditions of feeding 
decentralized power into the network grid (Jacobbson et al., 2004). In terms of potential 
market, this programme achieved another big step forward moving from an off-grid 
solar power system to an on-grid one. The on-grid system had a wider market potential 
than the off-grid one, however, the size of market created by this programme was still 
not enough to induce new investment in the PV industry. 
Secondly, Förderverein Solarenergie (Solar Promotion Association) and Eurosolar 
suggested the concept of a „cost covering feed-in law‟ in 1989. This suggestion was 
accepted by all parliamentary parties and became „the Electricity Feed-in Law of 
1990‟ 54  (Lauber and Mez, 2004). The law required electric utilities to connect 
renewable energy generators to the grid and to buy the electricity at rates of 65 to 90 
percent of the average tariff for final customers. This was the most significant 
institutional change in the history of renewable energy in Germany. In fact, the wind 
energy market exploded in Germany due to this law. However, according to this law, 
solar PV electricity was able to sell to electric utilities at nearly 17 pfennig
55
 (approx. 9 
                                                 
54
 The passing of this law was not difficult at that time. The majority of CDU members agreed 
because the law was supported by 3,500 owners of small-scale hydro power plants which were 
politically conservative. Within the German parliament, 15–20 politicians from the CDU, SPD 
and the Greens, organized within the Eurosolar Parliament Group, worked for the acceptance of 
the law (Jacobbson et al., 2004). 
55
 100 pfennigs = 1 DM (0.51 Euro). 
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Euro cents) per kWh (Lauber and Mez, 2004). This price level for PV electricity was 
too low to cover costs. Thus, the Electricity Feed-in Law of 1990 did not play any role 
in market creation in the PV sector at this time.    
In other words, neither the 1,000 roof programme nor the feed-in law of 1990 
contributed enough to help the German PV industry survive in the 1990s. Rather, local-
level activities were more helpful to its survival. Local solar activists petitioned local 
governments to impose „cost covering contracts‟ with renewable generators on the 
municipal utilities. This movement, known as the Aachen model because it started first 
in Aachen city, spread over dozens of cities in Germany (Lauber and Mez, 2004). 
Additional help came from the Länders (states) governments in the form of market 
introduction programmes, subsidising solar installations, and green pricing (Lauber and 
Mez, 2004; Jacobbson et al., 2004). Due to these local-level initiatives, the German PV 
market continued to grow throughout the 1990s, even though the 1,000 roof programme 
ended in 1993 (Lauber and Mez, 2004). 
 
 
3.2.3.3 Merger and Acquisition of the First Generation of PV Firms 
 
Due to the 1,000 roof programme and local-level activities, the domestic PV market 
grew steadily during the 1990s. As shown in Figure V-15, annual demand for PV was 
over 10 MWp in the late 1990s (Jacobbson et al., 2004). Considering that the whole 
capacity of the 1,000 roof programme was 5.3 MWp, this growth of the German PV 
market was remarkable. 
 
Figure V-15 Annual PV capacity installed in Germany (unit: MWp) 
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Source: Jacobbson et al., 2004 
 
Due to the growth of the PV market in the 1990s, the first generation of PV firms 
became more active than before. Firstly, they took over the US PV firms which had 
state-of-the-art PV technology. In 1990, Siemens acquired ARCO Solar, a US PV firm, 
which had started in 1977 and was one of the largest silicon solar cell manufacturers at 
that time (Jacobbson et al., 2004). In 1994, ASE (Applied Solar Energy: Angewandte 
Solarenergie) was set up by NUKEM and Daimler-Benz Aerospace. And then, ASE 
acquired Mobil Solar, a US PV firm which had developed the EFG (Edge-defined Film
-fed Growth) silicon ribbon technology
56
 in 1973 (Jacobbson et al., 2004). These seem 
to be very ambitious M&As in an attempt to become world leading solar cell companies. 
Milestones of each firm are shown briefly in Table V-2. 
 
Table V-2 M&As in the German PV sector in the 1990s       
 1973 1979 1980 1982 1990 1994 1998 1999 2002 
Siemens 
ARCO 
Solar was 
founded. 
 
ARCO Solar 
became first 
company to 
produce 
more than 1 
MW of PV 
modules in 
one year. 
ARCO Solar 
commission
ed world‟s 
first 1 MW 
grid-
connected 
PV 
installation. 
Siemens 
acquire
d 
ARCO 
Solar, 
forming 
Siemens 
Solar. 
 
Shell 
invested 
a 9.5MW 
factory in 
Germany
. 
 
Shell 
acquired 
Siemens 
Solar, 
creating 
Shell 
Solar. 
ASE 
Mobil 
Tyco Solar 
Energy 
developed 
the EFG 
solar cell. 
NUKEM 
developed 
a thin-
layer 
compound 
semi-
conductor. 
   
NUKEM 
and Daimler-
Benz 
Aerospace 
set up ASE. 
ASE bought 
Mobil Solar. 
ASE 
invested 
a 20MW 
factory in 
Germany
. 
RWE 
acquire
d ASE. 
 
Source: Websites of Schott Solar and SolarWorld 
 
Secondly, aggressive investments in mass production took place in Germany in the late 
1990s. Expecting the realization of a potential domestic PV market, ASE constructed a 
new factory with a annual production capacity of 20 MWp in Germany, which started to 
produce in 1998 (Lauber and Mez, 2004). Similarly, Royal Dutch Shell entered into the 
German solar cell industry with a 9.5 MWp plant (Lauber and Mez, 2004). Partly, these 
investments must have been induced by political promises and implicit incentives 
                                                 
56
 Instead of sawing silicon ingots with wire saws to make wafers as in the conventional 
method, two strings are used to grow silicon ribbon directly from molten silicon. Like a film of 
soapy liquid forms on a bubble blower, a silicon ribbon forms between the strings. The silicon 
crystallizes between the strings and is then cut into wafers with a laser. ASE commercialized 
this technology successfully using an octagon shape crystal growth method in 2001 (Schmidt et 
al., 2002).  
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(Jacobbson et al., 2004). However, the volume of two large manufacturers was too big 
to be satisfied with the actual domestic market size. Thus, they had difficulty in running 
factories because of large losses (Jacobbson et al., 2004). In other words, although the 
domestic PV market was growing, the size of it was still not sufficient to be 
economically viable. Finally, in the 2000s they were taken over by RWE Schott Solar 
and SolarWorld, the so-called new generation of PV firms. I shall describe this in detail 
in the next section.   
 
 
3.3 Start-up Period: 1998 – 2000s 
 
3.3.1 Market Explosion: the Great Change in the Feed-in Tariff 
 
3.3.1.1 Political Challenge to the Feed-in Tariff 
 
Since the Electricity Feed-in Law of 1990, opposition to the feed-in scheme had been 
raised by electric utilities with their invested interests in the incumbent technologies 
such as coal and nuclear, as they had to pay more and more money to renewable 
electricity generators (Jacobbson et al., 2004; Lauber and Mez, 2004). The opposition 
was supported directly and indirectly by the utilities association VDEW (German 
Electricity Association), the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and some of CDU(Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany)/CSU (Christian Social Union) parliamentary members. 
At first, in 1996, VDEW complained to DG Competition (the subdivision of the 
European Commission which looks after fair competition) that the feed-in law violated 
state-aid rules (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). DG Competition pronounced that feed-in 
rates should be reduced along with costs, addressing particularly wind power. 
Encouraged by this support, the Ministry of Economic Affairs proposed an amendment 
that decreased the rates (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). 
 
However, the government proposal provoked a repetition of large scale demonstrations 
that advocated renewable energy. In 1997, environmental organizations, solar and wind 
industry associations, metal workers trade union IG Metall, farmer groups and church 
groups protested against the government‟s attempt to change the feed-in rates. In 
addition, the Association of Investment Goods Industry and VDMA (German 
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Engineering Federation) joined the opposition (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Finally, 
the government proposal was rejected by a narrow vote of 8 to 7 in a select committee 
in the Parliament (Bundestag), and it seems that not only the Green and SPD members 
but also some CDU and CSU members voted against the reduced rates (Jacobsson and 
Lauber, 2006). This meant that renewable energy overcame the political challenge and 
won substantial legitimacy in Germany.  
 
 
3.3.1.2 The Great Change: Breakthrough for PV 
 
Whereas the wind market had increased substantially in Germany since the Electricity 
Feed-in Law of 1990, the solar PV market was still not stimulated by the feed-in law 
mainly due to the unrealistic feed-in rate, as I describe above in sub-section 3.2.3.1. 
This situation did not change until the Social Democratic-Green coalition became the 
ruling party. There were some attempts to boost the PV market in the 1990s. After the 
end of the 1,000 roof programme, Eurosolar proposed a 100,000 roof programme in 
1993 in order to help the German PV industry to survive. However, this proposition was 
not supported by the ruling coalition, the Conservative-Liberal government, so was not 
adopted at that time (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). After the major investments of ASE 
and Shell in 1998, lobbying by the solar cell industry also intensified (Jacobsson and 
Lauber, 2006).  
 
In 1998, the Social Democratic-Green coalition took over the government from the 
Conservative-Liberal coalition. Firstly, it started the 100,000 roof programme in 
January 1999, providing subsidies in the form of low interest loans to investors 
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Secondly and more importantly, the revision of the feed-
in law was started later in 1999. During this process, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
repeatedly delayed and diluted these efforts and big electric utilities opposed. However, 
the Social Democratic-Green coalition, the majority of the Parliament, finally adopted 
the Renewable Energy Source Law (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz: EEG) in March 
2000, supported by environmental organizations and industry associations (Jacobsson 
and Lauber, 2006). 
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This was the most significant institutional change affecting market creation for the PV 
industry. Firstly, the rate of PV was increased from 17 to 99 pfennig (approx. 50 Euro 
cents) a level which could cover the cost of PV electricity (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). 
This was a tremendous increase, considering the new rate was over five times as high as 
the previous one. Secondly, the new rate would be guaranteed for 20 years (Jacobsson 
and Lauber, 2006). It is necessary to guarantee long-term rate, considering the turn-over 
time from the initial investment in PV systems which are capital-intensive. These two 
main features of the change were enough to attract much attention from investors in PV 
systems. Therefore, the German PV markets have begun to take off since the adoption 
of the EEG, I shall describe this in detail in the next sub-section (3.3.1.3). 
 
Another important issue that should be noted is the attitude towards nuclear power as it 
will determine to what extent a nation will focus on renewable energy sources. If you 
abandon nuclear power, there is only one alternative energy option which is to develop 
renewable energy. Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, opposition to nuclear power 
increased as I describe earlier in sub-section 3.2.3.1. After the emergence of the Red-
Green coalition, the Nuclear Energy Phase-Out Act was adopted in 2002 (Lauber and 
Mez, 2004). Thus, this act accelerated German society to develop renewable energy 
sources. 
 
 
3.3.1.3 Explosion of the PV Market  
 
After the revision of the feed-in tariff of 2000 (EEG), the German PV market exploded, 
as shown in Figure V-16. The average annual growth rate of the market was around 100 
per cent except in 2006, as shown in Table V-3. When you consider that the German PV 
industry was deeply involved in the revision of feed-in tariff, it is not difficult to 
understand that the German PV industry perceived the importance of the growth of 
domestic PV markets. That is to say, due to this significant change of the feed-in tariff 
the PV market increased rapidly in Germany. As a consequence, the German PV 
industry benefitted from the fastest growing PV market. This is the reason why the 
German PV industry participated heavily in the process of revision of the law.   
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Figure V-16 The German PV market in the 2000s (unit: MWp) 
 
Source: „Statistical data on the German PV industry‟ (BSW, 2010) 
 
Table V-3 Annual PV installed and growth rate in Germany in the 2000s (unit: MWp) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Annual PV 
installed 
42 78 118 139 670 951 843 1,271 1,809 3,806 
Growth 
rate (%) 
163 86 51 18 382 42 -11 51 42 110 
Source: „Statistical data on the German PV industry‟ (BSW, 2010) 
 
 
3.3.2 Emergence of the New Generation of PV Firms 
 
3.3.2.1 Entry of New PV Firms 
 
There were two main PV cell firms in Germany until the late 1990s: ASE and Siemens 
Solar. As the PV support policy became stronger and the PV market grew, however, 
new PV cell companies have appeared in the German PV industry since the late 1990s, 
such as Ersol, SolarWorld, Q-Cells, and Sunways, as shown in Figure V-17. Schott 
group, one of the biggest glass manufacturers, participated in the PV industry in 2002. 
Siemens Solar was taken over by Shell Solar in 2002, and finally, Shell Solar was 
acquired by SolarWorld in 2006. In addition, Bosch group entered into the PV sector by 
acquisition of Ersol Solar in 2008. These entries and acquisitions are illustrated in 
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Figure V-17. 
 
Figure V-17 Main PV cell companies in Germany 
 
Source: firms‟ annual reports and web sites 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Rapid Expansion of Production Capacity 
 
According to KPMG (1999), there are three ways to achieve cost reduction in PV 
electricity: technological development, government subsidy and scale-up of production. 
Considering the big price gap between PV electricity and conventional electricity, 
government subsidy can result in a large budget deficit. Also, technological 
development such as thin-film technology is only likely to be accomplished in the long-
term. Therefore, expansion of production capacity is the most feasible way to achieve 
cost reduction of PV systems in the short-term (KPMG, 1999). In fact, the report argues 
that a 500 MWp of annual production capacity is capable of providing us with PV 
modules at 0.91 Euro/Wp (KPMG, 1999). If this is accomplished, it enables PV 
electricity to compete with conventional electricity without any government subsidy.  
 
The new generation of PV firms in Germany seem to have followed this strategy. They 
have made an effort to expand their production capacities as fast as they can in order to 
achieve economies of scale. In particular, Q-Cells and SolarWorld took a lead, the 
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former attaining a capacity of over 800 MWp and the latter reaching nearly 500 MWp 
by 2009. Figure V-18 illustrates their rapid expansion.  
 
Figure V-18 Production capacity of the new generation of PV firms (unit: MWp)  
 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report and web site 
 
There were two fundamental circumstances that enabled them to achieve rapid 
expansion: one was a well-developed financial market; the other was the tremendous 
growth of the domestic PV market. With regard to financing, firstly, the new generation 
of PV firms utilised the German stock markets to mobilize funds to invest in new 
production capacity. Initial Public Offering (IPO) was the main method for them to tap 
into capital. SolarWorld launched on the Düsseldorf Stock Exchange with an IPO in 
November 1999. In February 2001, Sunways was listed on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, with the net proceeds of the issue raised for the company amounting to 
approximately 16 million Euros. The IPOs of Ersol and Q-Cells on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange were successful, with the net proceeds of approximately 153 and 240 million 
Euros raised respectively in September and October 2005. After the IPOs, these 
companies placed new shares on the stock market to increase capital several times. 
SolarWorld, for instance, received liquid funds worth 233.7 million Euros by the 
placement of new shares in 2006. Secondly, they issued corporate bonds and 
convertible bonds in order to be able to implement their investment plans. For example, 
Sunways issued convertible bonds in a nominal amount of 10 million Euros in 2004, 
and SolarWorld sold its corporate bond with seven per cent yield for seven years in 
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2004. Thirdly, they utilised bank loans only as part of their long-term investment plans. 
For instance, SolarWorld financed less than 45 per cent of its expansion costs through 
banks in 2004. Furthermore, they were provided with substantial grants and subsidies 
by governments for their investments, as I describe later (V.3.3.2.5).      
 
Concerning the growth of the domestic PV market, as described earlier (V.3.3.1.3), due 
to the feed-in tariff scheme, the German PV market has grown faster than any other 
country in the world. Consequently, the German PV industry has been led mainly by the 
expansion of the domestic market, even though its export ratio has increased as shown 
in Table V-4. In terms of PV support policy such as the 100,000 roof programme and 
the increase of feed-in rates, most of the new generation of PV firms expected 
tremendous growth of demand for PV and invested heavily. In reality, expansion of the 
market was realised and they supplied the market with PV products. Figure V-19 shows 
us the PV demand and supply in Germany. 
 
Figure V-19 PV demand and supply in Germany (unit: MWp) 
 
Source: „Statistical data on the German PV industry‟ (BSW, 2010) 
 
Table V-4 Export ratio in the German PV industry  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
% 14 19 34 38 48 47 
Source: „Statistical data on the German PV industry‟ (BSW, 2010) 
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3.3.2.3 Cost Reduction through Technological Development 
 
As I note in the previous sub-section (V.3.3.2.2 p. 100), development of technology is 
one of the ways that enables the German PV industry to grow. In fact, cost reduction 
and improvement of conversion efficiency of crystalline silicon PV cells have been 
achieved mainly by the new generation of PV firms. Cost reduction was accomplished 
mainly by process innovation, namely, improvement of the existing production process 
and introduction of a new method of production process. For example, decreasing wafer 
thickness directly results in cost reduction by saving poly silicon material which 
normally accounts for about 30 per cent of the value of PV cells. In fact, Q-Cells and 
SolarWorld have attained a decrease of wafer thickness from 330 μm57 to 180 μm, as 
shown in Table V-5. This means that the consumption of poly silicon is reduced by 
about 45 per cent.   
 
Table V-5 Decrease of wafer thickness (unit: μm) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Q-Cells 330 275 230 200 180  
SolarWorld   240 210  180 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report  
 
Another process innovation in the production of crystalline-silicon PV cells is string 
ribbon technology. Instead of sawing wafers from silicon ingots with wire saws as in the 
conventional method, two strings are used to grow silicon ribbon directly from molten 
silicon. Like a film of soapy liquid forms inside a bubble blower, a silicon ribbon forms 
between two strings. The silicon crystallises between the strings and is then cut into 
wafers with a laser. This new process can reduce silicon consumption by 30 to 35 per 
cent because of no sawing waste. In fact, EverQ GmbH (present Sovello), a joint 
venture between Q-Cells and the US Evergreen Solar, commercialised this technology 
in 2005.  
 
Improvement of cell efficiency has been another technological goal in reducing the cost 
of PV electricity. In fact, the new generation of PV firms have achieved around 30 per 
cent increase of efficiency from 14 % to 18 %, as listed in Table V-6. 
                                                 
57
 Micron meter is a unit of length equal to one millionth (10
-6
) of a meter. 
104 
 
Table V-6 PV cell efficiency of the new generation of PV firms (unit: %) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
SolarWorld 
Poly 14 15     18  
Mono       20  
Q-Cells 
Poly      17   
Mono    20.5* 
(100cm²) 
   17.4 
Sunways 
Poly 14 15.7      16 
Mono  16.7      18.4 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report 
Poly: Poly crystalline silicon cells 
Mono: Mono crystalline silicon cells 
* a medium sized industrially applicable cell    
 
Although their R&D personnel ratios are around 5 to 10 per cent (Sunways: 10.4, Q-
Cells: 7.8, Schott Solar: 6, SolarWorld: 4.5), basically, their technological achievements 
have been achieved by cooperation with other actors such as research institutes, 
universities, equipment suppliers, technical companies, and competitors. In other words, 
these companies benefit from access to the comprehensive knowledge and long-
standing experience of renowned research institutes, universities and also sometimes 
other solar companies, and are not self-sufficient in developing technology. Firstly, they 
have cooperated with world leading research institutes and universities such as the 
Fraunhofer Society and Konstanz University in the research of PV technology. 
Sometimes they participated in government research projects and sometimes they 
contracted licensing with research institutes and technical companies. This kind of 
industry-university or -research institute cooperation has been a strong tradition of the 
German political economy since the late nineteenth century, as I mention earlier (V.2.1 
p. 69). It is the strong partnership with world leading research institutes and universities 
that is one of the institutional advantages which makes the German PV industry a world 
leader. Table V-7 summarises this kind of cooperation in the German PV sector. 
 
Table V-7 Cooperation with universities/research institutes 
 Research institutes and universities Project or technology 
Q-Cells 
ISE Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems 
IFSH Institute for Solar Energy Research 
CSP Fraunhofer Center for Silicon PV 
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands 
(ECN) 
Efficiency improvements 
Ultra-high-efficiency cells 
Thin film processes 
Polycrystalline production 
Contact placement 
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Helmholtz Centre 
University of Konstanz 
SolarWorld 
Technical University of Freiberg 
Fraunhofer Society 
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands 
(ECN) 
Silicon recycling 
Semiconductor materials 
RGS (Ribbon Growth on 
Substrate) 
Sunways 
Konstanz University of Applied Sciences 
PROKON project (federal government‟s 
support) 
RGSell poject 
Solar Valley Central Germany research with 
nine partners 
ISE Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems 
Solar inverter 
Reverse contact solar cell 
RGS (Ribbon Growth on 
Substrate) 
Ultra thin cells (150μm) 
 
Exclusive license on inverters 
Schott Solar 
ISE Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems 
German Aerospace Center 
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands 
(ECN) 
Government project with Merck KGaA 
 
 
 
Flexible, organic cells (efficiency: 
10%) 
 Source: Each firm‟s annual report 
 
Secondly, they have cooperated with other PV companies to incorporate Joint Ventures 
(JVs) and participate in stock holding of other firms. This kind of cooperation is 
summarized in Table V-8. This inter-firm cooperation was dominated by development 
of thin film technology which was not at a mature stage compared with crystalline-
silicon PV technology. Whereas the industry-university or -research institute 
cooperation focused on silicon solar cell technology as their core competence, the inter-
firm cooperation focused on thin film technology.  
 
Table V-8 Cooperation with other PV firms 
 PV firms Technology 
Q-Cells 
JV (EverQ) with a US Evergreen  
JV (Solibro) with a Swedish Solibro AB 
CSG Solar (holding under 50% stake) 
Solaria (holding under 50% stake) 
Brilliant 234 (subsidiary) 
Calyxo (subsidiary) 
VHF-Technologies (subsidiary)  
Sontor (subsidiary) 
String ribbon technology 
CIGS module (thin film) 
Crystalline silicon on glass (thin 
film) 
Low-concentration PV technology 
Micromorph technology (thin film) 
CdTe module (thin film) 
Flexible thin film 
Silicon based tandem thin film 
SolarWorld 
Cooperation with a US GT Equipment Tech. 
OEM with a Japanese Sharp 
JV (Joint Solar Silicon) with Degussa AG 
Solar silicon 
 
Solar silicon 
Sunways Cooperation with Unaxis AG Micromorph technology (thin film) 
Schott Solar 
JV (Wacker Schott Solar) with Wacker 
Chemie 
Cooperation with ersol Thin Film GmbH 
Wafer 
Micromorph technology (thin film) 
106 
 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report 
 
Furthermore, they have collaborated with the German equipment industry which has 
been strongly competitive in the world market through the construction of the most 
modern semiconductor and electronics manufacturing facilities. Because almost all the 
production processes of PV cells are automated, equipment suppliers play a significant 
role in improving the production processes of solar cells. In fact, the six German 
equipment companies were among the top ten companies in the world, as shown in 
Table V-9, and their sales have increased along with the rapid expansion of the world 
PV production capacity, as shown in Table V-10. Proximity to the world leading 
equipment supplier is likely to be one of the technological advantages of the German 
PV industry. 
 
Table V-9 Top ten companies in the solar cell equipment industry 
ranking company nation Sales in 2008(m. USD) 
1 Applied Materials The US 455 
2 Roth & Rau AG Germany 275 
3 Centrotherm GmbH Germany 270 
4 Oerlikon Balzers AG Switzerland 250 
5 Ulvac Inc. Japan 240 
6 Manz Automation AG Germany 140 
7 Schmid GmbH Germany 125 
8 Von Ardenne GmbH Germany 120 
9 Rena Sondermaschinen GmbH Germany 85 
10 Swiss Solar Systems Switzerland 70 
Source: VLSI research study, 2008 
 
Table V-10 Sales of the German PV machinery manufacturers (unit: Euro billion) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Sales (billion Euro) 0.2 0.5 0.9 2.4 2.0 
Export ratio (%) 31 37 40 68 79 
Source: BSW, 2010 
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3.3.2.4 Vertical Integration within the Value Chain 
 
Generally speaking, the silicon-crystalline PV value chain is composed of four parts: 
poly-silicon (raw material); ingots and wafers (intermediate goods); cells (intermediate 
goods); and modules (finished goods). Within the value chain, boundaries of the firm 
seem to have a tendency to expand forward or backward. However, the degree of 
vertical integration within the value chain is mainly determined by consideration of 
three factors: economies of scale; economies of scope; and economies of diversification 
(Dunford and Greco, 2006).  
 
Dunford and Greco (2006) argue that economies of scope especially influence the 
decision of firm boundary within the value chain as follows: 
 
Economies of scope are connected with the range of products a firm makes. This range 
depends in part on the degree of vertical integration upstream into activities supplying 
inputs and downstream into activities involving further transformations of the 
commodities it produces. In these cases the scope of a firm depends on a series of „make 
or buy decisions‟ and on choices between markets and hierarchies as coordination 
arrangements. These decisions depend on relative internal and external production costs 
and the costs of organization of economic activities. Organization costs comprise (1) the 
costs of internal coordination, which increase as a firm integrates upstream and 
downstream, and (2) transaction, or external coordination, costs, which increase as 
vertical integration declines and the volume of market transactions or transactions across a 
firm‟s boundaries increases (Dunford and Greco, 2006, p. 50).  
 
In other words, the strategies of integration are decided on the basis of the sum of 
production costs, internal coordination costs, and external transaction costs. Firms tend 
to minimise the sum of these costs through the decision of firm boundary within the 
value chain. 
 
Furthermore, from this perspective, value chains can be categorized into three types of 
production networks: market relations; vertical near-integration; and vertical integration 
(Dunford and Greco, 2006). When coordination costs are lower, information are more 
available, and asset specificity are lower, market relations are more appropriate, while 
the opposite is vertical integration. Vertical near-integration is favoured somewhere 
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between them (Dunford and Greco, 2006).   
 
Two contrasting cases are Q-Cells and SolarWorld. Q-Cells can be a representative 
model for „vertical near-integration‟, while SolarWorld can be a representative model 
for „vertical integration‟. Firstly, in terms of production capacity, Q-Cells has focused 
on the specification of cell production, while SolarWorld has extended its production 
value chain from wafers to poly-silicon demonstrating backward integration and from 
wafers to cells and modules demonstrating forward integration. Thus, Q-Cells has 
concentrated on the faster expansion of solar cell production capacity, while SolarWorld 
has completed the vertical integration from silicon to modules, as shown in Table V-11. 
 
Table V-11 Annual production capacity within the value chain (unit: MWp) 
 Value chain 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Q-Cells Cells   22 63 170 292 420 645 860 800 
SolarWorld 
Poly-si*(ton)      2 810 1,200 2,250  
Wafers  32 55  120  180 245 385 600 900 
Cells    30   60 185 205 260 450 
Modules   10  50 54 90 140 185 310 500 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report 
* Including recycling capacity    
 
Secondly, however, Q-Cells has sought to secure stable vertical customer-supplier 
relationships through vertical near-integration rather than via market relations. In fact, it 
tried to establish strong partnerships with suppliers and customers who are shown in 
Table V-12. For example, it bought 17.2 per cent of the shares of the Norwegian 
company REC (Renewable Energy Corporation), which was the world‟s largest 
manufacturer of poly silicon and silicon wafer, in order to consolidate a strategic 
partnership.      
 
Table V-12 Q-Cells‟ strategic partners in the value chain 
Value chain 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Poly-si  REC REC Elkem Solar 
(Norwegian) 
Timminco/BSI 
Wafers ScanWafer 
(REC group) 
  LDK Solar 
(Chinese) 
 
Modules  Solon AG 
(German) 
   
Source: Q-Cells‟ annual reports 
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Another issue related to value chains is relocation of production facilities to lower-cost, 
overseas areas. Q-Cells moved its production facility from Germany to Malaysia in 
2008, and Schott Solar have operated a factory at Valašskè Meziříčí in the Czech 
Republic. In addition, due to the trade barriers and local incentives, SolarWorld 
constructed production capacity in Hillsboro in Oregon, USA, and Schott Solar built a 
factory in Albuquerque in New Mexico, USA. 
 
 
3.3.2.5 Other Government Support 
 
The feed-in tariff is not the only form of government support. Other government 
support includes the establishment of „Solar Valley Central Germany (Solarvalley 
Mitteldeustchland)‟. This cluster policy has played a major role in the success of the 
German PV industry. The „Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland‟ consists of three Länders as 
follows under the sponsorship of the Federal Ministry for Education and Research 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung and Forschung): the Free State of Thuringia 
(Thüringen), the Free State of Saxony (Sachsen), and the Saxony-Anhalt (Sachsen-
Anhalt) (Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland, 2010). The cluster members are 29 global PV 
companies, 9 renowned research organizations, and 4 universities (Solarvalley 
Mitteldeutschland, 2010). Its support policies are mainly investment grants, R&D 
subsidies and reduction of operating costs. Investment grants are allowed to cover up to 
30 to 50 per cent of eligible investment costs, and R&D projects are provided with 
subsidies to cover up to 50 to 80 per cent of their expenses by the Länder (LEG, 2009). 
Furthermore, 80 to 100 per cent of costs for training and qualification of employees are 
paid for by the Länder (LEG, 2009). These supports are connected to the European 
Structural and Cohesion Funds, as I mentioned in sub-section 2.3.2. 
 
In fact, a total budget of 150 million Euros has been allocated to 98 joint projects over 
five years, half of which is being financed by the public sector (Solarvalley 
Mitteldeutschland, 2010). Q-Cells, Sunways, SolarWorld, and Schott Solar have 
participated in these projects. With regard to investment grants, these subsidies seem to 
be more helpful to start a new PV company in former eastern German area in the 1990s. 
According to interviews, public subsidies from the European Union and the state 
government accounted for 35 per cent of the initial financing of Deutsche Solar AG (a 
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current SolarWorld AG) company in 1994 (Woditsch, 2011). And Saxony-Anhalt 
state‟s subsidy influenced strongly on the decision of Q-Cells to locate in Thalheim, 
when it was looking for a site to construct a large solar cell factory in 2000 (Seifert, 
2011). Furthermore, according to firm‟s annual reports, SolarWorld was provided with 
73 million Euros for the expansion of solar factories in Freiberg of Saxony in 2003, and 
Q-Cells received a grant of approximately 21 million Euros for the construction of 
factories in Thalheim of Saxony-Anhalt in 2004. 
 
Mainly due to these supports, approx. 75 per cent of all solar cell production in 
Germany and approx. 65 per cent of German PV manufacturers are located in the 
„Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland‟ (Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland, 2010). The main PV 
companies in the cluster are listed in Table V-13.  
 
Table V-13 Main PV companies in the Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland 
State Wafers Cells Modules 
Thuringia 
Bosch Solar in Arnstadt 
Schott Solar in Jena 
PV Crystalox in Erfurt 
Bosch Solar in Erfurt 
Sunways in Arnstadt 
Bosch Solar in Erfurt 
Schott Solar in Jena 
 
Saxony SolarWorld in Freiberg SolarWorld in Freiberg SolarWatt in Dresden 
SolarWorld in Freiberg 
Saxony-Anhalt PV Crystalox in 
Bitterfeld 
Q-Cells in Thalheim 
Sovello in Thalheim 
 
Source: Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland‟s web site 
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4. IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE ON THE 
NECESSARY FUNCTIONS 
 
In this section, I shall examine the inter-relationship between the institutional 
advantages of the German political economy and the evolution of the German PV 
industry. In other words, I shall attempt to answer the question: what was the impact of 
institutional advantage on the four necessary functions (market formation, capital 
mobilisation, process innovation, and cost reduction) for the development of the PV 
industry? 
 
4.1 Market Formation 
 
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, there were several demand-pull policies 
implemented to stimulate the PV market such as the 1,000 roof programme and the 
Aachen model. These policies were remarkable market creations compared to the 
previous space satellite market in the 1970s and the RDD programmes in the 1980s. 
Still, in terms of market size, these measures were not enough for the PV industry to 
grow fast. In fact, a substantial PV market was not created until the emergence of the 
Red-Green coalition government.  
 
After taking over the government, the Red-Green coalition implemented the 100,000 
roof programme and revised the feed-in law (EEG). The feed-in rate for PV electricity 
increased from 17 to 99 pfennig (approx. 50 Euro cents) per kWh in 2000. This was the 
most significant institutional change affecting the creation of PV markets in Germany. 
Due to this change, the German PV market has grown at an unprecedented rate and has 
become the largest in the world since 2005.  
 
In terms of market creation, it is clear that Germany has an overwhelming institutional 
advantage compared to other countries. The German PV industry benefits from having 
the largest domestic PV market in aspects of logistics, marketing, producer-customer 
relationship, etc. Furthermore, the German PV industry seems to be relatively free from 
trade disputes and dependency on the global market compared to other countries. Thus, 
it is difficult to deny that the German PV market has contributed to the development of 
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the German PV industry. 
 
However, the growth of the German PV industry is attributable not only to the German 
PV market but also to other factors. The existence of a certain level of domestic market 
is not a sufficient condition for the development of a PV industry. Thus, it is necessary 
to examine other factors which contributed to the success of the German PV industry in 
the next sub-section. 
 
 
4.2 Capital Mobilisation 
 
Capital mobilisation is the essential function for the development of the PV industry, 
because the silicon solar cell industry is capital-intensive. Overall, the well-developed 
German financial market has enabled the German PV industry to mobilise capital so 
that it can invest in the expansion of its production capacity. In addition, investment 
grants and subsidies by governments have played a substantial role in starting and 
growing the German PV industry since German unification in the 1990s. 
 
Firstly, banking loans have been one of the main sources of capital for the German PV 
industry, as they were for other German industries. Since the 19
th
 century, it has been a 
tradition for the German bank to invest in promising industries such as the iron and steel 
industries, as I mention in V.2.1 (p. 67).  
 
Secondly, the German stock market and corporate bond markets have played a critical 
role in raising funds for the German PV industry. In particular, when investors‟ 
expectation of the PV industry turned optimistic, German PV firms utilised this 
opportunity for fund raising. For example, Ersol and Q-Cells mobilised about 153 and 
240 million Euros respectively through initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange in 2005.  
 
Thirdly, government subsidies have been effective in boosting the growth of the 
German PV industry in terms of corporate financing. Since the unification of Germany 
in 1990, there have been many regional subsidy programmes which are co-financed by 
the European Union, the federal and state (Länder) governments (Klodt, 2003). The 
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German PV industry is one of the beneficiaries of these subsidy programmes. In 
particular, „Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland‟ is one of the regional subsidy programmes, 
focusing on the PV industry in the three states: Thüringen, Sachsen, and Sachsen-Anhalt.    
 
 
4.3 Process Innovation 
 
Building a technological capability is one of the necessary functions for the 
development of the PV industry. In particular, process innovation was one of the main 
issues in the crystalline-silicon solar cell industry in the 2000s, as I discuss earlier 
(III.4.2.2 p. 52). Historically, Germany has had a strong tradition of collaboration 
between firms, research institutes, universities and other firms in terms of research and 
development since the nineteenth century, as mentioned in V.2.1 (p. 69). The German 
PV industry is not an exception. 
 
Process innovation in the German c-Si cell industry has been achieved mainly in two 
fields: decreasing the thickness of wafers; and increasing the conversion efficiency of 
solar cells. In fact, the German PV industry has decreased the thickness of wafers from 
330μm to 180μm and has increased the conversion efficiency of c-Si cells from 14 % to 
18 %.  
 
These achievements are largely attributable to the institutional advantage of the German 
economy in research and development. Firstly, the division of research and 
development is well-organised and well-developed between universities, research 
institutes, technical companies (most of them are small and medium-sized enterprises), 
joint ventures and other firms (Ettrich, 2011). Sometimes, intellectual property rights 
became a main issue in collaboration over R&D
58
, but most of R&D was conducted 
through collaboration between them, as I describe in V.3.3.2.3 (p. 104). In addition, 
governments and public research institutes have encouraged technology diffusion and 
knowledge transfer through public funding for these R&D collaborations. 
  
                                                 
58
 According to an interview, one German PV company is reluctant to collaborate with other 
organisations in R&D, because it prefers monopolising knowledge and technology to sharing 
them with other firms (Ettrich, 2011). 
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Secondly, the existence of competitive equipment suppliers has also contributed to 
process innovation in the German PV industry, because equipment suppliers are the 
main source of innovation in the PV industry. In fact, the world-leading German 
machinery industry has provided the German PV industry with state-of-the-art 
equipment, thus the production processes of German PV cell manufacturers improved. 
 
In short, the German PV industry has been better at process innovation mainly due to 
the institutional advantage of the superior division of R&D and the existence of a 
competitive German machinery industry.  
 
 
4.4 Cost Reduction  
 
Average end-customer prices of PV systems
59
 have decreased from 5,000 to 2,546 
Euro/kWp since 2006 (BSW, 2011), as shown in Figure V-20. For five years, the price 
of PV systems has nearly halved. This is a consequence of dramatic cost reduction in 
the PV industry. Furthermore, according to the „PV-Roadmap 2020‟ of the German 
Solar Industry Association (BSW), the price of PV system is expected to drop to 1,500 
Euro/kWp by 2017 (Roland Berger SC and Prognos AG, 2010). If this price of PV 
systems is realised, installation of PV systems on the roof of house will be affordable by 
house owners without any support from the government (Chrometzka, 2011).  
 
Figure V-20 Decrease of PV system prices in Germany (unit: Euro/kWp) 
 
                                                 
59
 To be precise, these prices are the system price for installed roof-mounted systems of up to 
100 kWp (BSW, 2011). The PV system is mainly composed of PV modules and inverters. Thus, 
the price of a PV system is higher than that of a PV module. 
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Source: BSW, 2011 
 
On the one hand, this cost reduction has been attributed to two main drivers: one is 
improvement of technology; the other is the achievement of economies of scale in 
production capacity. In the area of technological improvement, the German PV industry 
has an institutional advantage for process innovation, as I discuss in V.3.3.2.3. 
Moreover, the German PV industry has been capable of rapid expansion of production 
capacity, because it could afford to mobilise capital with support of the financial market 
and governments, as I discuss in V.4.2 (p. 112).  
 
On the other hand, cost reduction has been pushed by the reduction of feed-in rates and 
global competition. In fact, the feed-in rate for PV electricity decreased from 50.6 
Eurocents/kWh in 2000 to around 25 Eurocents/kWh in 2011
60
 (Lauber and Mez, 2004; 
BSW, 2011). Furthermore, global competition has become more serious than ever 
before, especially due to the entries of Chinese PV companies. In particular, compared 
to the Chinese PV industry, the German PV industry has an institutional disadvantage in 
terms of other costs, such as labour costs and investment costs, etc. According to 
interviews, an initial wage of engineer who has a Master or PhD degree in PV firms is 
around 30,000 or 40,000 Euros/year respectively (Seifert, 2011). I shall discuss this 
issue in detail in chapter VIII (comparison of the three cases). To cope with these cost 
disadvantages, German PV firms attempted to relocate their production facilities to 
lower cost areas. Despite these efforts, the German PV industry has difficulty in 
competing with global competitors, mainly Chinese PV firms. This is a real challenge 
for the German PV industry to have to resolve in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60
 To be precise, the feed-in rates for PV systems in 2011 are as follows: building-integrated 
systems (28.74:<30kWp, 27.33:>30kWp, 25.86:>100kWp, 21.56:>1,000kWp); ground-
mounted systems (21.11: commercial zones, etc., 22.07: conversion and sealed areas) (BSW, 
2011) 
116 
 
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this chapter was to outline and explain the development of the German PV 
industry. The rapid development of this industry in Germany is, I have argued, a result 
of a set of political decisions to create a domestic market for solar energy and a number 
of other features of the German political economy.  
 
In this chapter I dealt first with the emergence of Germany‟s particular institutional 
configuration: the social market economy and the coordinated market economy (CME). 
This configuration underpins Germany‟s strength in a range of manufacturing industries. 
 
Secondly, I have explained the evolution of the German PV industry in the context of 
the German political economy. Strong political support for renewable energy sources 
resulted in the strongest demand-pull policy in the world. Furthermore, a strong 
tradition of collaboration between universities, research institutes and firms enabled the 
German PV industry to lead technological innovation. 
 
Lastly, I have attempted to examine the inter-relationships between institutional 
advantage of the German political economy and development of the PV sector. 
Germany has an institutional advantage in creating PV markets, the feed-in tariff 
scheme being the best example. Moreover, the German PV industry has been one of the 
technical leaders, benefiting from the German national systems of innovation. In 
addition, well-organised financial markets and government subsidies have enabled 
German PV firms to mobilise capital so that they could expand their production 
capacities rapidly. However, despite the German PV industry‟s success in reducing 
costs, Germany has an institutional disadvantage in terms of cost reduction, in particular, 
that of higher labour costs.  
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CHAPTER VI PV INDUSTRY IN CHINA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to investigate the emergence and growth of the PV industry in China. 
In particular, I shall shed light on the catching-up process of the Chinese PV industry 
and explain how China‟s institutional advantage facilitated the PV industry‟s 
development in terms of four drivers: market formation, capital mobilisation, process 
innovation, and cost reduction. China‟s institutional advantage has been changed along 
with the transition of China‟s political economy from a planned system to a market 
system. In order to explain the development of the PV industry and of these drivers of 
the industry‟s development attention must be paid to the political economy of 
contemporary China. Thus, it is necessary to start with an examination of the political 
economy of China and its historical foundations.  
 
As in the German chapter, the structure of this chapter is composed of three sections: 
China‟s political economy; the evolution of the PV industry; and the impact of four 
drivers on the evolution of the PV industry. Firstly, in section 2, I shall examine in brief 
the history of China‟s political economy. After World War II, a planned economic 
system was established under the Chinese Communist Party. Since the economic reform 
and open door policy, a socialist market system has been introduced and China‟s 
economy has grown fast alongside the rise in foreign direct investment and international 
trade. Finally, by joining the WTO in 2001, China has integrated further into the global 
economy than ever before.  
 
Secondly, in section 3, I shall analyse the catching-up process of the PV industry in 
China. Under the planned economy system, there were a few solar cell factories. These 
factories upgraded in the 1980s and 1990s, but they still fell far behind foreign PV 
companies. In the late 1990s, a new generation of PV firms emerged in China. In an 
initial stage, these firms were strongly supported by local governments. As the global 
PV market expanded in the 2000s, they also grew fast and caught up with foreign 
leading companies not only in terms of production capacity but also in terms of 
technological capability.  
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Lastly, in section 4, I shall analyse how the four drivers functioned in the process of 
catching-up. In terms of mobilising capital, mainly due to local state corporatism, the 
Chinese PV industry succeeded in raising funds despite the high risk of investing in the 
early 2000s. After market conditions became more optimistic, foreign stock markets had 
a key role in mobilising capital for the Chinese PV industry. With regard to market 
creation, despite an insufficient domestic market, the Chinese PV industry grew fast 
mainly due to successful penetration in the European PV market. Moreover, the new 
generation of PV firms improved through importation of cutting-edge equipment and 
learning by manufacturing. In addition, in order to achieve cost reduction they utilised 
cost advantages in China such as low labour costs, low R&D costs and low expansion 
costs.    
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2. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA 
 
2.1 Planned Economy : 1950s – 1978 
 
After the Second World War in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao 
Zedong established the People‟s Republic of China (PRC). At this time, Chinese leaders 
chose „a heavy-industry-oriented development strategy‟ in order to recover, and 
modernise China‟s war-torn agrarian economy by turning it into an industrialised one61 
(Lin and Cai, 1996). Moreover, partly due to the influence of the former USSR, Soviet-
style industrial organisations were introduced and an extensive range of technologies 
was imported from the former USSR
62
 (Liu and White, 2001). As a consequence, this 
strategy, in concert with socialist ideology, resulted in forming a central planned 
economic system in China (Lin and Cai, 1996).  
 
In 1952 the CCP set up the State Planning Commission (SPC) which had ultimate 
control over economic plans and resource allocation (Pyle, 1997; Liu and White, 2001). 
„[The SPC] issued annual and 5-year plans that dictated both the operational and 
“strategic” objectives and activities of primary actors. This included new R&D and 
production project selection, capital and labour allocation, production levels, price-
setting, distribution and others‟ (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1097).   
 
Under the SPC‟s planning, the central government and governmental industrial bureaus 
managed functionally specialised organisations by deciding and regulating their 
activities (Liu and White, 2001; Marigo, 2009). 
 
Government research institutes and state-owned manufacturers, namely factories
63
, were 
                                                 
61
 Lin and Cai (1996) argue that Chinese leaders selected „a heavy-industry-oriented 
development strategy‟ because of the following reasons. „At that time, a developed heavy-
industry sector was the symbol of the nation‟s power and economic achievement‟ (Lin and Cai, 
1996, p. 202). Furthermore, for national security, China needed to industrialise itself as soon as 
possible to have capital goods and military materials (Lin and Cai, 1996). 
62
 „During the first 5-year plan in the early 1950s, China imported 156 large turnkey facilities, 
mostly in heavy industry, power generation, mining, refining, chemicals and machine tools‟ 
(Liu and White, 2001, p. 1097). 
63
 In the period of the planning system, manufacturers‟ main activities are production activities 
under the quantity target. Compared to normal firms under the market mechanism which is 
operated by demand and supply, these manufacturers have little management autonomy. From 
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under the control of the government (Marigo, 2009). The role of government research 
institutes was to carry out research in accordance with the government plan (Marigo, 
2009). Factories produced their products in accordance, not with market demand, but 
with production targets set by the government (Marigo, 2009).  
 
In short, the planned economy was fundamentally different from the market economy in 
that administrative activities replaced market mechanisms in allocating resources and 
setting prices of goods and services. 
 
In view of innovation theories, the planned economic structure had two significant 
characteristics compared with the market economy during the period before economic 
reform: one was the lack of incentives for actors to innovate their economic activities; 
the other was the lack of incentives for actors to interact with others (Liu and White, 
2001; Marigo, 2009).   
 
Firstly, there was no incentive for researchers and factory managers to import or imitate 
a new technology or to innovate proactively. „There was neither market competition, 
profit, nor other operational efficiency-based criterion for performance‟ (Liu and White, 
2001, p. 1098). Thus, factory managers did not take any initiatives to innovate 
production processes or products (Gu, 2001). Therefore, this lack of incentive resulted 
in an ineffectiveness of the innovation system in introducing and improving technology 
in the factories
64
 (Liu and White, 2001). 
 
Secondly, there was no incentive for economic actors to share their field knowledge or 
feedback information. Research institutes, factory managers, distributors and users had 
strong relationships with the government or planners, mostly top-down relationships, 
while they had weak horizontal linkages amongst themselves (Liu and White, 2001).  
 
As a result, the experience of daily operations of factories, feedback of information 
from distributors and users, and the basic and applied knowledge of researchers 
                                                                                                                                               
this perspective, I will describe these manufacturers as „factories‟ in order to prevent confusion 
with the term of „firms‟.   
64
 „For example, the Liberation Truck, whose design and production lines China imported from 
the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, was unchanged during the 40 years that China has mass-
produced it‟ (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1098). 
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remained isolated sources of information rather than something to be shared and 
discussed. 
 
However, there is another evaluation of Mao‟s era in terms of whether it contributed to 
the economic growth of China. Arrighi (2007) argues that China‟s economic success is 
based on the social achievements of the Mao era. He uses an example in the agriculture 
sector as follows.  
 
The boom in agricultural production of 1978-84 did have something to do with the 
reforms, but only because they built on the legacy of the Mao era. Between 1952 and 1978, 
the communes had more than doubled China‟s irrigated farmland and disseminated 
improved technology, such as greater use of fertilizers and high-yielding semi-dwarf rice, 
which by 1977 occupied 80 percent of China‟s rice land (Arrighi, 2007, p. 370). 
 
Furthermore, China succeeded in restoring its economy from the devastated situation 
and accomplished to build the productive base during the planned economic period 
(Pyle, 1997; Arrighi, 2007). Many human development indicators such as „literacy rate, 
daily calorie intake, death rate, infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and so on‟ (Nolan, 
2004a p. 118 cited in Arrighi, 2007, p. 370) supported these economic and social 
achievements during this period. Therefore, although the annual economic growth rates 
in the Mao era were lower than those in the economic reform era, it would have been 
impossible for China to succeed in developing its economy during the economic reform 
era without these economic and social achievements during the planned economy.   
 
 
2.2 Economic Reform: 1978 – 1980s 
 
After the death of Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping seized power of the CCP in 1978 (Pyle, 
1997). Deng‟s philosophy on socialism and his attitude to social change65 became the 
cornerstone of Chinese economic reform from 1978 (Nolan, 2004b; Dunford, 2010a). 
                                                 
65
 Deng thought that poverty was not the symbol of socialism (Nolan, 2004b; Dunford, 2010a). 
In addition, pragmatism and gradualism were the key features of Deng‟s thoughts. Examples are 
as follows: „truth to be found in practice‟ (Deng, 1979 cited in Nolan, 2004b, p. 7); „I don‟t care 
if it‟s a white cat or a black cat. It's a good cat so long as it catches mice‟ (Deng, 1961 cited in 
Dunford, 2010a); and the approach on the social change like „groping for stones to cross the 
river‟ (Nolan, 2004a, p. 1). 
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Transition from a planned economy to a market one began in agricultural and rural areas 
and extended to industrial and urban areas during the period between 1978 and the late 
1980s. There were two fundamental institutional changes: one was the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS); the other was an emergence of Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs). The HRS, which included various forms of contracting systems in 
the agricultural sector, had replaced the commune system rapidly since 1979, reaching 
99 per cent of the Chinese agricultural system by 1983 (Pyle, 1997). As a result, 
agricultural output grew at unprecedented rates between 1978 and 1984 (Pyle, 1997). 
By 1985 the CCP leadership had ended mandatory planning in the agricultural sector 
and henceforth targets were used only for guidance and reference (Pyle, 1997). 
 
TVEs, which were not co-operatives but collectively-owned companies, were typically 
small business firms in the rural non-farm sector. They can be described as „national 
state-owned enterprises, with the „state‟ being the local community (xiang [township] 
and cun [village])‟ (Nolan, 2004a) under the monitoring of the local government. 
Despite superficial similarities, there were distinctive characteristics of TVEs which 
were fundamentally different from SOEs: contract-based relationships between the 
enterprise and workers; more autonomy for the manager of the enterprise, especially 
with regard to use of any profits (Nolan, 2004a). Arrighi (2007) argues the significant 
institutional changes which influenced the emergence of TVEs in the rural area were as 
follows: 
 
The emergence of TVEs was prompted by two other reforms: fiscal decentralization, 
which granted autonomy to local governments in the promotion of economic growth and 
in the use of fiscal residuals for bonuses; and a switch to the evaluation of cadres on the 
basis of the economic performance of their localities, which provided local governments 
with strong incentives to support economic growth. TVEs thus became the primacy loci of 
the reorientation of the entrepreneurial energies of party cadres and government officials 
towards developmental objectives (Arrighi, 2007, p. 362).  
 
TVEs also influenced the state sector, because labour and capital in China began to 
move towards the sector with higher returns (Nolan, 2004a). As a consequence, TVEs 
paved the way to prosperity for China‟s local governments, and the rapid growth of 
123 
 
TVEs created rural jobs in the non-agricultural sector, from 28 million jobs in 1978 to 
123 million in 1993 (Nolan, 2004a; Arrighi, 2007; Dunford, 2010a). 
 
By contrast, SOEs were still largely controlled by the state in the 1980s, although many 
attempts had been made to handover responsibility. One of the main reasons which 
made the reform of SOEs difficult was the relationship with their workers. SOEs 
provided their workers with jobs for life – the so called the „iron rice bowl‟ (Pyle, 1997). 
A labour contract system was introduced into SOEs in 1986, however, only 21 per cent 
of their workers were covered by this scheme by the end of 1992 (Pyle, 1997). 
Moreover, SOEs were still under the dual pricing system, which applied to inputs of 
raw materials in order to widen the influence of the market (Pyle, 1997).      
 
In regard to innovation theories, these economic reforms resulted in a fundamental 
change to China‟s systems of innovation. Liu and White (2001) argue that this system 
change led to two institutional changes. One was „the change in the legitimate criterion 
for evaluating performance‟ (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1099), and the other was „the 
decentralization of decision-making over both resource allocation within the economy 
and operational decisions within primary actors‟ (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1099). 
Therefore, these changes prevailed over almost all organizations including the 
agricultural sector, industries and research organisations during the economic reform 
period. 
 
 
2.3 Fast Growth through FDI and Trade: 1990s 
 
2.3.1 Surge of FDI 
 
In the first few years after the adoption of an open door policy in 1978, the amount of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in China was small, mainly due to uncertainty about the 
consistency of this policy. By the end of 1983, „the cumulative amount of FDI actually 
undertaken in China was less than $US 2 billion or rather less than 1 per cent of China‟s 
GDP‟ (Pyle, 1997, p. 110). However, after Deng Xiaoping‟s visits to the four Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) (Shenzhen, Zuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and 
Xiamen in Fujian Province), China gradually extended open regions from four SEZs, to 
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fourteen coastal cities and further to three golden triangles (the Pearl River delta, the 
Yangtze River delta, and the south Fujian River delta) despite ongoing controversies 
within the CCP. As a consequence, the amount of FDI in China soared rapidly in the 
first half of the 1990s and China became the recipient of more FDI than any other 
developing country by the mid-1990s (Lardy, 1995). Figure VI-1 shows the rapid 
growth of FDI in China in the 1990s. 
 
Figure VI-1 Foreign direct investment in China, 1979-1999 (unit: USD billion) 
 
Source: „China Statistical Yearbook‟ (NBSC, 2010) 
 
Besides the opportunity of a potential market and cheap but well-educated labour, Lardy 
(1995) adds to the main causes of the dramatic increase of FDI in China as follows: the 
trend of FDI in developing countries in the 1990s; China‟s political stability after the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989; attractive incentives for FDI (for example, special tax 
concessions and liberalised land leasing); and recycled capital of Chinese origin. 
However, Huang (2003) argues that the rise of FDI in the 1990s can be explained not 
only by a „supply perspective‟ but also by a „demand perspective‟. From the demand 
perspective, other determinants affecting the pattern of FDI were „the political pecking 
order of Chinese firms and the fragmentation of the Chinese economy‟ (Huang, 2003, p. 
3). Moreover, another driving force for FDI in China originated in local governments 
and institutions. For example, when SEZs were set up by the central government, local 
governments were more enthusiastic about expanding these regions than the central 
government (Pyle, 1997). According to Howell (1993 cited in Pyle, 1997), the 
Guangdong Party wanted the whole province to be designated as a SEZ and the Fujian 
Party was also lobbying for the introduction of a SEZ in its territory.  
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As I mentioned in the overseas Chinese model (II.2.2.2.3, p. 18), Chinese diaspora 
capital played a major role in opening up mainland China in the 1980s. Thanks to 
geographical, cultural, and linguistic advantages of overseas Chinese investors, they 
have enjoyed preferential treatment by the mainland Chinese in comparison to other 
foreign investors (Arrighi, 2007). Despite disadvantages compared to overseas Chinese 
capital, Japanese, American and European capital flooded into China in order to take 
advantage of China‟s economic expansion in the 1990s. In this way Japanese 
investment attempted to catch up with that of overseas Chinese investors in 1990 
(Arrighi, 2007). 
 
In view of the innovation approach, FDI can be regarded as one of the channels of 
technology transfer, as I mention in the latecomer firm model (II.2.3.2, p. 22) (Hobday, 
1995). In fact, most of China‟s leaders hoped that FDI would facilitate technology 
transfer, thus some regulations and incentives which encouraged foreign companies to 
form joint ventures with local companies were introduced in the open door policy (Pyle, 
1997). Although there seems to be no systematic evidence of spill-over effects of FDI in 
China at a national level, it is difficult to deny that FDI, to some extent, resulted in 
positive spill-over effects through reverse engineering, skilled labour turnovers, 
demonstration effects, and supplier-customer relationships, etc. (Young and Lan, 1997; 
Hu and Jefferson, 2002; Cheung and Lin, 2004). However, the performance of joint 
ventures between SOEs and foreign companies in particular was not sufficient to satisfy 
China‟s leaders (Young and Lan, 1997). 
 
However, this does not mean that FDI was the only channel of technology transfer. 
Indeed, the Chinese government has made an effort to build China‟s innovation 
capability mainly through its science and technology policy. For instance, many R&D 
programmes have been carried out by public funds and overseas Chinese scientists and 
engineers have been encouraged to return to mainland China (OECD, 2007). Also, in 
the PV sector, many public R&D programmes were carried out and returned scientists 
played a key role in technology transfer, as I describe in details in the next section (V.3).  
 
 
2.3.2 Trade on the Rise 
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As shown in Figure VI-2, the growth of international trade in China was phenomenal in 
the 1990s. Average annual growth rates of export and import in the 1990s were around 
15 and 12 per cent respectively. While the balance of China‟s trade was in deficit in the 
1980s, it turned to a surplus in the 1990s with the exception of 1993.  
 
Figure VI-2 Foreign trade in China, 1985-99 (unit: USD billion) 
 
Source: „China Statistical Yearbook‟ (NBSC, 2010) 
 
In terms of contents of trade, the main items of import were machinery, equipment and 
components, while the main items of export were labour-intensive manufacturing goods 
such as textiles, apparel, footwear and toys (Lardy, 1995; Pyle, 1997). As the flying 
geese model indicates (see II.3.2.1, p. 31), mature industry relocated in China in the 
1990s. For example, simple electronic goods such as televisions, radios and telephone 
equipment were assembled with imported parts and components in Chinese factories 
(Lardy, 1995; Pyle, 1997).  
 
With regard to firm-types and their export performance, foreign invested firms and 
TVEs performed better than SOEs (Lardy, 1995). In fact, the contribution of foreign 
invested firms to total exports in China increased rapidly from 1 per cent in 1985 to 48 
per cent in 2000 (Lardy, 2002).  
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2.3.3 Fiscal/Tax Reforms 
 
Fiscal reform has been one of the most important institutional changes during the 
process of industrialisation in China. Overall, the direction of fiscal reform in China was 
to allow „greater fiscal autonomy‟ (Pyle, 1997, p. 141) and incentives for local 
development (Oi, 1999). The first fiscal reform was introduced in 1980 as a tax revenue 
shared between local and central governments by contracting
66
 (Pyle, 1997). Basic 
principles of the fiscal reform were that „(i) revenue shares were fixed for four or five 
years (and not renegotiated each year), (ii) provinces determined the structure and level 
of their local spending (no longer were they told what they must spend in their local 
community) and (iii) provinces were held responsible for balancing their budgets and 
could not expect central government „to get them out of gaol‟‟(Pyle, 1997, p. 141).  
 
According to Oi (1999), this fiscal reform significantly changed the incentive system for 
local governments as follows: 
 
First, the central state no longer guaranteed upper-level budget allocations to meet local 
expenditures. China converted a vertical (tiao) apportionment system that had allocated 
revenues from the upper to the lower levels into a system in which localities had to rely 
primarily on horizontal flows (kuai) – that is, on income that they generated themselves. 
The impact of the 1980s reforms is captured by the colloquial phrase “eating in separate 
kitchens,” the antithesis of the situation during the Maoist period when everyone “ate 
from one kitchen.” Second, behaving more like a business organization than a public 
bureaucracy, China began to motivate its agents by granting local governments clear 
rights to any economic surplus that they were able to generate. Contrary to what some 
observers have argued, this surplus was not simply more “organizational slack”; it was a 
residual. The 1980s fiscal reforms eliminated the organizational slack for local 
governments, but it granted them rights to a residual. Even though these rights were 
granted to governments, not individual, the re-allocation of property rights gave localities 
positive inducements to promote rapid economic growth, which became not only a 
necessary strategy for bureaucratic survival but a viable strategy for getting ahead (Oi, 
1999, p. 28). 
                                                 
66
 Revenue sharing was, in practice, quite complex. Fiscal contracts existed between the central 
state and each province, between each province and its prefectures, between each prefecture and 
its counties, and between each county and its townships, although was not instituted the reform 
down to township level in all areas (Oi, 1992). 
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The second fiscal reform was introduced in 1994, resulting in a change from the fiscal 
contracting system to a tax system for profit. The major changes were „(i) the 
establishment of a unified enterprise tax, (ii) extension of VAT to become the principal 
form of indirect taxation, (iii) revisions to the personal income tax and (iv) revisions of 
the revenue-sharing arrangements‟ (Pyle, 1997, pp. 142-143). At the expense of a 
taxation authority, local governments accepted this reform expecting less interference 
by central government and more tax revenue with an efficient tax system (Pyle, 1997). 
 
As a result, fiscal/tax reforms have provided local governments with strong incentives 
to encourage fast growth of industries in their localities, as I describe earlier as „local 
state corporatism‟ (II.2.2.2.2, p. 17) (Oi, 1992; Oi, 1999). This kind of local government 
activism played an important part in the development of the PV industry in China, as I 
will describe in detail later (V.3.3.3).  
 
 
2.4 Joining the WTO and Globalisation: 2000s 
 
2.4.1 Before and after Joining the WTO 
 
After fourteen years of arduous negotiations, on the 11
th
 December, 2001, China 
became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Considering the massive 
institutional adjustments
67
 necessary to comply with WTO obligations and the heavy 
costs entailed, one wonders why the Chinese leaders agreed to enter the WTO. However, 
there seem to be internal and external background factors which led to the decision to 
enter the WTO. Firstly, it was imperative for Chinese leaders to reform SOEs and 
financial institutions further, because they considered the decline of SOEs and 
nonperforming loans of banks to be a serious problem (Lardy, 2002). In fact, the share 
of SOEs went down from 64.9 per cent of gross industrial output in 1985 to 15.6 per 
cent in 2002 (Baek, 2005), and the rate of nonperforming loans of China‟s four big 
banks
68
 was over 40 per cent of their total loans (Park, 2009). Secondly, it was likely 
                                                 
67
 For example, „nine hundred Chinese laws will need to be changed and/or adapted for China 
to enter the WTO‟ (Nolan, 2001, p. 195). 
68
 China‟s four big banks are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Ba
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that the Asian financial crisis was a wake-up call for China, even though the crisis did 
not impact directly on the Chinese economy (Lardy, 2002). Similarly to Korea and 
some other countries in Southeast Asia, China‟s financial system was threatened by 
excessive loans to China‟s SOEs and insolvency problems (Lardy, 2002). Therefore, 
„China‟s leadership envisages foreign banks and other foreign financial institutions as a 
source of competition that should improve the ability of domestic institutions to allocate 
resources to high productivity uses, contributing to greater economic efficiency and thus 
more sustainable growth‟ (Lardy, 2002, p. 16). More generally, China expected that its 
WTO accession resulted in removing import restrictions of trading partners and 
reducing tariffs on its exports. For instance, as a result of China‟s WTO accession China 
was granted a most-favoured-nation (MFN) status by the United States (Adhikari and 
Yang, 2002).   
 
After joining the WTO, the performance of the Chinese economy was remarkable. As 
shown in Figure VI-3, exports and imports grew very fast. Eventually, China became 
the largest exporter in the world surpassing the second largest, Germany, in 2009 (WTO, 
2010). More importantly, the composition of China‟s trade has changed since the late 
1990s. In the early 1990s, light manufacturing goods such as footwear, clothing and 
toys accounted for more than 40 per cent of China‟s exports, whereas, in the 2000s, the 
share of more sophisticated goods in their exports increased gradually such as 
electronics, furniture and travel merchandise (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004; Li, 
Dunford and Yeung, 2011). 
 
Figure VI-3 Foreign trade in China, 2000-2008 (unit: USD billion) 
                                                                                                                                               
nk, Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China. 
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Source: „China Statistical Yearbook 2005; 2009‟ (NBSC, 2010) 
 
FDI also grew steadily, as shown in Figure VI-4, making China the second largest 
recipient of FDI after the USA, from the late 1990s. 
 
Figure VI-4 Foreign direct investment in China, 2000-2008 (unit: USD billion) 
 
Source: „China Statistical Yearbook 2009‟ (NBSC, 2010) 
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2.4.2 Outward Internationalisation of Chinese Firms 
 
In the 2000s, listing on the foreign stock market became one of the main financial 
channels for Chinese firms
69
. At first, in the late 1990s Chinese firms such as China 
Mobile and PetroChina began to enter the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in order to tap 
the overseas capital pool. In fact, Chinese firms raised over USD 20 billion worth of 
funds from foreign stock markets in 2000 (Park, 2009). Chinese firms started to be 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq, and, in particular, small and 
high-growth information technology companies made initial public offerings (IPOs) in 
the US stock markets such as Chinese solar cell and module companies. The total worth 
of Chinese firms‟ IPOs on foreign stock markets were USD 20.5 billion in 2005 and 
USD 44.0 billion in 2006 (Park, 2009).   
 
Another distinctive feature of Chinese firms in the 2000s compared with the 1990s is 
the surge in outward direct investment (ODI) of Chinese firms. According to the 
Ministry of Commerce of China (2008), the amount of ODI increased from USD 1 
billion in 2000 to USD 26.5 billion in 2007. Figure VI-5 shows this increase. 
 
Figure VI-5 Outward direct investment of Chinese Firms (unit: USD billion) 
Source: „The Statistical Bulletin of China‟s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2007‟ 
(Ministry of Commerce, 2008)  
                                                 
69
 Because there were institutional reforms such as reforms of company laws with regard to 
corporate governance in the 1990s, Chinese firms were able to be listed on the foreign stock 
markets.  
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The main reasons for the surge in ODI can be listed as follows: efforts for securing 
energy sources; attempts to access state-of-the-art technology through merger and 
acquisition (M&A); green field-type investments mainly in Africa and Southeast Asia; 
and the „going global (zǒuchūqū) policy‟ under a huge amount of foreign reserves (Park, 
2009; Cheung and Qian, 2009). Focusing on M&A, for example, Lenovo acquired a PC 
part of IBM in 2004, TCL acquired a TV/DVD part of Thomson in 2004, and Geely 
bought Volvo in 2010 (Park, 2009; People‟s Daily Online, 2010). In the PV sector, 
Suntech bought MSK, a high-tech Japanese solar module company, and Kuttler, a 
German PV equipment company, in 2006 and 2008 respectively.   
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3. EVOLUTION OF THE PV INDUSTRY IN CHINA  
 
Unlike in the German case, Van de Ven and Garud‟s ILC theory does not seem to be 
relevant in analysing the evolution of China‟s PV industry. This is partly because the 
whole life cycle of the PV industry did not exist in China. In particular, the gestation 
period when basic knowledge was created, did not exist in the history of China‟s PV 
industry. Rather, Vernon‟s product life cycle theory is more relevant in examining the 
evolution of China‟s PV industry in that his theory explains relocation of the mature 
industry, as I discuss earlier (II.3.2.1 p. 32). Moreover, the evolution of China‟s PV 
industry was the process of catching-up with more advanced countries. Furthermore, 
before 1978, the Chinese economy was the planned system which was fundamentally 
different from the market economy. 
 
Therefore, I shall divide the history of the Chinese PV industry into three periods: the 
planned economy period (1950s – 1978); the period of the traditional PV firms (1980s – 
mid-1990s); and the period of the new generation of PV firms (late 1990s – 2000s).  
 
 
3.1 Under the Planned Economy: 1950s – 1978 
 
3.1.1 Research and Fabrication of Solar Cells 
 
As I describe in sub-section VI.2.1, in this period, research institutes and manufacturing 
organisations were owned by the government and their activities were under the control 
of the government. Within the planned economic system, basically the central and local 
governments ordered factories and research organisations to produce and conduct 
research through the top-down process.  
 
According to the literature, the first research into solar cells in China began in 1958 
(Cui et al., 1990; CRED, 2000; Yang et al., 2003; Marigo, 2009). However, hardly any 
research into solar cells seemed to take place due to various economic and political 
difficulties during the 1960s
70
. From the 1970s, the ministries of electronic industry, 
                                                 
70
 In the 1960s, the Chinese economy experienced negative growth twice mainly due to „the 
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metallurgy, aeronautic industry, education, communication and railway started to fund 
research into solar cells for practical reasons (Cui et al., 1990).  
 
The first application of solar cells in China was on the second space satellite in 1971
71
 
(Cui et al., 1990; Zhao, 2001). As the application of solar cells was extended from space 
satellites to terrestrial areas in Western countries, so the same extension of solar cell 
applications took place in China in the 1970s. „PV lamps for railway stations of Qinghai, 
photovoltaic beacon light at Tientsin, and the telecommunication for the metrological 
observatory at mountain Huashan, Shaanxi‟ (Cui et al., 1990, p. 1011) are examples of 
solar cell usage in China.  
 
With regard to the fabrication of solar cells, there were three factories producing solar 
cells during the 1970s. The first factory to produce solar cells in China was the „Kaifeng 
Solar Cell Factory (henceforth Kaifeng factory)‟ which was founded in 1964 in Kaifeng 
City of Henan Province (CRED, 2000). Kaifeng factory started to produce mono-
crystalline silicon solar cells from 1975 (CRED, 2000). The second factory was the 
„Ningbo Solar Power Source Factory (henceforth Ningbo factory)‟ which was founded 
in 1976 in Ningbo City of Zhejiang Province (CRED, 2000). Ningbo factory was a 
state-owned factory subordinated to the Electronic Instrument Bureau of Ningbo 
(CRED, 2000). The third factory was the „Yunnan Semiconductor Devices Factory 
(henceforth Yunnan factory)‟ which was founded in 1977 in Kunming City of Yunnan 
Province (CRED, 2000). Yunnan factory was also a state-owned factory under the 
Yunnan Chamber of Electronics and produced mono-crystalline silicon solar cells in 
1979 (CRED, 2000).  
 
These three factories, which were originally semiconductor production plants, converted 
their production lines into solar cell lines because the production processes for solar 
cells were similar to those for semiconductors at that time (Cui et al., 1990; Dai and Shi, 
                                                                                                                                               
Great Leap Forward‟ and „the Cultural Revolution‟: one period was from 1960 to 1962; the 
other period was from 1967 to 1968 (Pyle, 1997). Furthermore, during the Cultural Revolution 
many scientists, technicians, and university professors were attacked and criticised (Pyle, 1997). 
Therefore, almost all research activities were shrunk during and after the Cultural Revolution. 
71
 Since the 1950s the Chinese government had made an effort to develop technology capability 
in the fields of atomic energy, electronics, semiconductors, automation, computers and rockets 
under the „National Science and Technology Long-Term Plan‟ (Liu and White, 2001). And then 
China achieved a success in launching a satellite in 1970. 
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1999; Marigo, 2009). However, the production cost of solar cells was around 400 RMB 
(approx. USD 206)
72
/Wp in 1976 (Cui et al., 1990) because semiconductor production 
processes were not fully modified for solar cell production. Although the applications of 
solar cells gradually extended, the amount of solar cells installed was still limited due to 
the high cost of solar cell manufacture. In fact, the total production of solar cells in 
China reached merely 0.5 kWp, 1kWp and 2kWp in 1976, 1977 and 1978 respectively 
(Cui et al., 1990). In short, the Chinese PV industry lagged far behind the advanced 
Western PV industry during this period. 
 
 
3.2 Traditional PV Firms: 1980s – mid-1990s   
 
3.2.1 Upgrading the Traditional PV Firms 
 
Due to successful economic reform, economic activities in China became more vibrant 
than ever before and technological development and transfer systems changed. 
Horizontal links and interactions between various research institutions and between 
research institutions and enterprises increased, and research institutions became more 
independent of governments (Liu and Jiang, 2001; Liu and White, 2001). Although 
some enterprises asked research institutes to help them to solve specific problems, cases 
of strategic cooperation between them were still rare in China (Liu and Jiang, 2001).    
 
In line with this trend, three traditional solar cell factories (Kaifeng, Ningbo and 
Yunnan factories), which were all small and medium-size SOEs, upgraded their 
production lines through importation of solar cell equipment in the 1980s. In 1984, 
Yunnan factory imported all equipment for its production line of mono-crystalline-
silicon cells from the United States (Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 2000). In 1988, Ningbo 
and Kaifeng factories introduced advanced mono-crystalline-silicon solar cell 
technology through importation of the main key production equipment from ARCO (the 
US), Spire (the US) and British Petroleum (the UK), supported by the State Science and 
Technology Commission (Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 2000). Therefore, importation of 
                                                 
72
 In 1976, the official RMB/USD exchange rate was 1.94 (SAFE, 2010). 
136 
 
capital goods was one of the main ways for traditional PV firms to access and learn 
advanced PV technology. 
 
In 1989, the „Huamei PV Equipment Company of Qinhuangdao (henceforth 
Qinhuangdao factory)‟ entered into the solar cell sector. This state-owned company was 
jointly operated by the Hongguang Electronic Tube Factory and the Qinhuangdao 
Electronic Tube Factory in Qinhuangdao City of Hebei Province (Dai and Shi, 1999; 
CRED, 2000). Thus, the total number of traditional PV firms was now four. The 
location of them is shown in Figure VI-6. 
 
Figure VI-6 Location of the traditional PV firms in China 
 
Source: Author 
① Qinhuangdao factory; ② Ningbo factory; ③ Kaifeng factory; and ④ Yunnan factory 
 
Due to the upgrading of equipment and the entry of a new firm, the annual production 
of PV cells reached 400KWp in 1989 (Cui et al., 1990). The production of solar cells in 
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China in the 1980s is shown in Figure VI-7 and Table VI-1. The production level of 
solar cells soared in 1988 because foreign advanced equipment was imported at this 
time. 
 
Figure VI-7 Production of solar cells in China between 1978 and 1989 (unit: kWp) 
 
 
Table VI-1 Production of solar cells in China, 1978-1989 (unit: kWp) 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
kWp 2 5 8 15 20 30 50 70 80 100 300 400 
Source: „Development of Photovoltaic in China: Status and Future‟ (Cui et al., 1990) 
 
At this time, they employed over two hundred engineers and technicians and upgrading 
of production facilities and technological improvements were conducted by these local 
engineers and technicians
73
. However, the cost of solar cells in China was still higher 
than that of leading countries. It was around 40 RMB (approx. USD 11)
74
/Wp in the late 
1980s, because they imported the equipment only once, and also the production 
capacity was not large enough to achieve economies of scale (Cui et al., 1990). 
  
                                                 
73
 There were over 200 engineers and technicians in the four factories in the 1980s. 
Approximately, 80 engineers and technicians worked for the Yunnan factory, 70 for the 
Qinhuangdao factory, 45 for the Ningbo factory, and 40 for the Kaifeng factory (CRED, 2000). 
74
 In 1989, the official RMB/USD exchange rate was around 3.77 (SAFE, 2010). 
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3.2.2 Entry of Joint Ventures and Foreign Firms 
 
Since 1978 Chinese leaders had adopted „the open door policy‟ as one of the central 
themes of China‟s modernisation strategy. However, the amount of FDI that actually 
flowed into China was small in the 1980s. From the early 1990s, FDI began to increase 
in China as shown in Figure VI-1 (p. 124). Moreover, China set up incentive systems to 
encourage joint ventures (JVs) in order to facilitate technology transfer from foreign 
partners to Chinese partners (Pyle, 1997).  
 
Due to the incentive system for foreign investment in China, several JVs and foreign 
companies appeared in the solar cell sector as well as in other sectors in the 1990s. The 
„Harbin-Chronar Solar Power Company‟ was the first JV solar cell firm in China. This 
company, which was set up by the Harbin Steam Turbine Factory, the Heilongjiang 
Movie Machine Factory and the Chronar Corporation of the US, produced amorphous-
silicon solar modules and components from 1991 (Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 2000). 
Another JV solar cell firm was the „Shenzhen Yukang Solar Energy Ltd.‟. This 
company, which was set up by the Shenzhen government and the Korean and 
International Finance Company, also produced amorphous-silicon solar modules and 
components from 1992 (Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 2000). 
 
In the late 1990s, foreign solar cell companies rushed into China in order to sell their 
products, expecting a huge growth in the domestic PV market in China. This 
expectation was partly due to the electrification programmes of the northern and 
western provinces, as I describe in sub-section V.3.2.3.1. The foreign solar cell 
companies include: British Petroleum (the UK); Shell (the Netherlands); Siemens Solar 
(Germany); Sharp and Sanyo (Japan); SEC (the US) and Photomatt (France) (Dai and 
Shi, 1999).  
 
Even though the electrification programmes were implemented, the growth of domestic 
PV demand was not sufficient for JVs and foreign firms to earn profits. Finally, the 
Shenzhen Yukang Solar Energy Ltd. shut down in 1997 mainly due to operational 
losses (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
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3.2.3 Central Government Support 
 
3.2.3.1 Electrification of Northern and Western Provinces 
 
About 80 million people had no access to grid electricity in the rural area of China at the 
end of 1995 (Stone et al., 1998; CRED, 2000). Almost all of them lived in northern and 
western provinces, including Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Gansu and Inner Mongolia 
Provinces, which were some of the poorest areas in China. Most of them also suffered 
from a lack of clean water. The Chinese government did make efforts to electrify these 
areas through its own electrification programmes and international cooperation (CRED, 
2000). 
 
Firstly, the Chinese government implemented a series of national projects in order to 
solve non-electrification problems in rural areas: the National Eight-Seven Poverty 
Alleviation Program
75
, the China Brightness Programme
76
 and the Project to Raise 
Income Levels of the Poor by Introducing Electricity
77
 (CRED, 2000).  
 
Secondly, China‟s international cooperation with Western countries and international 
organisations helped Chinese rural areas to electrify by harnessing renewable energy 
sources: the US Department of Energy (DOE) Project, the Netherlands‟ Shell Project, 
the Eldorado Program (a Sino-German project), the World Bank and Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) Project, the United Nations Development Programme 
                                                 
75
 The aim of this program „is to help 80 million people dress warmly and get enough to eat by 
concentrating man-hours, material, and financial resources during the last seven years of the 
century. … A large part of the population without electricity in these counties may use PV and 
wind power to resolve the problem. … Household PV systems were distributed to meet the 
basic electricity demands of peasants and herdsmen in five provinces of southwest China, Inner 
Mongolia, and Tibet. In 1996, 50-W and 100-W household PV systems were installed in 400 
houses with no electricity. Two PV water-pumping systems with 800 W of solar cells were 
installed to irrigate orchards in poor mountain areas in Jianchang County of Liaoning Province‟ 
(CRED, 2000, pp. 62-63). 
76
 In order to solve the problem of no access to electricity grid in rural areas, this programme 
built „a certain number of PV systems to form some wind/PV, wind/diesel, and wind/diesel/PV 
hybrid systems‟(CRED, 2000, p. 63). 
77
 Due to this project, „small independent PV stations and solar PV generation systems were 
distributed in the regions rich in solar energy such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, 
Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia. An independent PV station with an installed capacity of 100 kW 
was built in Naquanduo County in Tibet in October 1998. That makes six county-level PV 
stations, and installed capacity totaled 250 kW at the end of 1998‟ (CRED, 2000, p. 64). 
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(UNDP) Project, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Project (CRED, 2000).     
 
Largely due to these national programmes and international cooperation in the 1990s, 
the annual PV installed capacity was increased. In fact, annual growth rates of it were 
around 30 per cent, except in 1997 (Dai and Shi, 1999), as shown in Table VI-2. In 
particular, the share of agricultural and rural electrification applications was gradually 
increased, and thus the domestic demand for PV systems was expanded rapidly mainly 
because of these electrification programmes in the late 1990s. Therefore, these 
programmes provided the traditional PV firms with domestic market demand. However, 
the amount of demand was still not sufficient considering the production capacity of the 
traditional PV firms, JVs, and foreign firms. In fact, the annual PV installed capacity 
was at most 2.3 MWp in 1997 (Dai and Shi, 1999), although the production capacity 
was about 4.5 MWp (CRED, 2000). 
 
Table VI-2 Annual PV installed in China, 1993-1998 (unit: kWp) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Agricultural and 
rural 
electrification 
270 
(30%) 
300 
(25%) 
465 
(30%) 
651 
(30%) 
920 
(40%) 
- 
Communication 450 
(50%) 
720 
(60%) 
853 
(55%) 
1085 
(50%) 
920 
(40%) 
- 
Others 180 
(20%) 
180 
(15%) 
232 
(15%) 
434 
(20%) 
460 
(20%) 
- 
Total annual PV 
installed 
900 
(100%) 
1200 
(100%) 
1550 
(100%) 
2170 
(100%) 
2300 
(100%) 
3000 
Growth rate  33% 29% 40% 6% 30% 
 Source: „Technological Innovation of the Chinese PV Industry‟ (Dai and Shi, 1999) 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Accelerating R&D into PV Technology 
 
Due to the success of economic reform, the average annual growth rate of GDP of PRC 
was around 10 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s (WorldBank, 2010). However, this rapid 
economic growth resulted in an increase in energy demand. Thus, the Chinese 
government made efforts to cope with a severe shortage of energy supply through: 
energy conservation; stepping up fossil fuels exploitation; and R&D into renewable 
energy. These efforts were reflected in the Sixth (1981-85) and Seventh (1986-90) Five-
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Year Plans (FYPs) (NTIS, 1984; Vermeer, 1986). In particular, government funds for 
R&D into PV increased by more than twenty million RMB (approx. USD 7.6 million)
78
 
within the Sixth and Seventh FYPs (Cui et al., 1990). 
 
In the Eighth (1991-95) and Ninth (1996-2000) FYPs, the funds for renewable energy 
reached 60 and 82 million RMB (approx. USD 9.2 and 12.6 million)
79
, respectively 
(CRED, 2000). Research institutions, colleges, universities and PV firms conducted 
research into high-efficiency and low-cost solar cells, supported by this public funding. 
For instance, Yunnan factory participated in several science and technology 
programmes during the Eighth and Ninth FYPs and Kaifeng factory also undertook a 
series of programmes within the Sixth and Eighth FYPs (CRED, 2000).  
 
In addition, the Chinese government formulated many R&D programmes in order to 
develop PV technology. In 1995, the State Planning Commission (SPC), the State 
Science and Technology Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission 
jointly formulated „the Development Program for China New and Renewable Energy 
during the Year 1996 – 2010‟ (CRED, 2000). Due to this programme, construction of 
mass production lines of poly-crystalline-silicon solar cells, upgrading of production 
lines of mono-crystalline-silicon solar cells and R&D into new types of high-efficiency 
and low-cost solar cells were carried out (CRED, 2000).   
 
As a consequence, Chinese PV technological stock was accumulated and the laboratory 
efficiency of solar cells was improved, as listed in Table VI-3. 
 
Table VI-3 Efficiency and size of solar cells in laboratories in China 
Cell Type Highest Efficiency (%) Maximum Size 
Mono-crystalline silicon 
20.4 
14.0 
2 x 2 cm 
10 cm (utility-type) 
Poly-crystalline silicon 
13.1 
12.0 
2 x 2 cm 
10 x 10 cm 
Amorphous silicon thin film 
8.55 
7.88 
6.17 
10 x 10 cm 
20 x 20 cm 
30 x 30 cm 
Source: „Commercialization of Solar PV Systems in China‟ (CRED, 2000) 
 
                                                 
78
 In the 1980s, the official RMB/USD exchange rate was 1.50 and 3.77 (SAFE, 2010). 
79
 In the 1990s, the official RMB/USD exchange rate was 4.78 and 8.28 (SAFE, 2010). 
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3.2.4 Evaluation of the Traditional PV Firms 
 
Compared with the period of the planned economy (1950s – 1978), several 
improvements of the PV sector were accomplished during this period (1980s – mid-
1990s). Firstly, production capacity was increased and upgraded by importation of 
equipment from advanced foreign suppliers. Secondly, R&D cooperation between 
manufacturers and research institutes appeared and increased. For example, Yunnan and 
Kaifeng factories participated in the national projects. Thirdly, the domestic PV market 
grew and reached over 2MWp annual demand in the mid-1990s mainly due to the 
electrification programmes in northern and western provinces. Finally, some firms (for 
example, Yunnan factory and Harbin-Chronar Solar Power Company) started to export 
solar cells and modules in the 1990s (CRED, 2000). 
 
However, compared to developed countries such as the US, Japan and Germany, the 
Chinese PV industry still lagged behind. Firstly, most production lines in the 1990s 
were out-of-date and production capacity was limited. The four mono-crystalline solar 
cell manufacturers still retained the same capacity and production lines which were 
imported in the 1980s (CRED, 2000). As a result, average photoelectric efficiency of 
Chinese commercialised silicon solar cells was 10-12 per cent, compared to 14-16 per 
cent in developed countries (Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 2000). In addition, the quality 
of solar modules was not competitive
80
 in the domestic market as well as in the global 
market. Moreover, the production capacity
81
 was not large enough to take advantage of 
economies of scale. Furthermore, the running rate of production capacity was around 50 
per cent due to the limitations such as shortages of wafers
82
or lack of operating finance 
                                                 
80
 After 3-5 years usage of some Chinese PV modules, yellowing, bubbling, delamination of 
contacts and an efficiency decrease happened due to the low packing quality. At that time, most 
of PV modules were made by hand in China (CRED, 2000). 
81
 The production capacity of four mono-crystalline silicon cell manufacturers was under 1MW 
(CRED, 2000). It was said that economies of scale could only be achieved over 30MWp 
capacity at that time. 
82
 „The equipment of most enterprises can‟t form a complete system, so there is a bottleneck in 
the production line. Among the four monocrystalline silicon manufacturers, only the Yunnan 
Semiconductor Factory has an equivalent production capability between silicon and 
components; however, the other three factories‟ capability to produce silicon is weak. The 
production capability of components is 1 MWp, 500 kWp, and 500 kWp in the Qinhuangdao 
Huamei PV Equipment Company, the Ningbo Solar Cell Company, and the Kaifeng Solar 
Power Source, respectively; however, their production of silicon is only 600 kWp, 300 kWp, 
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(Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 2000). Indeed, all solar cell firms had difficulty in making 
both ends meet and Chinese banks were reluctant to loan to solar cell firms due to their 
poor credit rating and the uncertainty of the solar cell market (Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 
2000).  
 
Secondly, in terms of the innovation approach, Chinese solar cell firms lacked access to 
advanced production process technology. For example, the thickness of wafers was one 
of the key factors in reducing production costs because it related to the amount silicon 
feedstock usage. Most Chinese firms used a knife cutting machine which produced 
wafers of about 400 μm thickness. By contrast, most foreign firms used a steel wire 
cutting machine which produced wafers of about 250 μm thickness (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
In the case of amorphous-silicon modules, Chinese manufacturers produced only single-
junction modules, whilst most foreign firms produced double-junction or triple-junction 
modules
83
 (CRED, 2000). As a result, the cost of Chinese PV modules was about 10 
per cent higher than that of foreign products, despite the cost of plant construction and 
labour being lower than that of foreign manufacturers (Dai and Shi, 1999; CRED, 2000).    
 
Thirdly, R&D activities were limited in terms of scale and achievements. The scale of 
most PV R&D projects was small because the projects depended heavily on government 
funding and applicants for limited R&D funds were numerous
84
. At that time, China had 
not established effective investment systems to support the development of high-
technology. Most enterprises had to rely on self-financing in order to acquire new 
technology (Liu and Jiang, 2001; Allen et al., 2005). However, the traditional PV firms 
could not afford to invest in R&D and process innovation in this period (CRED, 2000). 
Moreover, R&D cases were rarely successful in commercialising their R&D 
achievements mainly due to improper usage of R&D resources and projects being 
poorly organised (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
 
Fourthly, little feedback came from the domestic market. The share of PV household 
                                                                                                                                               
and 150 kWp. The production capability of silicon wafers heavily restricts the ability to increase 
the output of PV production‟ (CRED, 2000, p. 60). 
83
 In case of amorphous silicon modules, multi-junction modules are better in efficiency and 
stability than single-junction one. 
84
 At that time, there were „about 40 R&D institutions and manufacturers which were engaged 
in R&D on photovoltaic technology‟ (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
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systems in the domestic PV market increased gradually, as described in Table VI-2 (p. 
140). However, most users were people who lived in remote and poor areas. They 
usually did not care about technical performance or the efficiency of the systems (Dai 
and Shi, 1999). Therefore, the pressure from the domestic market was not strong 
enough for solar cell manufacturers to improve the performance of products.  
 
In conclusion, although the traditional PV firms had improved in some ways compared 
with their performance in the 1970s, they still lagged behind more advanced PV 
companies in aspects of production capacity and technological capability. 
  
 
3.3 New Generation of PV Firms: late 1990s – 2000s  
 
3.3.1 Growth of the Global PV Market 
 
After the Tokyo Protocol in 1997, many countries attempted to increase renewable 
energy resources through various support schemes. Mainly due to adopting the feed-in 
tariff scheme, solar PV installed capacity was also on the rise at this time. The annual 
PV installed capacity can be taken to mean the demand for PV systems. As shown in 
Figure VI-8, the global PV demand was driven mainly by two countries: Germany and 
Spain (EPIA, 2010). In particular in 2004, German demand for PV soared to an annual 
growth rate of 294 per cent, as shown in Table VI-4. Due to the explosion of the 
German market, the global demand in 2004 also doubled as in 2003. Thus, after 2004, 
market expectations for the PV industry changed from gloomy to bright. Therefore, the 
uncertainty around the PV market disappeared, to some extent, through the introduction 
of the feed-in tariff scheme, which guaranteed a relatively long-term fixed price for PV 
electricity (such as 20 years in Germany). Moreover, Spain accelerated global PV 
demand in company with Germany in 2007 and 2008, due to its adoption of the feed-in 
tariff scheme. 
 
Figure VI-8 Annual PV installed capacity of the top 7 countries (unit: MWp) 
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Source: „Global Market Outlook‟ (EPIA, 2010) 
 
Table VI-4 German and Spanish PV markets and growth rate (unit: MWp and %) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany 
81 83 153 603 863 830 1,135 1,532 3,414 
 3% 84% 294% 43% -4% 37% 35% 123% 
Spain 
     100 561 2,511 99 
      461% 348% -96% 
Source: EPIA, 2010 
 
 
3.3.2 Emergence of the New Generation of PV Firms 
 
From the late 1990s, a new generation of PV firms appeared in China, Trina Solar, 
which was founded in 1997, being the first. Thereafter, several PV firms, which are 
listed in Table VI-5 as the top 6 PV firms in China in terms of production capacity, 
entered into the solar cell sector and grew at an unprecedented speed and swiftly 
achieving the expansion of annual production capacity to over 300 MWp
85
.  
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 Although there are over 100 solar PV cell companies in China in 2010 (ECJRC, 2010), I 
shall focus on the listed companies on Table 4 in this thesis because of the following reasons. 
Firstly, 300MWp is regarded as the minimum capacity to achieve economies of scale in the PV 
industry. Secondly, these top 6 PV firms have led the PV industry in China. They are influential 
in China‟s PV industry from the point of view of technological capability as well as production 
capacity. Although Ningbo factory has over 300MWp production capacity (ECJRC, 2009), its 
main features are very different from the new generation PV firms. For example, its corporate 
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Table VI-5 Entry of the new generation of PV firms in China  
Name The year of establishment Product capacity in 2009 (unit: MWp) 
Trina Solar 1997 600 (ingot, wafer, cell, module) 
Yingli 1999 600 (polysilicon*,ingot, wafer, cell, module) 
Suntech 2001 1,100 (cell, module) 
Solarfun 2004 420 (ingot, wafer, cell, module) 
China Sunergy 2004 320 (cell) 
JA Solar 2005 875 (cell, module) 
Source: Each company‟s web sites, „PV Status Report‟ (ECJRC, 2009), and interviews 
*Yingli‟s subsidiary company, Fine Silicon, started a trial produced silicon feedstock in 2009.  
 
Due to the rapid growth of the new generation of PV firms, China has been ranked as 
the largest manufacturing country of PV in the world since 2008 surpassing Japan, as 
shown in Figure VI-9. Furthermore, four Chinese PV firms were ranked in the top 10 
manufacturers in the world at the end of 2009. Table VI-6 shows us this. 
 
Figure VI-9 PV production of the top 5 countries (unit: MWp) 
 
Source: BSW, 2009 and 2010; Roney, 2010; KNREC, 2009 
 
                                                                                                                                               
governance is still state-owned and its marketing directs more to the domestic market than to the 
global market. Thus, Ningbo factory can still be categorised as a traditional PV firm. Henceforth, 
the new generation of PV firms can be taken to mean the top 6 PV firms, unless otherwise stated. 
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Table VI-6 Top 10 solar cells manufacturers in the world at the end of 2009 
Rank Name Nationality Annual production of solar cells (MWp) 
1 First Solar The US 1,100 
2 Suntech China 704 
3 Sharp Japan 595 
4 Q-Cells Germany 586 
5 Yingli China 525 
6 JA Solar China 520 
7 Kyocera Japan 400 
8 Trina Solar China 399 
9 Sunpower The US 397 
10 Jintech Taiwan 368 
Source: Photon International (April 2010) 
 
This astonishing rise of the Chinese PV industry is on a par with other Chinese 
industries such as the marine container and personal computer sectors (Zeng and 
Williamson, 2007). How did this take place? What are the differences between the 
traditional PV firms and the new generation of PV firms? How did Chinese PV firms 
expand their production capacity faster than any other country? How did the Chinese 
PV sector acquire technological capability at a high enough level to compete with those 
of advanced countries? What were the roles of governments in these processes? These 
are key questions in explaining a success story of the PV industry in China. 
 
In order to answer these questions, I conducted field work in China in July, 2010. As 
part of this field work, I interviewed 9 firms, of which 6 were new generation PV firms. 
I also spoke to 1 policy maker and 5 experts who are involved in the Chinese PV 
industry. Hereafter, this chapter will be based on the interviews carried out during this 
field work. 
 
 
3.3.3 Rapid Expansion of Production Capacity 
 
In the late 1990s, crystalline-silicon solar cell technology became mature compared to 
thin film and organic solar cell technologies (Green, 2000). It has been said that 
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expanding production capacity quickly in order to achieve economies of scale is the best 
strategy to success in the PV industry (KPMG, 1999). In fact, the new generation of PV 
firms followed this strategy. As shown in Figure VI-10 and Table VI-7, total production 
capacity of these six firms started under 10 MWp in 2002 and reached around 4,000 
MWp at the end of 2009. Most of them expanded their production capacity annually. 
 
Figure VI-10 Production capacity of the top 6 PV firms in China (unit: MWp) 
 
Source: Annual reports and web sites of each firm and interviews  
 
Table VI-7 Production capacity of the top 6 PV firms in China (unit: MWp) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Suntech 10 30 60 150 270 540 1,000 1,100 
JA solar     75 175 600 875 
Yingli  30 50 100 100 200 400 600 
Solarfun      240 360 420 
Trina solar   6 6 28 150 350 600 
Sunergy    32 192 192 320 320 
total 10 60 116 288 665 1,457 3,030 3,915 
Source: Annual reports and web sites of each firms and interviews with them 
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3.3.3.1 Local Governments and Institutions 
 
In terms of corporate finance, the expansion can be divided into two different stages: 
one is an initial investment stage by 2004; the other is an initial public offering (IPO) 
stage in the foreign stock market after 2005. The first stage was a very difficult time for 
the PV firms to invest, because the size of the global market was small, and the rate of 
growth slow, as shown in Figure VI-8 (p. 144). In other words, the PV industry was 
regarded as too risky to invest in before 2004. Interviews (Chen, 2010; Xu, 2010; Wei, 
2010) and literature (Park, 2009) show the difficulties, the new generation of PV firms 
faced at this time as follows: 
 
Suntech built a 10 MWp production capacity in 2002, and then Dr. Zengrong Shi, the 
CEO, tried to expand it to 30 MWp in 2003. At this time, most of high executive officers 
and major stockholders objected to his expansion plan, because PV markets were 
uncertain and the performance of the firm was not good. Sometimes, salaries for high 
executive officers and engineers were not paid by the firm. Thus, some engineers quitted 
the firm. But, he convinced Wuxi City (shi) government and induced local state-owned 
companies to invest in his firm. Thus, mainly due to the financial support from the local 
government and SOEs, Suntech completed a 30 MWp production capacity in 2003 (Chen, 
2010).  
 
Also, other firms‟ initial investments were supported financially by bank loans and 
SOEs‟ investments under the assistance of the local government. In short, local 
governments supported the new generation of PV firms in a range of ways such as, 
encouraging local state-owned companies to invest in them and guaranteeing them for 
bank loans. 
 
Considering the active role of local governments in the initial investments; why did 
Chinese local governments get heavily involved in these investments and the growth of 
these industries, despite their risky nature? One of the answers to the question can be 
found in the characteristics of the Chinese institutional framework, so called „local state 
corporatism‟ (Oi, 1999), as I discussed earlier (p. 17). Chinese local governments have 
strong incentives to facilitate the growth of local industries due to fiscal decentralisation 
and the evaluation system of cadres and high officials (Arrighi, 2007). The PV industry 
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was one of the beneficiaries of this kind of functional industrial policy of local 
governments. In fact, Yingli and Solarfun have become the biggest firms in Baoding 
City (shi) and Qidong County (xian), respectively. Suntech has become the second 
biggest firm in Wuxi City (shi). In short, most of city governments in Jiangsu Province 
have strongly supported PV firms in their localities (Suntech in Wuxi, Trina Solar in 
Changzhou, China Sunergy in Nanjing, and Solarfun in Nantong) (Wei, 2010). 
Furthermore, because the PV industry was regarded as a high-tech
86
 and green 
technology industry, it received greater preferential treatment compared to other 
industries by local governments. Mainly due to the support by city (shi) governments, 
banks, and local SOEs, most of the new generation of PV firms could achieve a basic 
size of production capacity in readiness for the next stage of rapid growth. 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Foreign Stock Markets 
 
After the explosion of demand for PV in 2004, in the second stage, investors‟ 
expectations of future PV markets brightened. On the basis of experience and readiness 
in the first stage, the new generation of PV firms accelerated their investments in 
response to this optimistic signal about future markets. In order to raise more funds 
rapidly, they entered into the foreign stock market guided by returnees and overseas 
Chinese who knew the global finance market well (Xu, 2010). Suntech led this trend 
through its IPO on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 2005, and other Chinese 
PV firms followed Suntech‟s example. In 2006, Trina Solar and Solarfun were listed on 
the NYSE and Nasdaq, respectively. In 2007, Yingli followed suit by joining the NYSE, 
while JA Solar and China Sunergy were listed on Nasdaq. Thus, all of them were listed 
on stock markets in the US. Tapping into overseas capital pools enabled them to expand 
their production capacities very rapidly so that they could achieve economies of scale. 
As a consequence, their total production increased at an unprecedented rate in the 
second stage as illustrated in Figure VI-10 (p. 148).   
 
Global financing through the foreign stock market is another distinctive feature in the 
growth of the PV industry in China. However, this new trend of financing came into 
                                                 
86
 At the central government level, there were many special supports for technology-based 
firms such as grants, low-interest loans, tax incentives, and high-tech zones (Marigo, 2009) 
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fashion not only in the PV sector but also in other sectors in China in the 2000s. Indeed, 
since China joined the WTO in 2001, Chinese firms have been able to access foreign 
stock markets more easily than ever before. In fact, the total worth of Chinese firms‟ 
IPOs on the foreign stock market was 20.5 and 44.0 billion USDs in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively (Park, 2009). Thus, it can be inferred that an institutional change in 
financing through foreign stock markets also influenced the Chinese PV sector. In other 
words, access to the foreign stock market enabled the new generation of PV firms to 
expand their production capacities very rapidly in the second half of the 2000s.  
 
 
3.3.4 Export-led Growth 
 
Although PV production increased rapidly in China in the 2000s, the domestic PV 
market still grew slowly due to the lack of strong incentive systems like the German 
feed-in tariff scheme, as shown in Figure VI-11. In fact, China produced around 3,800 
MWp of PV modules but consumed only 160 MWp locally in 2009.   
 
Figure VI-11 Annual PV installed in China in the 2000s (unit: MWp) 
 
Source: EPIA, 2010 
 
This means that almost all PV modules were exported to foreign countries. PV trade 
data in China reveals this to be true. As shown in Figure VI-12, the European market 
has played a substantial role in the growth of the Chinese PV industry in the 2000s. 
Their import accounted for around 80 per cent of PV exports in China at this time 
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(except in 2009).   
 
Figure VI-12 PV products export in China (unit: USD million) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE database 
 
Through the export-led growth, the new generation of PV firms has overcome „two sets 
of competitive disadvantages‟ of latecomer firms (Hobday, 1995). Firstly, they made 
efforts to learn state-of-the-art technology through various routes, in order to export 
their products to international markets. This is examined in the next sub-section. 
Secondly, they were able to access the sophisticated demand of the global market so 
that they were not isolated from mainstream international markets. Finally, they were 
able to meet sufficient demand to achieve economies of scale through exports. 
 
However, exporting to the advanced foreign countries was not easy for Chinese PV 
firms. At the start, it was very difficult for them to penetrate the European PV market. 
Thus, they focused on attaining certificates of European countries such as TÜ V and IEC 
(Chen, 2010), because solar systems required a long-term guarantee such as 25 years. 
As time went by, they succeeded in building marketing networks and letting European 
customers know their own brand names mainly through their credible and cheap 
products (Lee, S., 2010). In terms of cost advantage, as I discuss later, the price of their 
products was around two thirds that of foreign companies‟ products. 
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3.3.5 Technological Learning 
 
As in the East Asian catching-up processes (Hobday, 1995), technological learning for 
the new generation of PV firms was conducted through various channels such as turn-
key based importation of capital goods, learning by manufacturing, and original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) (Lee, S., 2010; Chen, 2010). In particular, there were 
two main types of technological learning: codified knowledge was learned mainly by 
importation of equipment and learning by manufacturing; tacit knowledge was 
introduced by scientists who studied abroad and engineers who worked for the 
traditional PV firms. 
 
Firstly, because crystalline-silicon solar cell technology matured, most state-of-the-art 
technologies were embedded in production equipment by the 2000s (Bae, 2009). Thus, 
importation of equipment from advanced foreign suppliers was one of the best ways to 
learn state-of-the-art technology. In fact, the new generation of PV firms learned how to 
install equipment, how to modify equipment in order to reduce production costs, and 
finally how to make equipment through continuous expansion (Lee, S., 2010; Chen, 
2010). Indeed, they expanded their production capacities almost every year.  
 
According to interviews (Lee, S., 2010; Chen, 2010; Xu, 2010; Zhu, 2010; Sun, 2010; 
Yang, 2010), technological learning through equipment can be summarised as follows. 
At first, they all imported turn-key based equipment from more advanced countries such 
as Germany, the US, and Japan. As time went by, they could select the best equipment 
in each production process piecemeal and install it by themselves. As the volume of 
domestic demand for PV equipment grew, local equipment suppliers emerged in 
simpler PV equipment markets. They collaborated with these local equipment suppliers 
who were able to provide them with lower-priced equipment. Recently the market share 
of the Chinese equipment industry reached around 50 per cent of the local PV 
equipment market (Chen, 2010; Sun, 2010). Thus, using local equipment partly 
contributed to the rapid growth of production capacity in that it enabled them to reduce 
expansion costs. 
 
Secondly, technological learning was led mainly by scientists who studied state-of-the-
art PV technology in foreign countries. This point is one of the most distinctive features 
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of the catching-up process of the Chinese PV industry. Dr. Zhengrong Shi, who is the 
founder and CEO of Suntech, is the most famous example of this kind of PV scientist 
(Chen, 2010; Wei, 2010). Table VI-8 shows us how many scientists who studied abroad 
work in top management positions. 
 
Table VI-8 Scientists and technicians in the top management group 
 Scientists (position/career/year of PhD) Technicians (position/career) 
Suntech Zhengrong Shi (CEO/UNSW/‟92) 
Jingjia Ji (Senior Researcher/UNSW/‟94) 
Guangchun Zhang (Researcher/UNSW) 
Stuart Wenham (CTO/UNSW/‟86) 
Graham Artes (COO/Kuttler)  
Some technicians (high position 
engineer/Yunnan)  
Yingli Guaxiao Yao (CTO/UNSW/‟95) 
Seok Jin Lee (COO/HII) 
Nabih Cherradi (VP/France)  
 
Trina 
Solar 
Qiang Huang (VP/Singapore) 
Suping Chen(VP/China) 
Sean Hsiyuan Tzou (COO/US) 
Chen Chung Yu (VP/Taiwan) 
Yu Zhu (VP/US) 
Diming Qiu (Senior 
Researcher/Yunnan) 
China 
Sunergy 
Jianhua Zhao (CTO/UNSW/‟89) 
Aihua Wang (VP/UNSW/‟92) 
Fengming Zhang (VP/Australia/‟96)  
 
JA Solar Ximing Dai (CTO/UNSW/‟95) 
Bingyan Ren (Director/China)  
Zhilong Zhang (COO/China) 
Boping Li (VP/China)  
Solarfun Yun Fei (Researcher/UNSW)  Yuting Wang (CE/Qinhuangdao)  
Source: Annual reports of each firm and interviews with them 
CEO (Chief Executive Officer); CTO (Chief Technology Officer); COO (Chief Operating 
Officer); VP (Vice President); CE (Chief Engineer); UNSW (University of New South Wales in 
Australia); Kuttler (German equipment company); HHI (Hyundai Heavy Industries, Korean 
company) 
 
Two interesting facts can be identified in Table VI-8. One fact is that over half of these 
top management scientists are from the University of New South Wales (UNSW), 
Australia. Indeed, the centre for PV engineering in the UNSW has achieved a world 
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record in efficiency of crystalline-silicon solar cells since the late 1980s, as shown in 
Figure VI-13. Most of these scientists worked in this centre, which was led by Professor 
Martin A. Green, who was a Nobel Prize laureate in 2002. Thus, most of them had good 
knowledge of cutting-edge PV technology and were able to play a key role in 
technology transfer in the PV sector in China. 
 
Figure VI-13 Evolution of the efficiency of silicon cells in laboratories 
 
Source: Green, 2000, p. 992 
 
The other fact is that innovation was often accomplished by a combination of these 
scientists and technicians who had experience in traditional PV firms (Chen, 2010; Zhu, 
2010). These two groups seem to have possessed a complementary relationship in terms 
of innovation. Usually, scientists have good knowledge of state-of-the-art technology 
and laboratory-level experiments, but can lack experience of manufacturing. In contrast, 
technicians who have worked in factories for a long time have a lot of tacit knowledge 
of mass production, but know little of new technologies. According to Table VI-8, there 
were some technicians from traditional PV firms such as Yunnan and Qinhuangdao 
factories. It seems, therefore that this combination is likely to have worked well. There 
is no direct evidence of this kind of innovation, however, indirect evidence is provided 
by the fact that the technicians worked in important positions in the new generation of 
PV firms (Chen, 2010; Zhu, 2010; Yang, 2010). 
 
In addition, „complementary assets‟ (Teece, 1986) of the PV industry can be found 
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throughout the Chinese economy. The machine tools industry, the semiconductor 
industry and the electronics industry were developed adequately to support the 
developing PV industry in the late 1990s (Chen, 2010). Moreover, abundant human 
resources were involved in PV technology at that time (Chen, 2010). 
 
Another factor is that, M&As have increased in China since joining the WTO and have 
acted as one of the channels for accessing state-of-the-art foreign technology. In the PV 
sector, Suntech acquired MSK Corporation, a leading PV module manufacturer and 
Building-Integrated PV (BIPV) company in Japan in 2006, and KSL-Kuttler, a German 
company specialising in equipment automation in the printed circuit board industry in 
2008. Due to the M&As, Suntech has been able to accelerate its innovation in this area. 
 
In short, various types of technological learning enabled the new generation of PV firms 
to reach a similar technological level to more advanced foreign PV companies. 
 
 
3.3.6 Cost Advantages 
 
One of the most important comparative advantages of Chinese companies is cost 
advantage. First of all, labour costs are cheaper than any other country considering the 
quality of labour. Average salary of workers in the industrial sector was 26,599 
RMB/year (approx. 3,900 USD)
87
 in 2009 (NBSC, 2010). In fact, the salary of workers 
in the PV factories was between 1,000 and 1,500 RMB (approx. 146 and 220 USD
88
) a 
month in Jiangsu Province in 2009 (Lee, S., 2010). Thus, some production processes 
such as welding and arraying of solar cells in the module production process are still 
conducted by workers, as shown in Figure VI-14.  
 
Figure VI-14 Manual production processes: welding and arraying 
                                                 
87
 In China, average salary of workers is substantially different between provinces. For example, 
it was 48,207 RMB/year in Shanghai, 40,642 in Beijing, 27,372 in Jiangsu Province, and 23,815 
in Hebei Province in 2009 (NBSC, 2010).  
88
 In 2009, the official RMB/USD exchange rate was around 6.83 (SAFE, 2010). 
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Source: Xu, 2009 
 
The manual process is argued to give two advantages to Chinese firms. One is cost-
effectiveness compared to the automated process. In terms of breakage of solar cells in 
the production process, Chinese PV firms train their workers and introduce a penalty 
system which connects worker‟s breakages to his or her salary (Lee, S., 2010; Chen, 
2010; Zhu, 2010; Xu, 2010). Therefore, it is argued that the rate of breakage in the 
manual process is lower than that of the automated process (Xu, 2010; Zhu, 2010). The 
other is an advantage of customisation. Customisation strategy is important in the PV 
sector, because there is demand for different sizes of PV modules. The cost of 
customization in production using the manual process is much lower than that of the 
automated process. This kind of cost innovation appears not only in the PV sector but 
also in the electronics sector in China (Zeng and Williamson, 2007).   
 
Secondly, low R&D costs are another advantage of Chinese PV firms. The traditional 
PV firms and many local universities have supplied them with skilful human resources 
at low wages. For example, a high positioned engineer, working for Suntech, originally 
worked at the „Yunnan factory‟ at a monthly salary of around 2,000 RMB89 (approx. 
300 USD
90
) in the 1990s (Chen, 2010). With regard to the higher education system, this 
is mainly because the tertiary education system focuses on science and engineering 
subjects in China. In fact, more than 300,000 scientists and technologists graduated 
from universities and these degrees accounted for 73 per cent of the total of first 
university degrees awarded in China in 2002 (National Science Board, 2002 cited in 
Marigo, 2009). Indeed, the average initial salary of Master degree engineers in the PV 
                                                 
89
 Of course, now his salary is much more than this. 
90
 In the 1990s, the official RMB/USD exchange rate was between 4.78 and 8.28 (SAFE, 2010). 
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industry is around 3,000 RMB (approx. 430 USD) a month. Thus, quality control in 
production processes and in-house R&D were available at a lower cost in China than in 
foreign countries. In addition, collaborations between the new generation of PV firms 
and local universities and domestic research institutes such as Shanghai Jiatong 
University, Sun Yat-sen University, and the Chinese Academy of Science have 
increased and contributed to facilitating innovation at low cost (Zhu, 2010; Xu, 2010).   
 
Thirdly, the cost of production capacity expansion of Chinese PV firms was cheaper 
than that of foreign companies. It is argued that the setting cost of a 25 MWp production 
line with mixed local and foreign equipments was around half that of foreign companies 
(Wang, 2010). Moreover, local governments sometimes provided them with land 
preferentially. As a consequence, they were able to expand production capacity cheaply 
and rapidly compared to foreign companies. 
 
Partly due to these cost advantages, the Chinese PV products could penetrate the global 
market, as I describe in sub-section VI.3.3.4. 
 
 
3.3.7 Vertical Integration Strategy 
 
In the crystalline-silicon solar PV industry, the value chain is composed of four sub-
industries: poly silicon (raw material), ingot and wafer (components), cell (components), 
and module (finished goods) sub-industries. In terms of a vertical integration strategy, 
cell and module industries are the starting points for vertical integration of the whole 
value chain. However, manufacturing processes of PV modules are simpler and more 
labour-intensive than those of PV cells. Moreover, a technological entry barrier of the 
cell industry is higher than that of the module industry. 
 
Almost all the PV firms that I interviewed adopted a „vertical integration‟ strategy 
except JA Solar. This strategy secured the PV firms raw material and components and 
gave them room for reducing production costs in terms of transaction costs (Williamson, 
1971). Yingli, Trina Solar, and Solarfun started as module assemblers and integrated 
backwards through the value chain. These firms chose to begin with module assembly 
because they were less technically oriented than Suntech and China Sunergy in the 
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initial stage. However, later on, they learned and assimilated technology, and 
internalised from ingot and wafer production to cell production. Finally, Yingli 
completed the whole value chain from poly silicon to solar modules in 2009.  
 
By contrast, Suntech and China Sunergy started as a cell supplier and integrated 
forward through the value chain. At first, they began with solar cell manufacturing 
because their founders, Dr. Zhengrong Shi and Dr. Jianhua Zhao, were experts in the 
latest solar cell technology. Over time, they extended their firms‟ boundaries to module 
production in order to reduce transaction costs.  
 
In short, vertical integration of the new generation of PV firms was one of the strategies 
that allowed them to establish their competitive advantages. 
 
 
3.3.8 Role of the Central Government 
 
As I describe in sub-section VI.3.2.3 (p. 139), the central government encouraged 
research and development of PV technology and formulated many demand-pull 
programmes. In line with these electrification programmes, the central government 
started the „Transmission Electricity to Village (Song Dian Dao Xiang)‟ programme in 
the early 2000s. Due to this programme, the new generation of PV firms such as Trina 
solar and Yingli accumulated their experiences and managed to maintain their 
production capacity without exporting their products to the global market (Wei, 2010; 
Yang, 2010).  
 
With regard to the feed-in tariff scheme, a Renewable Energy Law was passed in 2005 
and has been effective since 2006. Although this law has provisions similar to the 
German feed-in tariff, the feed-in tariff is not yet implemented in China (CREDP, 2008; 
EPIA, 2010). According to interviews, a local feed-in tariff has been implemented in 
Jiangsu Province, but the scale is very limited (Wei, 2010; Zhu, 2010). 
 
After the global financial crisis in 2008, the demand for PV in the global market shrank, 
causing difficulties for the Chinese PV industry. In 2009, the central government (the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the National Energy 
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Administration of the National Development and Reform Commission) launched „the 
Golden Sun (Jin Tai Yang) Project‟ which was to facilitate the deployment of large-
scale PV plants of no less than 500 MWp within the coming two or three years (MOST, 
2009). This programme has helped partly to overcome the aftermath of the financial 
crisis for the PV firms as well as to accomplish the renewable energy target of the 
central government. 
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4. IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE ON THE 
NECESSARY FUNCTIONS 
 
As in the German chapter (V), in this section, I shall examine the inter-relationship 
between the institutional advantage of the Chinese political economy and the four 
necessary functions in the development of the Chinese PV industry: market formation; 
capital mobilisation; process innovation; and cost reduction. 
 
 
4.1 Market Formation 
 
The Chinese government implemented a series of electrification programmes, installing 
PV systems in rural areas in the 1990s, as described earlier (p. 139). Also, the 
„Transmission Electricity to Village (Song Dian Dao Xiang)‟ programme was carried 
out in the early 2000s. These government programmes increased domestic demand for 
PV systems. In particular, Song Dian Dao Xiang helped some PV firms survive during 
difficult times.  
 
However, the amount of PV demand created by the Chinese government‟s demand-pull 
policy was not enough to satisfy the Chinese PV industry. Furthermore, despite the 
Renewable Energy Law, the feed-in tariff was not yet implemented in China. Thus, in 
contrast to the German case, there was no substantial domestic market creation for the 
PV industry in China. In other words, in terms of market creation, China had an 
institutional disadvantage compared to Germany. 
 
In the German case, due to the creation of the domestic PV market, the domestic PV 
industry grew fast throughout the 2000s (see p. 111). However, in the Chinese case, the 
domestic PV industry grew fast without the creation of an adequate domestic PV market 
in the 2000s. As far as China is concerned, it is clear that the creation of a domestic PV 
market was not a necessary condition for the development of the domestic PV industry. 
Thus, it can be said that the Chinese PV industry was able to grow despite the 
institutional disadvantage in terms of market creation. 
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4.2 Capital Mobilisation 
 
In order to achieve economies of scale rapidly, capital mobilisation was a key factor 
because the crystalline-silicon cell industry was capital-intensive. China had an 
institutional advantage in mobilising capital through an unprecedented combination of 
local state corporatism and global financing during the 2000s. 
 
In the early 2000s, local governments, especially city (shi) governments, played a 
decisive role in mobilising capital in the PV sector. At this time, the Chinese PV 
industry was too risky for investors, because the domestic PV market was not sufficient 
to demand large scale PV production. Moreover, it was difficult for the Chinese PV 
industry to penetrate the global PV market due to the low quality and high price of its 
products. However, local governments facilitated the new generation of PV firms in 
raising funds through various routes, because they had a strong incentive to encourage 
local industries in their localities, as discussed in sub-section VI.3.3.3.1 (p. 149).   
 
After 2005, global financing paved the way for the Chinese PV industry to tap into a 
huge pool of foreign capital. After Suntech succeeded in mobilising capital in the New 
York Stock Exchange in 2005, the rest of the new generation of firms imitated 
Suntech‟s success. As a consequence, the influx of a substantial amount of capital from 
the foreign stock market enabled the Chinese PV industry to expand its production 
capacity at an unprecedented rate. Thus, China has become the largest PV manufacturer 
since 2008.             
 
Compared to the German case, different financial mechanisms have played a part in 
mobilising capital in the PV industry in China, local state corporatism and global 
financing in particular have been unique institutional instruments in mobilising capital 
for the development of China‟s PV industry.   
 
 
4.3 Process Innovation 
 
Compared with leading countries in the PV sector such as Germany, the US and Japan, 
China lagged far behind in terms of technology in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, 
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technological learning was a major issue for the Chinese PV industry. According to 
Hobday (1995), a range of institutional mechanisms functioned as channels of 
technology transfer from more advanced countries to East Asian ones, as discussed in 
sub-section II.2.3.2 (p. 22). In the technological learning process of the Chinese PV 
industry, two factors played a key role in catching up with forerunner countries. One 
was the importation of state-of-the-art equipment and learning by manufacturing, and 
the other was the coming together of scientists who studied abroad and engineers who 
worked for the traditional PV firms. 
 
Firstly, mainly codified knowledge was transferred by the former mechanism in that 
cutting-edge c-Si cell technology was embedded in production equipment. The new 
generation of PV firms imported sets of PV equipment, assimilated production 
processes using the equipment, and modified the production processes (Marigo, 2009). 
The speed of learning by manufacturing was fast, because learning was much faster in 
the factory than in the laboratory (Lee, S., 2010; Peschke, 2010). 
 
Secondly, returning scientists and experienced engineers took a lead in the process of 
learning by manufacturing. The scientists knew about new PV technologies, whereas 
the engineers knew much about the floor experience of mass production. Thus, they 
played complementary roles in production processes using their tacit knowledge. 
 
In short, these two mechanisms enabled the Chinese PV industry to catch up with more 
advanced countries in terms of process innovation. 
 
 
4.4 Cost Reduction 
 
It is difficult to deny that China has an explicit comparative advantage in labour-
intensive sectors, because it has a large fund of labour available. Not only labour-
intensive sectors such as the textile industry but also the PV industry has benefited from 
a labour-cost advantage despite being a capital-intensive industry
91
. For instance, 
                                                 
91
 The implications of this are different from the comparative advantage theory. According to 
this theory, a relatively labour abundant country has a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive sectors not in capital-intensive sectors. 
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machines have been replaced by workers in some processes such as welding and 
arraying cells because of the cost-effectiveness of manual labour, as mentioned in sub-
section VI.3.3.6 (p. 156).    
 
Both low labour cost and low R&D costs have provided the PV industry with an overall 
cost advantage. In fact, the average initial salary of a Masters degree engineer in the PV 
industry is around 3,000 RMB (approx. 430 USD) a month. This is mainly because the 
Chinese higher education system supplies a huge number of scientists and engineers for 
industries. Most of their R&D activities are involved in quality control and process 
innovation not in product innovation such as the development of a new product.  
 
Furthermore, low expansion costs of production capacity are one of the cost advantages 
of the Chinese PV sector. Low prices for production equipment supplied by the local 
machinery industry, low land costs, and low construction costs have all contributed to 
the low expansion costs of the PV industry in China. 
 
Owing to these cost advantages, the price of cells and modules of the Chinese PV 
industry have been able to be lower than any other country, making Chinese solar cells 
and modules competitive in the global market. 
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5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I have explained the evolution of the PV industry, and impacts of 
institutional advantage on the evolution, in the context of the political economy of 
China. 
 
After economic reform in 1978, a market mechanism was introduced into the Chinese 
economy and the traditional PV firms appeared. They upgraded their production 
facilities, but they fell far behind more advanced countries. There was no remarkable 
improvement in the PV industry in China until the emergence of the new generation of 
PV firms in the late 1990s.  
 
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the new generation of PV firms succeeded 
in mobilising capital with support from local governments despite it being a very risky 
time to invest. Due to the market explosion in Europe, they grew fast through exports 
without substantial domestic market creation. Furthermore, after China joined the WTO, 
they raised funds through tapping into the foreign stock markets. As a consequence, 
they expanded their production capacities faster than in any other country. 
 
In addition, in terms of technology, they caught up with leading companies mainly 
through importation of equipment from more advanced countries and a successful 
linking up of scientists who had studied abroad and engineers who had worked for the 
traditional PV firms. With regard to cost reduction, China‟s cost advantages make the 
PV industry more competitive than in any other country. Thus, it can be said that the 
Chinese PV industry does not lag behind more advanced countries any longer in terms 
not only of production capacity but also of technology and cost.  
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CHAPTER VII PV INDUSTRY IN KOREA 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the Korean political 
economy and the evolution of the Korean PV industry and to investigate institutional 
advantages and disadvantages of the Korean economy related to the development of the 
PV industry. Thus, I shall focus on three drivers
92
 (market formation, capital 
mobilisation and process innovation) in the Korean context and their impact on the 
development of the PV industry. The key questions are as follows: firstly, why the 
policy regime, especially the feed-in tariff, failed to facilitate the development of the PV 
industry in Korea unlike Germany; secondly, under what context of the political 
economy the policy regime was formulated and why Korea was late in starting its PV 
industry: thirdly, what institutional configuration of Korean political economy affected 
this evolution.      
 
Given the assumption that a sector is embedded in a political economy, the policy 
regime for the PV sector has been formed and Korea‟s PV industry has evolved under 
the influence of the Korean political economy. Thus, it is necessary to begin with an 
exploration of the political economy of Korea. 
  
Firstly, in section 2, I shall explain the history of the Korean political economy. 
Between the 1960s and 1980s, Korea succeeded in industrialising its economy as an 
example of a developmental state. However, since the 1990s, liberalisation of the 
economy has been started. In particular, before and after the 1997 crisis the 
developmental-state characteristics of the Korean political economy were dismantled.  
 
                                                 
92
 It is difficult to access cost information of the Korean PV firms, mainly because most of them 
have started PV cell businesses since 2008. Furthermore, SMEs (Photon Semiconductor, 
Millinet Solar and Shinsung Holdings) of them do not need to publish their annual reports, 
because they are not listed on the stock market. Thus, the Korean PV industry is not analysed in 
terms of cost reduction. 
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Secondly, in section 3, I shall examine the evolution of the Korean PV industry. After 
the two oil shocks the National Project was implemented in order to develop PV 
technology. However, due to the limitation of technological capability, 
commercialisation of the first production facility failed. In 2002, the feed-in tariff was 
adopted by the collaboration between an environment-oriented coalition and an 
industry-oriented coalition. As a result, the domestic PV market expanded enough to 
stimulate the local PV industry to grow. However, it was not a good time for local firms 
to invest in the PV sector. In fact, chaebols, large Korean business groups, responded to 
the market expansion late because they had little opportunity to find new businesses 
under the restructuring programme in the early 2000s. Thus, the domestic market was 
penetrated largely by imported solar modules. Eventually, the feed-in tariff was changed 
to the less supportive policy scheme, the Renewable Portfolio Standard, and Korea‟s PV 
industry fell behind the other leading countries such as Germany and China. 
 
Lastly, in section 4, I shall attempt to explain the inter-relationships between 
institutional advantage of the Korean economy and the development of the PV industry. 
Despite the institutional advantage of the growth of the local PV market, the Korean PV 
industry failed to catch up with leading countries mainly due to the institutional 
disadvantage in mobilising capital in new sectors.    
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2. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KOREA 
 
2.1 The Success of Korea: Free Market versus Developmental State 
 
Korea has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world since the Second 
World War. In fact, the annual growth rate of real GDP of Korea was around 8 per cent 
from 1961 to 2000 excepting the years 1980 and 1997 (Shin and Chang, 2003). This is 
shown in Figure VII-1. 
 
Figure VII-1 Forty years‟ economic growth in Korea (unit: %) 
 
Source: Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 2 
 
This success story of Korea has been interpreted mainly by two different views: one is 
from the neoclassical economics; and the other is from alternative development theories 
(Chang, 2006). The former view regards the institutional changes forward free-market 
and free-trade systems as the main factors contributing to the economic success of 
Korea, while the latter emphasises the role of state and „substituting institutions‟ on the 
process of development (Chang, 2006), as I discuss earlier in the literature review 
chapter (p. 26).  
 
Because the focal point of the thesis is not to examine the disputes between the two 
views, I shall not deal with their main arguments in the thesis. However, I shall follow 
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the latter view, the developmental state view, when I examine the Korean political 
economy in this chapter because it is more appropriate for the literature review and 
conceptual framework of the thesis, as described earlier. 
 
 
2.2 Industrialisation of Korea: 1960s-1980s 
 
2.2.1 Institutions for Industrial Policy 
 
According to Gerschenkron (1962), industrialisation of backward countries was 
accompanied with establishing its own unique institutional instruments as „substitutes 
for the lack of the supposed „prerequisites‟ of development‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 
10). He points out that „investment banks‟ and „the state‟ played the role of substitute 
institutions in the German and Russian industrialisation processes in the nineteenth 
century, respectively (Gerschenkron, 1962). From this perspective, three main features 
of the institutional setting of Korea can be identified in the process of its 
industrialisation. Firstly, the state had controlled the domestic and cross-border financial 
flow directly and strictly. In fact, the Park Chung Hee regime had hardly come to power 
before it nationalised all the banks in Korea in the early 1960s. Also, the Korean state 
had kept direct control over the banking system until the liberalisation of financial 
systems in the 1990s. Moreover, the Korean state maintained tight foreign exchange 
controls during this period (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 2006). Thus, the state was capable 
of enforcing industrial policy effectively, utilising financial tools such as policy loans or 
guaranteed foreign debts. Secondly, the Park regime set up the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) as the super-ministry which was in charge of planning and budgeting. In 
order to eliminate conflict between planning and industrial ministries (which normally 
focus on long-term investments) and the finance ministry (which normally focuses on 
short-term stability), economic policy-making power was consolidated within the EPB. 
Therefore, due to the role of the EPB as control tower, the implementation of industrial 
policy was more effective than other industrialisation processes (Chang, 2006). Thus, 
the establishment of the EPB can be interpreted as an „institutional innovation‟ (Chang, 
2006) or institutional advantage for the industrialisation process of Korea. Thirdly, the 
Five Year Plan (FYP) was introduced by the Park regime for the first time in 1962. This 
was repeated six times over thirty years until the abolition in 1993. The FYPs geared 
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various government policies toward the progression of „independent economy‟ (Jarip 
Gyongje) as an „overarching policy coordination framework‟, even though there were 
some revisions during the plan period (Chang, 2006). For instance, priority sectors 
which were designated by the FYPs extended and changed from cement, fertiliser, and 
oil refining industries in the first FYP (1962-66) to machinery, electronics, automobile, 
chemical, shipbuilding industries in the fifth and sixth FYPs (1982-91) (Chang, 2006). 
As a result, the FYPs enabled the Korean economy to grow fast by concentrating its 
resources on more promising sectors. 
 
The industrialisation of Korea had been attributed mainly to these institutional 
implementations: the state‟s financial control, the existence of the EPB as a control 
tower of industrial policy, and long term planning of the FYP. The typical pattern of 
development in Korea is as follows: firstly, the state, mainly the EPB, selecting 
promising industries as priority sectors in the FYP; secondly, the state encouraging local 
companies, mainly large business groups such as chaebols, to enter into priority sectors 
and catch up with the leading foreign companies, providing them with a range of 
supports such as policy loans, guaranteed foreign debts, preferential tax treatments, and 
import protection and entry restrictions; lastly, chaebols achieving economies of scale 
in their manufacturing, and growing fast mainly through exporting their products to the 
global market (Chang, 2006). This kind of state intervention process is described as 
„setting relative prices deliberately wrong‟ by Amsden (1989).  
 
However, this explanation is not sufficient to explain the success of industrialisation in 
Korea. One of the weak points of this explanation is associated with rent-seeking 
theories (see Chang, 2006, p.87). For example, state intervention creates rents, and the 
state-created rents can lead to social waste such as rent-seeking behaviours like 
lobbying and corruption. In fact, there were a number of corruptions and lobbying 
activities in the industrialisation process of Korea. Therefore, what is the difference 
between the Korean experience and those of other countries such as Latin American 
countries (Chang, 2006), even though they seem to be similar in terms of state 
intervention in their development processes?   
 
Amsden‟s (1989) answer to this question is that it was „the discipline [Korean] state 
exercises over private firms‟ (p. 14). She explains in detail the process of discipline in 
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Korea as follows: 
 
Discipline may be thought of as comprising two interrelated dimensions: (a) penalizing 
poor performers; and (b) rewarding only good ones. Evidence of the former has taken two 
guises in Korea. First, in industries weakened at various times by over-expansion (some 
heavy industries, construction, shipping), firms have been subject to rationalization, … 
Second, discipline has taken the form of refusal on the part of the government to bail-out 
relatively large scale, badly managed, bankrupt firms in otherwise healthy industries 
(Amsden, 1989, p.15). 
 
On the other hand, the discipline had been accompanied by the rise of big business 
groups, chaebols. Due to the performance-based incentive system, chaebols 
strengthened their economic power along with their economic performance (Amsden, 
1989). For example, if they accomplish good performance of exports or new product 
introduction, they are rewarded with further licences to expand. Otherwise, however, 
they are punished by the state as described above. Sometimes, if the business is badly 
operated, the ownership is transferred to another chaebol. (Chang, 2006) Therefore, „the 
chaebols had a powerful incentive to remain efficient, especially when the loss of state 
support can mean a sharp downturn in business in a few years‟ time, given the state 
control of credit and the high leverage of Korean firms‟ (Chang, 2006, p. 94). The role 
of chaebols in the industrialisation process will be described in detail in the next section.   
 
 
2.2.2 Industrial Upgrading and Innovation 
 
The industrialisation process of Korea can be interpreted as the process of industrial 
upgrading. In fact, the industrialisation began with light and labour-intensive industries 
such as the textile industry, mainly due to comparative advantages like low wages in the 
1960s. As time went by, upgrading of industrial structure was proceeded mainly by the 
state intervention as I describe above
93
. As a result, six capital-intensive and high-tech 
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 According to the FYPs, priority sectors evolved as follows: „The practice of giving priority to 
certain industries identified as important originated in the very early years of Korean 
development, with the designation of cement, fertiliser, and oil refining in the 1
st
 FYP (1962-66) 
as „basic‟ industries. In the 2nd FYP (1967-71), chemical, steel, and machinery were designated 
as „priority‟ sectors. And during the 3rd and 4th FYP periods (1972-81), especially through the 
HCI [heavy and chemical industries] programme (announced in 1973), non-ferrous metals, 
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industries, petroleum refining, petrochemicals, iron and steel, electrical and electronics, 
automobile, and shipbuilding, became the leading industries in the Korean economy in 
the late 1980s.     
 
Compared with the industrialisation in England, Germany and the US in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, industrialisation in the late twentieth century (including 
Korea‟s industrialisation) can be termed as „late industrialisation‟ (Amsden, 1989). 
Whereas the former industrialisation occurred on the basis of invention and innovation, 
the late industrialisation occurred on the basis of learning (Amsden, 1989). Thus, 
Amsden (1989) emphasises learning as „the new mode of industrialisation‟ that 
functioned as the main way to transfer technology.   
 
However, if we define the concept of innovation broadly, as I discuss in the chapter of 
literature review, learning processes are not separable from the innovation process. 
Rather, (interactive) learning is argued to be essential to innovation (Lundvall, 1992). 
Whether the concept of innovation is defined broadly or not, Korea‟s industrialisation 
started with learning, went beyond imitation, and finally reached innovation (Kim, 1993; 
Kim, 1997a). The best examples are Samsung‟s technological learning in the 
semiconductor sector and Hyundai Motor‟s organisational learning in the automobile 
sector (Kim, 1997b; Kim 1998). 
 
Although, the process of industrialisation was led mainly by the state, as I describe in 
the previous section, it should be noted that the chaebols were the protagonists of 
industrial upgrading and innovation in Korea. The chaebols became main players in the 
industrialisation under the heavy and chemical industrialisation programme in the 1970s, 
even though some of them began business in the early 1950s (Shin and Chang, 2003). 
They grew much faster than the overall economy. For example, the average annual 
growth rate of the top five groups was 31.6 between 1973 and 1977, whereas that of the 
Korean economy was 9.9 (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 29). Under the state-led industrial 
policy, „the state-banks-chaebols nexus thus became the central feature of the Korean 
economic system‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 13).    
                                                                                                                                               
shipbuilding, and electronics were added to the list of „priority‟ sectors. The practice continued 
in the 5
th
 and 6
th
 FYP periods (1982-91), during which machinery, electronics, automobile, 
chemical, shipbuilding, and various high-tech industries (semiconductor, new materials, 
biotechnology) were designated „priority‟ sectors‟ (Chang, 2006, p. 81). 
173 
 
 
Furthermore, chaebols had greater powers to exploit the economies of scale and scope 
from their diversification (Shin and Chang, 2003). Firstly, „the structure of business 
group works as a mini-capital market for member firms‟ (Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 27). 
Member firms could mobilise financial resources through direct subsidy, corporate 
lending, loan guarantees, and so on. Secondly, they could increase the amount of capital 
through utilising leverage based on interlocked shareholdings (Shin and Chang, 2003). 
Mutual shareholding and circular shareholding were the easiest ways to increase their 
capital without actually putting in real money. Thirdly, the „central office effect‟ could 
save their entrepreneurial resources (Shin and Chang, 2003). Technologies, engineering 
skills, marketing capabilities of the group could be shared to member firms.  
 
Two examples of ways to utilise these advantages of business groups were the Hyundai 
Heavy Industries (HHI) and Samsung Electronics (SE). Firstly, HHI, which is one of 
the largest shipbuilders in the world, was set up by the Hyundai Group in 1971 in order 
to enter into the shipbuilding sector. Armsden (1989) describes its entry as follows:  
 
The top-ranking Korean manager of HHI was formerly a high level manager of the 
Hyundai Construction Company (HC), and when HHI ran into problems keeping to 
schedule, engineers from HC were mobilised. In addition, Hyundai Construction provided 
HHI with many of its front-line supervisors, managed the construction of the Mipo 
dockyard, and helped supervise feasibility studies. Hyundai Motors dispatched engineers 
to help in the struggle to reduce throughout time and also provided technical assistance in 
assembly line and training techniques. Hyundai Cement sent people to work in production 
control. All in all, as HHI managers pointed out, „a lot of people joined‟. The possibility 
of mobilizing such personnel enabled HHI to act quickly and to avoid delays of recruiting 
fresh talent in the market (Amsden, 1989, pp. 286-287). 
 
Secondly, Samsung Electronics (SE), which is one of the leading firms in the 
semiconductor sector, was set up by the Samsung Group in 1974 as follows (Shin and 
Chang, 2003). 
 
Samsung‟s foray into semiconductors would not have been possible without the intra-
group resource mobilisation. The group started the semiconductor business by acquiring a 
venture firm, Korea Semiconductor Inc. (KSI) in 1974, whose name was changed to 
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Samsung Semiconductor Co. (SSC) in 1978, and later to Samsung Semiconductor and 
Telecommunication Company (SST) in 1982. This semiconductor firm was „notorious 
within the Samsung Group as a symbol of low productivity‟ (Choi 1994: 87). … But the 
company maintained an over 50 per cent investment-to-sales ratio all through the 1980s, 
which was sustained by the group‟s strategic concern and financial support from member 
firms. SEC [Samsung Electronics Co.] on its own was much smaller than its key 
competitors such as Toshiba or Hitachi, but the Samsung Group was comparable to them 
in size. SEC compensated for its relative lack of resources as compared to Japanese 
forerunners by group-level resource mobilisation and more narrowly focusing its 
catching-up effort on DRAM manufacturing (Shin 1996: Ch. 8) (Shin and Chang, 2003, 
pp. 30-31).   
 
In short, state-banks-chaebol nexus was the most distinctive feature of the 
industrialisation of Korea during this period (Shin and Chang, 2003). 
 
 
2.3 Liberalisation and the Crisis: 1990s 
 
2.3.1 Rising Neo-liberalism and Financial Liberalisation 
 
Under the influence of the global trends of neo-liberalism such as Reaganomics and 
Thatcherism, neoliberal ideology began to prevail in Korea from the late 1980s
94
 
(Chang, 2006). Furthermore, the power of chaebols became greater and greater in Korea, 
and they attempted to escape from government intervention (Chang, 2006). From this 
background, the Kim Young Sam regime took over power in 1993 under the slogans of 
globalisation and small government, which meant the Anglo-American neo-liberal 
economic model and the minimal state.  
 
Firstly, the regime scrapped the key developmental instruments under the slogan of 
small government. Although the traditional industrial policy started to wane from the 
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 Pirie (2008) explains that „the disintegration of the Korean developmental state‟ (p. 8) began 
from the early 1980s despite its processes were uneven, slow and piecemeal. And he criticises 
that the state-institutionalist analysis focuses on domestic policies rather than supranational 
political and economic changes. Moreover, he argues that „the neo-liberal reform was rational 
from the perspective of Korean capitalism‟ (p. 9), and this reform inevitably resulted in the 1997 
crisis (Pirie, 2008).  
175 
 
late 1980s, the decline of developmental state culminated in this regime. „On its 
assumption of power in 1993, the Kim Young Sam government abolished the practice 
of five-year planning, which had provided an overarching policy coordination 
framework since its introduction in 1962‟ (Chang, 2006, p. 214). Moreover, „in the 
name of government administrative „rationalisation‟ [small government], the planning 
ministry, Economic Planning Board (EPB), was merged with the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), forming the super-ministry, Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), which 
symbolised the demise of (indicative) „planning‟ in Korea‟ (Chang, 2006, p. 214). This 
meant that two main institutional instruments which had played a decisive role in 
economic development were removed from the Korean political economy. 
 
Secondly, more important institutional change occurred in the Korean financial system 
under this regime
95
. Although a series of financial liberalisations began to happen 
during the 1980s, the liberalisation process did not accelerate greatly until the 
appearance of the Kim Young Sam regime. This regime announced the five-year 
financial liberalisation plan in 1993 which aimed at the significant and unprecedented 
change in the financial system as follows: „interest rate deregulation, abolition of 
„policy loans‟, granting of more managerial autonomy to the banks, reduction of entry 
barriers to financial activities and, most importantly, capital account liberalisation‟ 
(Chang, 2006, p. 208).      
 
In addition to the abolition of the FYP and EPB, this financial liberalisation dismantled 
industrial policy through removing policy loans which had been one of the most 
powerful tools of the government in the industrialisation process. Under this 
deregulation and liberalisation, the foreign exchange crisis was about to hit the Korean 
economy. 
 
 
2.3.2 The 1997 Crisis and the Restructuring of the Economic System 
 
The Foreign Exchange Crisis of Korea happened suddenly without any expectation in 
December 1997, even though the Asian financial markets were unstable due to the Thai 
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 At the same time, this financial liberalisation proceeded under pressure from the US 
government (Chang, 2006). 
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and the Indonesian financial crises (Chung, 2003). The Korean currency (Won) fell to 
around one-third of its value before the onset of the crisis as shown in Figure VII-2. 
Finally, the Korean government announced that it would call in the IMF on 3
rd
 
December 1997 (Shin and Chang, 2003).  
 
Figure VII-2 The currency crisis in Korea in 1997-98 
 
Source: Shin and Chang, 2003, p. 35 
 
There are two different views about the cause of the crisis: one argues that this crisis 
resulted from long-term structural factors of the Korean economic system which was 
fundamentally inefficient mainly due to moral hazard and corruptions; the other argues 
that the crisis was caused by the short-term macroeconomic mismanagement under the 
financial liberalisation (Shin and Chang, 2003). The latter view seems more reasonable 
than the former, because it explains the evolution of the crisis and the rapid recovery of 
the Korean economy. However, the former view sheds light on the restructuring 
programmes after the crisis (Chung, 2003).  
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When it comes to the evolution of the crisis, it happened directly due to the lack of 
foreign reserve as shown in Figure VII-2 and the rejection of the foreign financial 
institutions to roll over the short-term
96
 loans of the Korean financial ones since late 
October in 1997 (Chung, 2003). Although the ratio of foreign debt/GNP was at a 
sustainable level, the critical point was the maturity structure of the foreign debt (Shin 
and Chang, 2003). In fact, the share of short-term one in total foreign debt rose from 
around 30 per cent in the 1980s to 58 per cent at the end of 1996 (Shin and Chang, 
2003). This increase mainly resulted from the „inexperienced merchant banks (officially 
called „merchant banking corporations‟) newly licensed by the Kim government in the 
name of financial liberalisation‟ (Chang, 2006, p. 212). Furthermore, the proper 
regulation and monitoring systems on the merchant banks were not established under 
the trend of deregulation, as pointed out by Chang (2006). 
 
Moreover, supervision of the merchant banks, unlike that of the deposit banks, was 
virtually non-existent, to the extent that the Kim government was apparently not even 
aware of the huge mismatch in the maturity structures between their borrowing (64% of 
their $20 billion total foreign borrowings were short-term) and lendings (85% of them 
long-term) that existed on the eve of the crisis (Chang, 2006, p. 213). 
 
As a consequence, it can be concluded that the crisis was due mainly to financial 
liberalisation‟s lack of consideration to proper regulation and supervising systems under 
the deregulation and globalisation slogan (Shin and Chang, 2003; Chung, 2003).  
   
However, after the crisis the government restructuring programmes focused on not only 
the financial systems but also corporate reform, especially the reform of the chaebol 
(Shin and Chang, 2003). Firstly, the Korean government enforced a range of measures 
to restructure chaebols in order to lower financial risks in the corporate sector. Major 
measures were the reduction of the debt-equity ratio, fair trading regulations mainly on 
internal transactions within the business group, the introduction of consolidated 
financial statements, and the liberalisation of M&A markets (Shin and Chang, 2003). In 
fact, the debt-equity ratio of thirty largest chaebols reduced dramatically from 513 per 
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 A short-term loan is defined as a loan with less than a year‟s maturity (Shin and Chang, 
2003). 
178 
 
cent in 1997 to 171 per cent in 2000 (Shin and Chang, 2003). Most of these measures 
were implemented by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) under the strengthening of its 
regulations on chaebols.       
 
Secondly, the restructuring of the financial sectors was undertaken by the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC), which was established as a comprehensive regulation 
scheme in April 1998. At first, 572 ailing financial institutions were shut down and 
several major commercial banks were nationalised by the bail-outs. In addition, 
financial supervision standards were significantly strengthened. For example, the 
minimum capital adequacy standard
97
 of BIS (the Bank for International Settlements) 
was strictly applied to the bank regulations (Shin and Chang, 2003). 
 
Thirdly, the Korean government attempted to find alternative engines of growth in FDI 
and venture businesses. However, unlike the anticipated benefits, the efforts of 
attracting foreign investment largely resulted in asset sales at bargain prices not green 
field investments. Furthermore, the venture boom, which occurred in 1999 mainly due 
to the efforts of nurturing venture businesses, ended with the bursting of the huge 
speculative bubble in the KOSDAQ (the Korean version of NASDAQ) in 2000 (Shin 
and Chang, 2003).    
 
As a consequence, the institutional reforms after the crisis have removed the long-term 
investment dynamics from the economy by dismantling the ability of Korean companies 
to access large investment funds. Because financial institutions became extremely 
conservative under the restructuring of the financial system, indirect financing of the 
corporate sector shrank. On the other hand, direct financing was not sufficient to 
compensate for it. Furthermore, the corporate sector, especially chaebols, lost their 
powerful tools of mobilising resources such as internal transactions and mobilisation 
within their business groups. Therefore, these institutional changes, which can be 
interpreted as the introduction of the Anglo-American economic system, weakened the 
ability of the Korean economy to grow.  
 
 
                                                 
97
 The minimum capital required should remain at 8% of risk weighted assets. 
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2.4 Contemporary Political Economy: Chaebol-dominant Structure under the Anglo-
American System  
 
According to Gerschenkron‟s (1962) fundamental insights, a backward economy can 
catch up with advanced countries when it devises substituting institutional instruments 
in order to compensate for its relative lack of the prerequisites such as capital, 
technology, and so on (Shin and Chang, 2003). 
 
As a matter of fact, under the process of the industrialisation in Korea between the 
1960s and 1980s, the state, banks, and chaebols cooperated with each other and shared 
the risk of large-scale investment projects through forming the „state-banks-chaebols 
nexus‟. This can be interpreted as the substituting institutions. However, the 
institutional changes which took place after the 1997 crisis have restructured the Korean 
economic system geared to the Anglo-American one which is focused not on long-term 
development strategy but on the stability of the financial sector (Shin and Chang, 2003).     
 
Through these institutional changes, the ability of risk taking of the Korean economy 
has been dampened because the state-banks-chaebols nexus was dismantled and there is 
non-existence of risk taking agents such as the banks and chaebols of the 
industrialisation period (Shin and Chang, 2003). 
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3. EVOLUTION OF THE PV INDUSTRY IN KOREA 
 
3.1 Importation of Knowledge: 1970s to 1980s 
 
While the creation of basic knowledge on PV and the invention of new PV products 
were the starting point of the PV industry in advanced countries such as Germany, as I 
described in chapter V, the importation of this knowledge from foreign countries was 
interpreted as a starting point of the PV industry in backward countries such as Korea. 
Thus, I shall begin with the importation of foreign knowledge from foreign countries in 
order to deal with the evolution of the PV industry in Korea. 
 
3.1.1 Oil Shocks and Institutional Changes 
 
The first oil shock of 1973 and the second oil shock of 1978 had a huge impact on the 
Korean economy as well as on the world economy because the domestic energy supply 
was heavily dependent on imported oil. Moreover, because the Korean government 
implemented „heavy and chemical industrialisation‟ as a economic development 
strategy in the 1970s, petroleum consumption accounted for 53.8 % and 63.3% of the 
primary energy consumption in 1973 and 1978, respectively (MOER, 1988). In addition, 
the surge in crude oil prices after the two oil shocks, as you can see Figure VII-3, 
caused inflation in the domestic economy and worsened the trade deficit. Thus, the 
government realized that a stable supply of energy and less dependency on oil were 
essential to economic growth. 
 
Figure VII-3 Crude Oil Prices from 1970 to 2009 (unit: USD) 
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Source: WTRG Economics (http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm) 
 
For this reason, the Korean government established „the Ministry of Energy and 
Resources (MOER)‟ in January 1978 in order to make energy policy and diplomacy 
independently (MOER, 1990). In addition, „the Korea Energy and Resources Research 
Institute (the current Korea Institute of Energy Research: KIER)‟ and „the Korea Energy 
Management Corporation (KEMC)‟ were founded in 1981 and 1980, respectively 
(MOER, 1990). These three public organisations played a major role in the 
development of PV technology and the deployment PV markets. Thus, the 
establishment of these organisations can be regarded as „institutional change‟ which is 
one of the four features
98
 of a formative period of the transformation of an energy 
system (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
 
Another substantial „institutional change‟ was the legislation of the „Alternative Energy 
Development Promotion Act (AEDPA)‟ in December 1987 (MOER, 1990). This act, 
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 Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) argue four features of formative period as follows: market 
formation, the entry of firms and other organisations, institutional change and the formation of 
technology-specific advocacy coalitions. 
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which mainly stipulated how to develop alternative energy technology, was the starting 
point for explicit PV support policy in Korea as well as other renewable energy sources.  
 
In order to implement the Alternative Energy Development Promotion Act (AEDPA), 
the government formulated a fourteen-year master plan in June 1988. In this plan, the 
government set the target of 3% of alternative energy contribution to total energy supply 
by 2001 (MOER, 1990). Considering the contribution of alternative energy, mostly 
hydropower energy
99
 at that time, was 1.2% in 1989, the target of 3% was very 
ambitious one (MOER, 1990). Furthermore, the government designated PV and fuel 
cells as priority sectors through the National Project. This project was provided with 
substantial R&D funds and implemented by the consortium of firms, universities, and 
government research institutes (MOER, 1990). 
 
Due to these institutional changes, the research into PV technology began to increase in 
universities and government research institutes in Korea, as I will describe below. 
 
 
3.1.2 Importation of Foreign Knowledge 
 
In view of research into PV science and technology, much research had been carried out 
in the US, Japan, and the USSR by the 1980s, as shown in Table VII-1. 
 
Table VII-1 Number of publications of literature about „photovoltaic‟, 1900-1989 
 US Japan USSR France India Canada Italy Germany China Korea 
number 389 95 67 56 53 39 29 27 7 5 
Source: Web of Science (Searching the literature by topic with term of „photovoltaic‟) 
 
Looking at the number of research publications in Korea year by year, there was one in 
1986 and two in 1987 and 1988, respectively. This shows that major research into PV 
technology started after the institutional changes in the 1980s in Korea. According to 
the „Alternative Energy Technology Census‟ (1988) of Korea, 94 researches into PV 
were carried out between 1964 and 1987. Thus amount of research into PV technology 
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 In terms of the AEDPA of Korea, only small hydro is included in alternative energy by 
definition, however, generally large hydro is also included in alternative energy, for example in 
IEA statistics. 
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increased greatly after the oil shocks and the institutional changes (KEEI, 1988). 
 
On the other hand, compared with advanced countries, it is not surprising that Korea‟s 
scientific knowledge of PV lagged far behind at the time. While research in advanced 
countries mostly focused on the creation of new knowledge and the invention of new 
products, the level of research in Korea was based largely on knowledge introduced by 
foreign scientists. According to the „Alternative Energy Technology Census‟ (1988) of 
Korea, in terms of the quality of research, 67% of research results were evaluated as 
„under the level of developed countries‟ or as „introduction of foreign knowledge‟ 
(KEEI, 1988). However, the importation of foreign knowledge was an essential process 
in establishing a new industry in backward countries because this knowledge was 
created by foreign scientists.  
 
Moreover, research areas were biased towards chemical mixture solar cells rather than 
crystalline silicon solar cells because of lower cost of experimental instruments and 
more foreign references (KIER, 1992). In the view of funding, the average scale of one 
PV research project was 28.3 million Korean Won (KW) (approx. 28,300 USD), making 
it smaller scale than that of coal slurry research which was 57.6 million KW (approx. 
57,600 USD) (KEEI, 1988). This is likely to be due to the simplicity of PV research at 
the laboratory level. For example, typical PV research was the fabrication of small-sized 
solar cells, for example a solar cell sized 1cm x 1cm
100
.  
 
It should be noted that only universities and government research institutes took part in 
this research. No firms participated in research into PV technology until the „National 
Project‟ was launched in 1989 (KIER, 1992). This may reflect the fact that the level of 
technological capability of firms was not sufficient to carry out „proprietary activities‟ 
such as applied R&D and developing and commercializing products (Van de Ven and 
Garud, 2000, p.493). 
 
 
3.1.3 Domestic Niche Markets 
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 Currently, a normal solar cell size is a 16cm x 16cm. 
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The first PV systems were installed on unattended lighthouses by the Korea Maritime 
and Port Administration (KMPA) in 1972 in Korea. KMPA extended PV systems to 
manned lighthouses in the 1980s because it had been established that PV systems were 
more reliable and economical than diesel systems (KERRI, 1982). In addition, Korea 
Telecommunication used PV systems for the generators of remote stations on islands. 
Furthermore, Korea Electric Power Corporation began to build PV systems for the 
electrification of remote islands from 1987 (KIER, 1992). 
 
Almost all of the PV systems were small scale systems around 10 kWp in this period, 
thus the total annual capacity installed was under 200 kWp till 1989, as shown in Figure 
VII-4 and Table VII-2.  
 
Figure VII-4 Annual PV installed in Korea, 1978-1989 (unit: kWp) 
 
 
Table VII-2 Annual PV installed in Korea, 1978-1989 (unit: kWp) 
 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
kWp 0.5 0.4 5.3 6.8 6.1 16.3 50.7 42.1 156.6 86.6 132.1 95.5 
Source: Korea Energy Management Corporation, Alternative Energy Statistics 
 
The domestic market of this period has two characteristics: one is its limited size; the 
other is specialisation of use. Firstly, the size of the domestic market was smaller than 
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the minimum efficient scale of mass production at that time. A manager of a PV firm 
says that minimum efficient scale in manufacturing solar cells was at least 500kWp at 
that time (Bae, 2009). Thus, domestic demand was not sufficient for Korean firms to 
pay attention to the PV sector unless they intended to export. Therefore, one of the 
reasons why all solar modules were imported lay in the small domestic market size and 
the absence of export markets as well as a lack of technological capability in this period. 
 
Secondly, most buyers of PV systems were public organisations, not private ones. This 
meant that almost all the markets were public procurement markets, where the size of 
the market relied on government budget. Thus, the market size could fluctuate and did, 
as you can see in Figure VII-4. The fluctuation of the market meant uncertainty for 
firms and this was likely to hinder firms‟ investment, because firms tend to avoid risk 
and uncertainty when considering investing. 
 
In short, the small size and uncertainty of the domestic market was one of the main 
reasons for Korean firms not to be interested in the PV industry in this period. 
 
 
3.2 Attempts of PV Manufacturing: 1990s 
 
3.2.1 The National Project: Big Supply-push (1989 – 1992) 
 
3.2.1.1 Consortium of Firms, Universities and Research Institutes 
 
The Korean government formulated the first Alternative Energy Technology 
Development Master Plan in 1988, as I mentioned above. The term of the Master Plan 
was between 1988 and 2001, and it was divided into three phases within the plan. In the 
first phase, between 1988 and 1991, PV and fuel cell sectors were selected as the 
National Project, which was a large-scale R&D project carried out by the consortium of 
firms, research institutes and universities for the first time in Korea. The participation of 
firms implied that the level of this project was beyond the existing laboratory one. Thus, 
the goal of the National Project was initiating commercialization and diffusing 
technology (MOER, 1992). This can be described as the first big „supply-push policy‟ 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979) for innovation in the PV sector in Korea. 
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In detail, the targets of the PV National Project were as follows: the development of a 
100kWp scale PV system; the achievement of reaching over 15% conversion efficiency 
of mono-crystalline silicon cells and over 12% conversion efficiency of solar modules; 
and the reduction in price of solar modules to 3,500KW/Wp (approx. 3.5 USD/Wp) 
(KIER, 1992). In the context of energy policy, acquiring PV production technology 
meant that energy sources were able to become domestic and diverse so that 
dependency on imported oil could be reduced. In other words, the PV National Project 
sought to link two goals: one is the development of PV technology; the other is the 
deployment of PV electricity. Policy makers seemed to believe that building the local 
production capacity of PV systems could lead to increased PV installation by using PV 
systems produced locally. This can be interpreted as an „unintended import substitution 
policy‟, not an export-led policy which was dominant in other sectors such as the 
electronics sector in Korea. This perspective can be found in many government 
documents and government research institute reports (KIER, 1991; KIER, 1992; MOER, 
1992).  
 
Participants in the PV National Project and the titles of R&D programs are shown in 
Table VII-3. There were three types of participants: firms, institutes and universities. In 
Korea, the National Project was the first R&D into PV in which firms took part. After 
firms got involved in R&D, the focus of R&D moved from basic science and 
knowledge to applied technology and problem solving. One of the participants in the 
National Project said, “The National Project was totally different from the previous PV 
R&D. The latter was a kind of small-scale experiment in the university laboratory, 
while the former was a big project through collaboration between firms, institutions, 
and universities” (Yoon, 2009).  
 
Table VII-3 Participants and program titles of the PV national project 
Participant type Title of program 
Siltron firm Fabrication Technology Development of Low Cost, High 
Efficiency Crystalline Si Solar Cells 
Goldstar Central 
Institute 
institute The Development of Large Area Amorphous Silicon Solar Cell 
KIST institute Fabrication of High Efficiency Amorphous Silicon Solar Cells 
Kyunghee university Fabrication Technology of Amorphous Silicon Tandem Solar Cells 
Seoul National university Fabrication and Investigation of Degradation Phenomena of 
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Amorphous Silicon Solar Cells by Photo CVD 
KIST institute A Study on Enhancing the Efficiency of Amorphous Si/Metal 
Substrate Type Solar Cells by three-chamber Photo-CVD Method 
Goldstar firm Development of DC/AC Converters for the Power Generating 
System using the Silicon Solar Cell and the Phosphoric Acid Fuel 
Cell 
Yukong firm Development of Zinc/Bromine Battery for Photovoltaic Energy 
Storage 
Sebang Battery firm Improvement of Lead-Acid Batteries for Photovoltaic Power 
Generation System 
Hankook Glass firm Development of Transparent Conducting Films for Substrates of 
Amorphous Solar Cell 
Korea university A Study on the Standardization of Solar Array Support 
Korea 
Eletrotechnolgy 
Research 
Institute 
institute Study on the Optimization and Economical Diffusion Scheme of 
Photovoltaic Power Generation System 
Korea Research 
Institute of 
Standards and 
Science (KRISS) 
institute Testing and Evaluation of Lead-Acid Batteries Used in Solar 
Photovoltaic Power System 
KRISS institute Development of Sealed Lead-Acid Battery for Solar Photovoltaic 
Power System 
KIER institute A Study on the Performance Measurement and Evaluation 
Procedures for Photovoltaic Devices 
KIER institute A Study on the Standardization of Photovoltaic System for Remote 
Islands 
KIER institute Studies on Performance Improvement of SnO₂ Transparent 
Conducting Films by Pyrosol Deposition Method for use in a-Si 
Solar Cells 
KIER institute Development of High Efficiency DC-AC Inverters for PV System 
Korea Research 
Institute of 
Chemical 
Technology 
institute Production of Polycrystalline Silicon Wafer for Solar Cell by the 
Casting Method 
Source: Analysis Report on Alternative Energy R&D Program (MOER, 1992) 
 
In view of the scale of budget, the National Project was also remarkable. During the 
three years, from 1989 to 1991, the R&D budget for photovoltaic was 6,031 million 
KW (approx. 6 million USD) let alone 5,880 million KW (approx. 5.9 million USD) of 
private funding. In addition, the government supported 2,766 million KW (approx. 2.8 
million USD) for purchasing R&D instruments and equipment. Thus, the total amount 
of finance was 14,677 million KW (approx. 14.7 million USD). However, considering 
that the budget for PV R&D in Germany, Japan and the US was respectively, 61, 53, 
and 34 million USD in 1990, the budget for the National Project in Korea was not so 
extraordinary. However, the annual R&D budget for PV was about ten times higher 
than the total alternative energy budget, which was just around 500 million KW (approx. 
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0.5 million USD) in the 1980s (MOER, 1990). Therefore, it is not difficult to assume 
that there must have been a big change in allocating the energy R&D budget in the late 
1980s in Korea. 
  
 
3.2.1.2 The First Solar Cell Production 
 
In evaluating the achievement of the National Project, I will focus on Siltron‟s 
programme, because manufacturing of crystalline silicon solar cells is one of the most 
important prerequisites in establishing the domestic PV industry. In fact, Siltron 
accomplished 16.5% conversion efficiency of silicon solar cells and constructed a solar 
cell production line of 300kWp annual capacity by the end of 1992 through the 
participation in the National Project. However, the price of solar modules estimated at 
6,937KW (approx. 7 USD) /Wp was about twice as high as 3,500 KW/Wp (the target of 
National Project) (MOER, 1992). Considering that the international price and efficiency 
of solar modules was around 4 USD/Wp and about 15% at that time (Song, 1994), 
Siltron‟s solar cells were therefore not competitive in the global market. However, 
according to the government report, Siltron‟s solar cells might compete with imported 
solar cells in the domestic market (MOER, 1992). 
 
In short, Siltron‟s programme was technically successful in fabricating mono-crystalline 
silicon solar cells, whilst the program failed to produce silicon solar cells at a low 
enough cost to compete with foreign solar cell manufacturers in the global market.  
    
However, looking at a typical sequence of a catching-up process and other industries‟ 
experiences in Korea, this goal of price seemed to be impossible to achieve within one 
R&D project. Acquiring basic technology capability to produce (imitation mode), 
investment to achieve a reduction in cost through economies of scale, upgrading 
technology capability through learning by doing, investment R&D to adapt, and 
improvement and development of one‟s own technology (innovation mode) were a 
basic formulation in establishing an industry in the industrialization of Korea (Kim and 
Dahlman, 1992). For example, Samsung‟s technological learning in semiconductors 
required a lot of trial and error in R&D and manufacturing, thus taking a long time (Kim, 
1997b).  
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From this perspective, Siltron‟s programme was likely to have to start from scratch in 
building technological capability of the PV industry in Korea. 
 
 
3.2.2 Revision of „the Promotion Act‟: the First Demand-pull (1997) 
 
3.2.2.1 Climate Change Issue and Local Background 
 
In the 1990s, the climate change issue had growing influence on the international 
agenda. In June 1992, „the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)‟ was signed as an international environmental treaty by about 150 nations 
in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, in December 1997, the „Kyoto Protocol‟ was adopted as 
establishing legally binding obligations for developed countries. These international 
circumstances put major pressure on the Korean economy to transform current 
development into sustainable development (MOTIE, 1997a).  
 
In addition, the Korean government restructured ministries, so MOER (Ministry of 
Energy and Resources) was merged into MOTIE (Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy) in 1993. This implied that the industrial policy perspective might receive more 
weight than the energy policy perspective within alternative energy policy. Actually, the 
government adjusted the Alternative Energy Development Master Plan, expanding the 
period to 2006 (previously to 2001) and lowering the target from 3% to 2%. This was 
because the government judged the achievement of 3% by 2001 as impossible 
considering slow technology development and low oil prices in the 1990s (MOTIE, 
1997a). Because of the modification of the target and period, the Plan became more 
realistic and attainable than previously. 
 
On the other hand, the domestic alternative industries as well as the PV industry 
claimed that more government support was needed in order to create demand for 
alternative energies so that they were able to succeed in commercialization of 
alternative energy technology. Without government supports, alternative energy 
industries could not survive in the market, because most alternative energies were still 
more expensive than conventional energy (Lee, 1997; Song, 1998). 
190 
 
3.2.2.2 Revision of the Promotion Act 
 
Under international influence and domestic pressure, the Alternative Energy 
Development Promotion Act was revised to become the Alternative Energy 
Development and Deployment Promotion Act in December 1997 (MOTIE, 1998). The 
main points of this revision, as you can infer from the title of the revised act, were not 
only to develop alternative energy technology but also how to deploy it (CTI, 1997). 
Major additions were as follows: the Alternative Energy Development Master Plan 
should include not only the development of alternative technology but also the 
deployment of alternative energy; the government could recommend public agencies to 
utilize alternative energy; and the government could implement alternative energy 
demonstration programmes, etc. (CTI, 1997).  
 
This revision of the act was the first systemic demand-pull policy for alternative energy. 
However, the industrial policy perspective was not the first priority within this revision. 
The enforcement of the UNFCCC was the first reason to revise this act (CTI, 1997). As 
a consequence, setting a target and accomplishing the target became important in order 
to reduce CO2 emission. This was one of the reasons why the government modified the 
alternative share target from 3% to 2% and extended the deadline from 2001 to 2006. 
 
Following the first legislation of this act, more interactions between actors of 
governance, technology and market areas also took place. Some interest groups, such as 
solar thermal firms and renewable energy researchers were interested in this legislative 
process and expressed their opinions in support of the revision (KIER, 1997). 
 
 
3.2.3 Difficulties of the PV Industry 
 
3.2.3.1 Stagnation of the Domestic PV Market in the 1990s 
 
Due to the National Project, a 100kWp photovoltaic generation system, which was 
made in Korea, was installed on Ho-island for the first time (KIER, 1992). In contrast to 
the efforts in PV technology development by the National Project, domestic PV demand 
shrank to a low of 50kWp in 1994, as you can see in Figure VII-5 and Table VII-4.  
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Figure VII-5 Annual PV installed in Korea, 1990-1999 (unit: kWp) 
 
 
Table VII-4 Annual PV installed in Korea, 1990-1999 (unit: kWp) 
 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
kWp 170.5 477.6 224.9 159.6 50 92 388 410 619 518 
Source: Korea Energy Management Corporation, Alternative Energy Statistics 
 
The main reasons why domestic PV markets contracted were likely to relate to the PV 
market structure. As in the 1970s and 1980s, the main domestic buyers in the 1990s 
were the Korea Maritime and Port Administration (a ministry), the Korea 
Telecommunication (a public corporation), and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (a 
public corporation). They used most solar PV power systems for lighthouses, remote 
telecommunication stations, and the electrification of remote islands. Therefore, 
domestic demand for solar systems relied heavily on the public budget for their own 
administrative objectives not put towards the goal of deploying alternative energy. Thus, 
the decrease in domestic demand was mainly due to the reduction of budget for them. 
Furthermore, the scales of most PV systems were very small because all the PV systems 
were of the stand-alone type. This also reduced the total demand for PV systems. 
 
In addition, the crude oil price was around 20 USD/barrel in the 1990s (Figure VII-1 p. 
168). Enthusiasm for the development of alternative energies had a tendency to be 
linked to oil prices. One of the Korean PV entrepreneurs comments that “the 
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relationship between oil prices and the amount of R&D fund for renewables is positive. 
At the beginning of the National Project, firms which took part in the project were very 
passionate for R&D. But, as the oil price fell down, their passions were also getting 
weaker” (Park, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, in the second half of the 1990s, the domestic PV demand increased 
steadily due to demand-pull policies such as the revision of the act. During the revision 
of the act, the government fully supported the construction of the first on-grid 30kWp 
photovoltaic systems at Changwon city hall in November 1997 through the 
demonstration programme (MOTIE, 1997b). After the revision, government allocated 
33, 33.3, and 27.8 billion KW (approx. 33, 33.3, and 27.8 million USD) budgets for the 
preferential loan to alternative energy system installation or alternative energy firms in 
1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively (MOTIE, 1998; MOTIE, 1999; MOCIE, 2000). 
 
However, the domestic demand for PV systems was still so limited that it did not reach 
1MWp by the end of 1999, as Figure VII-5 and Table VII-4 shows us. The amount of 
annual domestic demand was around 500kWp in the 1990s, far under 2 MWp of the 
domestic module annual production capacity. This meant that the first demand-pull 
policy was not sufficiently effective in expanding the demand for PV systems. 
Furthermore, domestic firms‟ seemed not to have entrepreneurship to export their 
product like typical export-led sectors. As a consequence, firms‟ entry, private 
investment, and technological innovation were stagnant as I will discuss below.  
 
 
3.2.3.2 Shut Down of the First Production Facility 
 
The National Project for development of PV systems can be regarded as a starting point 
for the Korean PV industry. It was the first project in Korea in which main actors of 
governance, technology, and market areas interacted and cooperated. In fact, Siltron 
(the first solar cell manufacturer in Korea) completed its solar cells production line at 
300kWp of annual capacity in 1992 through the National Project and extended its 
capacity to 500kWp later. In addition, Goldstar Industrial System attained its mono-
crystalline silicon solar module production line at 500kWp of annual capacity in late 
1992. Moreover, Samsung Electronics achieved a solar module line at 500kWp of 
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annual capacity in early 1994, and Hacksim Chemical built a solar module line at 
500kWp of annual capacity in late 1994 (KIER, 1997). 
 
However, commercialization of PV systems after the National Project was in retard. 
One of the main reasons for the PV industry‟s failure to progress seems to be weak 
domestic demand. Most renewable energy industries have a stage of „valley of death‟ 
between demonstration and commercialization (Carbon Trust, 2006 cited in Watson, 
2009, p.135). Thus, „nursing markets‟ should be provided to renewable technology for 
market formation (Ericsson and Maitland, 1989 cited in Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
That is to say, in order to create a successful renewable energy industry, not only 
technically but also commercially, policies need to be „designed to provide effective 
linkages between the demand and supply sides‟ (Kim and Dahlman, 1992). To illustrate 
this point, public procurement policies played a major role in the formation of an initial 
market when the computer industry emerged in the early 1980s (Kim and et al., 1987). 
 
In line with this, the demand-pull policy was introduced by the revision of the 
Promotion Act in late 1997. However, the demand which was created by the policy was 
not large enough to lead to the growth of the PV industry.    
 
Moreover, forerunner PV companies such as Sharp hindered potential future rivals from 
successfully entering into the PV market. For example, Japanese firms‟ strategic 
behaviour prevented Korean PV firms‟ from settling down successfully in the Korean 
PV market. They cut the price of PV modules to around half price in the Korean market 
(Lee, 2000). As a consequence, the total production of solar modules by Korean PV 
firms came to 452kWp in 1995, 352kWp in 1996, and 370kWp in 1997, whilst total 
annual production capacity reached 2MWp. Therefore, the ratio of their working 
production line was under 20% during these three years (Song, 1998). 
 
According to the industrialisation experience in Korea, usual industrialisation sequences 
are as follows: firstly, building the first production capability by importing capital goods 
or reverse engineering etc; secondly, accumulating technological capability by 
substituting for import in the domestic market; thirdly, reducing costs by economies of 
scale and exporting to global markets; and lastly, upgrading technological capability by 
investment in R&D and developing products and services (Kim, 1993). Some producers 
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skipped the second step in circumstances where the domestic market was small. With 
regard to the PV industry in the initiation period, early entrants, such as Siltron, 
Goldstar Industry System, and Samsung Electronics, remained at the second step. The 
reasons why they did not consider exporting to overseas markets seems to be a failure to 
meet an international competitive price and a lack of entrepreneurship.  
 
In particular, Siltron underestimated the potential growth of the global PV market and 
so did not invest (Bae, 2009). Furthermore, it had difficulty in managing a solar cell 
production line in the 1990s, and disposed of its solar cell production line to Nesco 
Solar in 1997 in order to focus on producing wafers for semiconductors when the Asian 
financial crisis happened (Bae, 2009; MOCIE, 2003b). 
 
 
3.2.4 Evolution of the PV Industry between the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Since the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Five Year Plans (1972-81), the Korean government and chaebols 
had made efforts to accomplish industrial upgrading mainly through the „heavy and 
chemical industries programmes‟ as I discuss in sub-section VII.2.2.2. In terms of 
energy policy, a heavy and chemical industrialisation requires a stable and cheap energy 
supply, because they are energy-intensive. In the middle of the programme, however, 
the first and second oil shocks happened in 1973 and 1978, respectively. Thus, the 
Korean government established „the Ministry of Energy and Resources (MOER)‟ in 
1978 in order to cope with the energy problem during the process of industrial 
upgrading.    
 
On the other hand, the institutional change that was more directly associated with the 
PV sector occurred in the second half of the 1980s. In order to reduce the dependency 
on imported oil, „the Alternative Energy Development Promotion Act‟ was passed in 
1987 through the involvement of MOER. Similarly to other selective industrial policies 
at that time, an alternative energy policy designated the PV sector as a priority sector 
through the National Project between 1989 and 1992. The most distinctive characteristic 
of the National Project was the participation of the company. Due to the participation of 
the firm, the project was significantly different from previous PV research such as a 
small-scale experiment in the laboratory. One of the main aims of the project was to 
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begin the manufacture of silicon solar cells.    
 
In fact, Siltron successfully completing a solar cell production line at 300 MWp of 
annual capacity was one of the achievements of the National Project. Indeed, this was 
the first silicon solar cell production facility in Korea. However, Siltron failed to 
commercialise its solar cells in the market place. The price of Siltron‟s solar cells was 
about double that of solar cells in the global market. At that time, the technological 
capability of the PV sector in Korea needed to learn more about advanced foreign PV 
technology, especially mass production technology. Due to this deficiency, Siltron 
could not export its solar cells. To make matters worse, the domestic PV market was 
stagnant, despite the fact that the demand-pull policy was introduced by the revision of 
the Alternative Energy Development Promotion Act. In other words, the government 
also failed to create sufficient demand to sustain the local PV production capacity. 
Eventually, facing the 1997 financial crisis, the first silicon solar cell production facility 
was shut down.    
 
 
3.3 Emergence of PV firms: 2000s- 
 
3.3.1 Adoption and Abolition of the Feed-in Tariff 
 
3.3.1.1 Cooperation between the Two Advocacy Coalitions 
 
From the 1990s, several environmental activist groups started to appear in Korea and 
gradually increased pressure on the government. Under the strong influence of the 
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), the „Korean 
Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM)‟ was launched as Korea‟s largest 
environmental organization by merging eight local environmental groups in 1993 
(KFEM, 2009). In the next year, the „Green Korea United (GKU)‟ was founded (GKU, 
2009)
101
. In addition, the „Korea NGO‟s Energy Network (KNEN)‟ was established to 
                                                 
101
 These two Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), as representative civil environmental 
activists‟ groups in Korea, played a major role in enlightening and organising the Korean people 
to become more environmentally minded. Moreover, the „Centre for Energy Alternative (CEA)‟ 
was established as a subsidiary of KFEM to oppose conventional energy, especially nuclear 
energy, as well as to expand alternative energy consumption by a bottom-up process in 2000 
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launch a voluntary and energy-saving movement as well as to support alternative energy 
(KNEN, 2009). These environmental groups have pressured the government to change 
energy policy to more environmental ones through forums, press releases, and 
demonstrations, etc. In particular, KFEM and KNEN were much involved in the 
introduction of the feed-in tariff in Korea.  
 
Furthermore, industrial associations for alternative energy were also founded. At first, 
the „Korea Small-hydro Generation Association‟ was founded in February 2001, and 
then it was enlarged and changed its name to the „Korea New and Renewable Energy 
Association (KNREA)‟ in August 2001 (KNREA, 2009). This association has made 
great efforts to disseminate alternative energy policy through institutional changes and 
cooperation with the government, in particular with MOCIE. 
 
The concept of „advocacy coalitions‟, which is defined by Sabatier (1999)102, is suitable 
for analysing the process of this cooperation in Korea. When this concept is applied to 
energy policy making in Korea, two advocacy coalitions can be identified: one is an 
industry-oriented coalition; the other is an environment-oriented coalition. Each 
coalition is composed of many groups as shown in Table VII-5. 
 
Table VII-5 Two advocacy coalitions in energy policy making in Korea 
 Industry-oriented Coalition Environment-oriented Coalition 
Ministry Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Energy (MOCIE) 
Ministry of Planning and Budget (MOPB) 
Ministry of Environment (ME) 
Research 
Institute, 
Industry 
Association, 
and NGO 
Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) 
Korea Institute of Energy Research 
(KIER) 
Korea Electrotechnology Research 
Institute (KERI) 
Korea Energy Management Corporation 
(KEMC) 
Korean Federation for Environmental 
Movement (KFEM) 
Green Korea United (GKU) 
Korea NGO‟s Energy Network (KNEN) 
Centre for Energy Alternative (CEA) 
Korea New and Renewable Energy 
Association (KNREA) 
Korea Photovoltaic Industry Association 
(KOPIA) 
Korea Solar Electric Power Association 
(KSEPA) 
                                                                                                                                               
(CEA, 2009a). 
102
 Sabatier defines this concept as follows: „“[a]dvocacy coalitions,” each composed of people 
from various governmental and private organizations that both (1) share a set of normative and 
causal beliefs and (2) engage in a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time‟ (Sabatier, 
1999, p.120). 
In addition, Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) use this concept to analyse the transformation energy 
sector (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004).  
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Utility and 
Firm 
Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO) 
Unison 
Source: Author 
 
The former concentrates on economic development by the creation and growth of new 
industries, while the latter prioritises protection of the environment and reduction of 
CO2 emission over economic growth in an effect to fight global warming. In this sense, 
the industry-oriented coalition represents not a specific industry but a whole industry.  
 
With regard to energy policy, whilst disputing some issues, the two coalitions have 
collaborated with each other on other issues. For example, concerning the nuclear policy, 
the industry-oriented coalition supported nuclear energy because it enabled industries to 
use electricity cheaply. However, the environment-oriented coalition opposed nuclear 
energy, pointing out the disposal problem of nuclear waste and high cost of nuclear 
energy in the long-term. On the other hand, they cooperated with each other with regard 
to the renewable energy support policy. The industry-oriented coalition expected this 
policy to play a decisive role in creating new renewable industry, while the 
environment-oriented coalition considered this policy to be effective in deploying 
renewable energy and cutting CO2 emissions. 
 
Each coalition expressed its opinion in the professional forums
103
. Finally, in December 
2001, KEEI (Korea Energy Economics Institute) submitted to MOCIE a report called 
„A Study on Building up Legal Institution for Disseminating New & Renewable 
Energy‟, which suggested introducing a feed-in tariff scheme in order to deploy 
renewable energy sources substantially. KERI, KEMC, KNEN, KFEM, Unison and 
KIER participated in this study as advisors and co-authors (KEEI, 2001). Thus, this 
study was the result of the collaboration of the two advocacy coalitions. The industry-
                                                 
103
 In September 1998, KFEM hosted the „Renewable Energy Symposium‟, in which main 
discussions were as follows: nuclear energy was not the answer for sustainable energy system; 
renewable energy could be one of the solutions for future energy systems; and current energy 
policy was not sufficient to form renewable energy market (KFEM, 1998). In July 2001, 
MOCIE hosted the „Great Discussion for Accelerating Deployment of Renewable Energy‟, in 
which Unison, a wind turbine company, KFEM, KEEI, KIER, and KERI (Korea 
Electrotechnology Research Institute) took part. In this discussion, the feed-in tariffs was 
suggested officially for renewable support policy for the first time in Korea (MOCIE, 2001). In 
September 2001, CEA and KNEN co-hosted the „Renewable Energy Promotion Act Forum‟, in 
which they claimed that the coming revision of the Promotion Act be more promotional to 
renewable energy markets (CEA, 2009b). 
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oriented coalition, MOCIE, KEMC, KERI, and KIER wished to adopt the feed-in tariff 
in order to boost the domestic PV industry as well as other renewable industries. On the 
other hand, the environment-oriented coalition, KFEM, KNEN, and Unison wished to 
adopt the feed-in tariff in order to deploy PV energy as well as other renewable energies. 
 
In the process of revising the Act, there was some opposition to the introduction of the 
feed-in tariff. In particular, the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MOPB) strongly 
opposed the introduction of the feed-in tariff at first because MOPB thought the feed-in 
tariff a too generous subsidy for renewable energies. However, MOCIE explained to 
MOPB the urgency of deployment of renewable energies putting forward the cases of 
Germany, Japan and Spain. Moreover, NGOs persuaded higher executives in MOPB 
directly to help with the adoption of the feed-in tariff. During the deliberation process of 
the National Assembly, NGOs and members of the National Assembly who agreed on 
the draft Act persuaded other members of the National Assembly who disagreed with it 
(Lee, 2009). Finally, the feed-in tariff was adopted mainly due to the cooperative efforts 
made by the two coalitions.  
 
 
3.3.1.2 Adoption of the Feed-in Tariff 
 
In March 2002, the Alternative Energy Development and Deployment Promotion Act 
(AEDDPA) was revised to add the feed-in tariff provision. As MOCIE announced the 
instructions of the „Standard Price of Electricity Generated by Alternative Energy‟ on 
29th May 2002, the feed-in tariff was implemented for the first time in Korea (MOCIE, 
2002). Table VII-6 shows us the feed-in rates (standard prices) in these instructions. 
 
Table VII-6 Feed-in rates in Korea in 2002 
 
Standard Price (KW/kWh) 
For private use For business 
Photovoltaic 716.40 
Wind SMP+CP* 107.66 
Small hydro SMP+CP 73.69 
Gas from waste SMP+CP 
~ 20 MW 65.20 
20 ~ 50 MW 61.80 
Incineration of waste  SMP+CP 
Source: MOCIE Press Release on 29
th
 May 2002 
*SMP(System Marginal Price) + CP(Capacity Price) 
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The standard price for PV electriciy (716.40KW/kWh) was decided by consideration of 
the price of the German feed-in tariff (597KW (0.99Mark)/kWh, using the average 
currency exchange rate in October 2001). The standard price for PV electricity was 
fifteen times higher compared to the average transaction price electricity of 48.80 
KW/kWh in 2001 (MOCIE, 2002). This was a huge demand-pull policy which could 
create a large amount of domestic demand for PV systems, and can be stated as being a 
significant „institutional change‟ going to the heart of the process whereby new 
technologies gain ground (Freeman and Louça, 2002 cited in Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004).  
 
The main goals of introducing the feed-in tariff were dealing with UNFCCC, 
diversification of energy sources, and creating next generation renewable industries. In 
other words, the goals were development of renewable industries and deployment of 
renewable energies. At that time, these two goals harmonised well without serious 
conflict, because the industry-oriented coalition also prioritised deployment of 
renewable energies in order to meet their target by 2006 (Lee, 2009). As time went by 
and subsidy grew, disputes over which goals were more important occurred between the 
two advocacy coalitions, as I will describe below. 
 
 
3.3.1.3 Domestic Market Explosion and Import Penetration 
 
The domestic demand for photovoltaic systems was still stagnant until 2003, despite the 
feed-in tariff implemented from 2002. Thus, it took over two years from their 
introduction for the feed-in tariff to become effective. This duration can be explained by 
an administrative time lag which includes local governments‟ recognition of the new 
scheme, adaptation to it, setting further detail processes of permission, etc. In fact, in the 
case of the first commercial PV power plant, it took about two years to get permission 
from the local government (Heo, 2009). 
 
However, since the first commercial PV power plant (New Sun Energy, 200kWp) was 
constructed in September 2004, the average annual growth rate of PV installed was 
about 280% between 2004 and 2008, although some decrease happened in 2009 
(KNREC, 2009). Figure VII-6 and Table VII-7 illustrate the domestic market expansion.  
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Figure VII-6 Annual PV installed in Korea, 2002-2009 (unit: MWp) 
 
Table VII-7 Annual PV installed in Korea, 2002-2009 (unit: MWp) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MWp 
(%)* 
0.475 
(-40) 
0.563 
(19) 
2.553 
(353) 
4.99 
(95) 
22.32 
(347) 
45.35 
(103) 
276.3 
(509) 
164 
(-40) 
Source: Photovoltaics Support Policy and Industry (KNREC, 2009) 
*Annual growth rate 
 
This expansion of the domestic market was the effect of mixed demand-pull policies 
such as the rooftop programme, subsidies for local governments and the regulation of 
public agencies until 2005. However, the effect of the feed-in tariff has been distinctive 
since 2006, as you can see in Table VII-8. The share of installation through the feed-in 
tariff compared to total PV installed surpassed other policy‟s shares from 2006, and 
became the dominant contributor to PV installation, reaching 93% in 2008. 
 
Table VII-8 Contributions of demand-pull policies to annual PV installed (unit: kWp) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Feed-in tariffs 
(%)* 
200 
(8) 
1,143 
(23) 
9,012 
(40) 
28,842 
(64) 
257,499 
(93) 
Rooftop program 
(%)* 
625 
(25) 
2,340 
(47) 
6,573 
(29) 
8,341 
(18) 
9,579 
(4) 
Etc 
(%)* 
1,728 
(67) 
1,507 
(30) 
6,737 
(31) 
8,164 
(18) 
9,246 
(3) 
Total 
(%) 
2,553 
(100) 
4,990 
(100) 
22,322 
(100) 
45,347 
(100) 
276,324 
(100) 
Source: Photovoltaics Support Policy and Industry (KNREC, 2009) 
*Share of total PV installed 
 
In short, demand-pull policies which were introduced since 2002 have been effective in 
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increasing the domestic demand for PV systems. In particular, the feed-in tariff played a 
major role in expanding the domestic demand. Therefore, the feed-in tariff, as a 
representative demand-pull policy, was successful in deploying PV electricity.  
 
On the other hand, the domestic demand explosion without sufficient local production 
capacity, as I will discuss later, resulted in the rapid increase of imported PV cells and 
modules. Figure VII-7 and Table VII-9 show us how fast the importation of PV cells 
and modules increased between 2003 and 2008.    
 
Figure VII-7 Import of PV in Korea, 2003-2009 (unit: USD million) 
 
Table VII-9 Import of PV cells and modules in Korea, 2003-2009 (unit: USD million) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 
(%)* 
8 
(57) 
10 
(25) 
30 
(200) 
51 
(70) 
100 
(96) 
364 
(264) 
220 
(-40) 
Japan 
(%)* 
20 
(-6) 
25 
(25) 
43 
(72) 
69 
(60) 
99 
(43) 
187 
(89) 
71 
(-62) 
Germany 
(%)* 
0.04 
(290) 
0.3 
(650) 
4 
(1,233) 
31 
(675) 
67 
(116) 
178 
(166) 
162 
(-9) 
USA 
(%)* 
7 
(92) 
3 
(-57) 
3 
(0) 
19 
(533) 
39 
(105) 
95 
(144) 
31 
(-67) 
Total 
(%) 
46 
(16) 
53 
(15) 
97 
(83) 
205 
(111) 
403 
(97) 
1,083 
(169) 
676 
(-38) 
Source: Trade Database of KITA (Korea International Trade Association), 
(http://www.kita.net/: required to log in), searched by HSK 8541.40.9020
104
 
                                                 
104
 In terms of HS (Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System), photovoltaic 
cells/modules are included in the code of „8541.40‟ which is described as „photosensitive 
semiconductor devices; light emitting diodes‟. In particular, HSK (Harmonized System of 
Korea) adopts 10-digit category. In HSK, photovoltaic cells/modules are included code of 
„8541.40.9020‟ which is described as „photovoltaic cell (includes solar cell, photo diode, photo 
couple and photo relay; solar module and solar panel)‟. Photo diode is a kind of sensor to 
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*Annual growth rate 
 
According to trade data, imports from China increased faster than those from any other 
country.  
 
When we look at other sets of data, the origins of PV modules in PV power plants and 
rooftops also reveal how much imported modules were installed in Korea, as shown in 
Figure VII-8 and Table VII-10. 
 
Figure VII-8 Origins of PV modules in PV plants and rooftops in Korea (unit: kWp) 
 
Table VII-10 Origins of PV modules in PV plants and rooftops in Korea (unit: kWp) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Korea 
(%)* 
 595 
(72%) 
928 
(27%) 
3,666 
(24%) 
9,640 
(25%) 
64,731 
(24%) 
China 
(%)* 
0 34 
(1%) 
746 
(5%) 
5,304 
(14%) 
60,152 
(23%) 
Japan 
(%)* 
230 
(28%) 
2,036 
(58%) 
7,250 
(47%) 
11,082 
(29%) 
61,062 
(23%) 
USA 
(%)* 
0 72 
(2%) 
1,308 
(8%) 
8,342 
(22%) 
56,949 
(21%) 
Rest of World 0 415 2,415 3,814 24,201 
                                                                                                                                               
recognise light. Photo couple and photo relay are a kind of electrical currents controller like a 
switch. They are usually used as parts of electronics. “The trade volume of them is small 
enough to ignore compared to solar photovoltaic cells and modules” (Kang, 2009). 
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(%)* (12%) (16%) (10%) (9%) 
Total 825 
(100%) 
3,485 
(100%) 
15,385 
(100%) 
38,182 
(100%) 
267,095 
(100%) 
Source: Photovoltaics Support Policy and Industry (KNREC, 2009) 
*The shares in total 
 
According to Table VII-10, the market share of Korean modules in the domestic market 
fell from 72% to 24% between 2004 and 2008, whilst that of imported modules rose 
from 28% to 76% in the same period. As a consequence, the high contributions of 
imported modules to PV systems installed in Korea caused some criticism against the 
feed-in tariffs in view of industrial policy, even though the local production of PV 
modules also increased very fast.  
 
 
3.3.1.4 From FIT to RPS: Conflicts between the Two Advocacy Coalitions 
 
After the introduction of the feed-in tariff, cooperation between the two coalitions 
continued well for several years. In 2003, MOCIE extended the guaranteed period for 
the feed-in tariff from 5 years to 15 years and introduced a market cap scheme of 
20MWp (MOCIE, 2003a). In 2004, MOCIE introduced a new regulation that forced 
new government and local government buildings, and public agencies to install 
alternative energy systems such as PV, solar thermal, and geo-thermal systems (MOCIE, 
2004a). 
 
However, this short-lived collaboration between the two advocacy coalitions came to an 
end in 2006. On 23
rd
 March 2006, the hearing for a revision of standard price was held 
in COEX in Seoul. The environment-oriented coalition opposed a reduction of the 
standard price, while the industry-oriented coalition suggested a draft of revision in 
favour of a reduction of price (Jung, 2006). MOCIE proposed that the standard price of 
PV electricity be reduced in accordance with an analysis of the revenue of generators 
within the period. Though generators opposed MOCIE‟s proposal on the basis of the 
domestic market‟s infancy (Jung, 2006), MOCIE finally revised the „Standard Prices of 
Renewable Electricity‟ in October 2006. The price for PV electricity decreased from 
716.40 KW/kWh to 711.25 (under 30kWp) and 677.38 (over 30kWp) (MOCIE, 2006). 
The reasons of the industrial-oriented coalition for the revision were as follows: firstly, 
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it was forced to revise the standard price of renewable electricity before the end of the 
five-year enforcement period by the „Standard Price of Electricity Generated by 
Alternative Energy‟; secondly, the price of PV systems fell from 15 m. KW (approx. 
15,000 USD)/kWp to 9.4 m. KW/kWp between 2003 and 2006 through technological 
innovation (Kim, 2009). 
 
In 2008, conflict between the two coalitions became more serious after the Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy (MKE, previously MOCIE) suggested further reduction of the 
standard price. In fact, the amount spent on feed-in renewable generators since 2008 
went substantially beyond the estimated budget. In particular, the budget spent in 2009 
was seven times as high as the budget estimated in 2006. Table VII-11 reveals the 
differences between the budgets estimated and spent.  
 
Table VII-11 Budgets estimated and spent (unit: KW billion; approx. USD million) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Estimated 3.3 5.63 14.66 25.99 34.47 - - - 
Spent 3.3 5.58 5.08 7.55 9.97 26.82 119.73 233.0 
Source: MOCIE (2002) and KNREC (2009) 
 
In particular, the government estimated that the budget for the feed-in tariff would reach 
213 billion KW (approx. 213 million USD) in 2011 (MOFE, 2008). Furthermore, the 
government recognised that most budgets for the feed-in tariff resulted in the rapid 
increase of imported PV modules rather than the development of the local PV industry. 
Therefore, the Korean government suggested not only a reduction in the standard price 
of PV electricity but also a change in policy from the feed-in tariff to the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard
105
 (RPS).  
 
Many environmental civil activist groups, together with the PV generators strongly 
criticised the government‟s inconsistency of policy and claimed that the government 
                                                 
105
 The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is another scheme to deploy renewable energy 
resources. RPS enforces electricity generators to produce a certain ratio of their electricity from 
renewable energy resources. Whereas the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme is regulation of price, RPS 
is regulation of quantity. Thus, RPS is more market-oriented than FIT, because the price of 
renewable electricity is determined by the market. RPS has been adopted in many of the states 
in the US and had been adoped in the UK. It is argued that RPS is less effective in deploying 
renewable energy than FIT (Mitchell et al., 2006). 
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should withdraw the draft for revision (Jung, 2008). Finally, the standard price of PV 
electricity decreased from 677.38 KW/kWh to 590.87 (option 15-year) and 536.04 
(option 20-year). However, a market cap was allocated 50, 70, and 80 MWp in 2009, 
2010 and 2011, respectively
106
, and the RPS to be introduced in 2012 (MKE, 2008).  
 
 
3.3.2 Start-up of the PV Industry 
 
3.3.2.1 Global Market Explosion 
 
Due to European countries‟ demand-pull policies, mainly the German feed-in tariff, and 
the US tax incentives, the global PV market has sky-rocketed since 2000. The average 
annual growth rate was around 50% between 2001 and 2009, as you can see Figure VII-
9 and Table VII-12. 
 
Figure VII-9 Annual PV installed in the world, 2000-2009 (unit: MWp) 
 
 
Table VII-12 Annual PV installed in the world, 2000-2009 (unit: MWp) 
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MWp 278 334 477 583 1,122 1,422 1,596 2,594 6,090 7,203 
                                                 
106
 Thus, the amount of PV system which can be applied to the feed-in rate is only 50 MWp in 
2009.   
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(%)*  (20) (43) (22) (92) (27) (12) (63) (135) (18) 
Source: Global Market Outlook 2010 (EPIA, 2010) 
*Annual growth rate 
 
This growth of the global PV market influenced not only foreign companies but also 
Korean companies. Since the late 1990s, the Korean solar cell companies entered into 
the PV industry, as shown in Figure VII-10. In particular, after the PV market became 
brighter than before, most of the chaebols such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai 
participated in the rush for the PV industry. 
 
Figure VII-10 Entry of Korean companies into the PV cell industry 
 
Source: Interviews and each firm‟s website 
SME (Small and Medium-sized Enterprise) 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Entry of SMEs 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Rapid Response to the Market Expansion 
 
Responding to global market expansion, Nesco Solar and Photon Semiconductor 
entered into the PV industry in 1998 and 2000, respectively, as shown in Figure VII-10. 
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They were small and new companies. Nesco Solar was founded as a joint venture 
between three Korean companies and a Canadian company. It began with taking over 
the cell production facility of Siltron in 1998 and completed the pilot cell production 
line at the annual capacity of 2MWp in 2002 (Bae, 2009). On the other hand, Photon 
Semiconductor was founded as a laboratory venture in Sungkyunkwan University, and 
also completed the pilot cell production line at the annual capacity of 2MWp in 2002 
(Lee, J., 2010).      
 
According to Malerba and Orsenigo (1997), there are two types of firm entry into new 
markets: one is a new entry, and the other is a lateral entry. The new entry is the birth of 
a new firm, while the lateral entry is a diversification of existing firms. Moreover, most 
new entrants are small firms, while most lateral entrants are large firms (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1997). 
 
From this respect, Nesco Solar and Photon Semiconductor can be categorised as new 
entrants because they were Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and their 
entries were „births of new firms‟. By contrast, Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics 
and Hyundai Heavy Industries can be categorised as lateral entrants because they were 
chaebols, large business groups, and their entries were a type of „diversification of their 
business areas‟.   
 
However, the former was prompt to respond to the market, while the latter was late to 
do so. One of the reasons why the former was faster than the latter is that the PV market 
was still risky and uncertain in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Another reason might 
be associated with the venture boom in the early 2000s in Korea. After the 1997 
financial crisis, the Korean government nurtured venture businesses as an alternative 
engine of growth, as I mention in sub-section VII.2.3.2 (p. 178). In fact, Photon 
Semiconductor was provided with 50 million KW (approx. 50,000 USD) in 2001 by the 
government promotion programme of venture businesses (Lee, J., 2010).  
 
Thus, at the starting point of the PV industry in the early 2000s, the Korean PV industry 
seems to be more advanced than the Chinese PV industry. To illustrate this, Photon 
Semiconductor was visited by the engineers of Yingli in order for them to learn about 
PV technology (Lee, P., 2010). 
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3.3.2.2.2 Difficulties in Financing and Rapid Expansion 
 
Unlike in the German and Chinese cases, the Korean solar cell companies failed to 
expand their production capacity rapidly in the first half of the 2000s. As shown in 
Table VII-13, Nesco Solar did not expand its production capacity any more. Finally, it 
shut down in 2006. On the other hand, Photon Semiconductor made a success in 
constructing a mass production line at 5MWp of annual production capacity in 
December 2003. However, it did not expand its capacity until it was taken over by the 
KPE in 2006.  
 
Table VII-13 Production capacity of Nesco Solar and Photon Semiconductor (unit: 
MWp) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Nesco 2    closed    
Photon 2 5   30*   60 
Source: Interviews 
* Since 2006, Photon Semiconductor was taken over by the KPE   
 
At this time, it was said that the minimum efficient scale of a solar cell production line 
was at least 30 MWp of annual capacity. This scale of investment required at least 30 
billion KW (approx. 30 million USD) excluding the land costs. However, it was too 
large an amount of investment for SMEs to finance in the Korean economy. Firstly, the 
Korean government support for new industries such as policy loans in the 1970s and 
1980s has not existed since the 1990s. Secondly, it was difficult for SMEs to obtain a 
loan from the banks without security such as land. Thirdly, it was not easy for SMEs to 
access the stock market because the market still regarded the PV sector as risky in the 
first half of the 2000s. Therefore, there was no way for SMEs to raise a fund to invest in 
such a scale of production line.    
 
Furthermore, most of the solar cell production equipment had to be imported from more 
advanced countries due to the lower level of technology of the Korean equipment sector.  
Due to the difficulties of SMEs, Nesco Solar finally shut down and key persons moved 
to Hanwha Chemical (Bae, 2009). Also, Photon Semiconductor was taken over by KPE 
(a medium-sized enterprise) in 2006. 
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3.3.2.3 Late Entry of the Chaebols 
 
3.3.2.3.1 Reasons for Late Entry 
 
Since 2004, the German market exploded due to the feed-in tariff scheme as I discuss 
earlier (V.3.3.1 p. 96). Mainly due to the growth of the German market, the annual 
growth rate of the global PV market reached 92 per cent as shown in Table VII-12 (p. 
205). Thus, the global PV market was worth more than an annual 5 billion Euros at that 
time. Moreover, the market expectations of the PV industry changed from uncertain to 
optimistic because of the rapid growth of PV markets and the increase of feed-in tariff 
schemes mainly in European countries.  
 
As these changes revealed a brighter future, Korean business groups started to jump on 
the bandwagon. In 2004, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) launched a new energy team 
in order to enter into the PV industry. In 2005, Millinet Solar established itself as a new 
entry into the solar cell industry. In 2007, Samsung Electronics
107
, STX Solar, and 
Shinsung Holdings entered, as did LG Electronics and Hanhwa Chemical in 2008. Most 
of these, including Hyundai, Samsung, STX, LG and Hanhwa, were chaebols as shown 
in Table VII-14.  
 
Table VII-14 General information about the chaebols which entered into the PV 
industry 
 
Year of 
establishment 
Main items 
Sales in 2008 
(unit: billion 
KW) 
Number of 
employer in 
2008 
HHI 1970 Shipbuilding, engine 19,957 25,000 
Samsung 
Electronics 
1969 
Semiconductor, 
mobile phone 
73,000 69,000 
STX Group* 1976 
Shipbuilding, 
shipping 
23,800 46,800 
LG Electronics 1958 
Mobile phone, 
electronics 
27,638 28,659 
Hanhwa Chemical 1965 PE, PVC 3,037 - 
Source: Website of each firm 
                                                 
107
 In fact, Samsung Electronics has engaged in solar business (module part) since 1992. Its 
entry looked like trials and experiments towards new businesses in order to diversify its 
business area. However, the domestic demand for PV systems was very limited in the 1990s, 
thus a solar business team of Samsung Electronics spun off as a manufacturer of solar modules, 
S-Energy, in 2001 (S-Energy, 2009). 
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* STX Solar is a subsidiary of STX Group  
 
The chaebols‟ entries were late compared with the SMEs‟ entries as well as those of 
foreign big companies such as Sharp, Siemens, BP, etc. According to interviews, the 
reasons for their late entries can be explained as follows: firstly, the market size of the 
PV industry was not sufficient to achieve economies of scale in the first half of the 
2000s; secondly, the PV market was heavily dependent on government policy such as 
the feed-in tariff, thus chaebols regarded the PV market as risky and unattractive; 
thirdly, the level of technological capability of the Korean PV sector was lower than 
that of more advanced countries.  
 
The first reason is connected to a „defensive innovation strategy‟ rather than an 
„offensive strategy‟ by the Korean chaebols during the industrialisation process 
(Freeman and Soete, 1997). If I follow this theory, then chaebols appeared to choose a 
defensive strategy in the PV sector. In other words, they did not wish to be the first in 
the world, because they did not wish to take the high risks of being the first. Rather, 
they preferred to follow, so that they could learn and profit from the mistakes of those 
first movers (Freeman and Soete, 1997). However, considering the efforts of the 
chaebols in being the first in many sectors regardless of risks, this reason does not fully 
explain the late entry. 
 
The second reason is likely to be associated with the chaebols distrust of the 
consistency of government policy. They were concerned that the PV market could 
shrink when government policy changed. However, considering the urgency of the 
climate change issue and the pressure to establish a sustainable energy system, it was 
difficult for major countries such as Germany to change government policy against the 
PV industry. Moreover, most new industries are often provided with support from the 
government in their initial period. Thus, the second reason does not fully explain it, 
either.  
 
The third reason is correct in that the PV research pools were not sufficient and there 
were fewer local PV equipment suppliers than in more advanced countries such as 
Germany and Japan. However, considering the catching-up process of the 
semiconductor industry, they were not prerequisites for manufacturing. In fact, in the 
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Korean semiconductor industry, manufacturers grew first and the growth of local 
equipment suppliers followed. Furthermore, it is said that the technical barrier of 
developing silicon solar cells is not higher than that of the semiconductor. Thus, the 
third reason is not a comprehensive explanation, either.  
  
The most important reason is likely to lie in the Korean political economy during the 
first half of 2000s. After the 1997 crisis, the Korean government implemented 
restructuring programmes in the financial and corporate sectors, as I discuss in sub-
section VII.2.3.2. For example, the government enforced the reduction of the debt-
equity ratio of chaebols and regulated internal transactions within the business groups. 
Furthermore, the Big Deal, which meant business swaps among the top five chaebols in 
industries with over-capacity, were enforced by the government in order to make the 
chaebols concentrate their resources on the sectors of their core competence (Shin and 
Chang, 2003). As a consequence, chaebols seemed to have no room to invest in new 
sectors such as a PV industry. They concentrated on their core sectors such as the 
semiconductor and shipbuilding industries, even though many reports pointed out the 
lack of alternative engines of future growth (SERI, 2002). In fact, chaebols did not 
invest much in the solar cell industry until 2008.  
 
 
3.3.2.3.2 The Strategy of Chaebols 
 
Although the start of solar-cell manufacture by chaebols was later than that of bigger, 
more advanced companies, they have been catching up with more advanced companies 
swiftly utilising their advantage of business groups. Firstly, they seem to have no 
difficulty in mobilising capital for investment. Considering their level of sales and 
ability to raise funds through direct and indirect financing, the amount of investment 
required for a minimum efficient production line of solar cells was not too demanding 
for them. Secondly, they have a high concentration of skilled personnel within the solar 
cell business unit, bringing relevant scientists and engineers together from within 
business groups or from the outside. For example, Samsung Electronics gathered PV 
scientists and engineers from Samsung SDI and Samsung Advanced Institute of 
Technology. Also, LG Electronics acquired the solar cell team from LG Chemical, and 
Hanhwa Chemical brought key persons from Nesco Solar into its solar team. Thirdly, 
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they have utilised their brand names and marketing channels to export their products.  
    
They have expanded their production capacity swiftly, as shown in Figure VII-11 and 
Table VII-15. In fact, the total annual production capacity of silicon solar cells was 
nearly 2 GWp at the end of 2010. While most of them expanded by the construction of 
their factories and production facilities, Hanhwa expanded faster than any other firm 
through the acquisition of Solarfun, the fourth largest Chinese PV firm which had a 
500MWp of annual production capacity. 
 
Figure VII-11 Annual production capacity of silicon cells in Korea (unit: MWp) 
 
 
Table VII-15 Annual production capacity of silicon cells in Korea (unit: MWp) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
Nesco 2 2 2 2      
Photon 2 5 5 5 30 30 30 90 90 
HHI       15 70 400 
Millinet       30 100 300 
Shinsung       50 100 150 
Samsung        30 100 
LG        120 240 
STX        25 50 
Hanhwa        30 530** 
Total 4 7 7 7 30 30 125 565 1,860 
Source: Interviews and website of each firm 
* Estimation in September 2010  
** Hanhwa took over Solarfun, China‟s fourth largest producer of PV, in September 2010  
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Moreover, they have attempted to complete vertical integration within the silicon solar 
cell value chain. For the first time in Korea since 2010, HHI have completed vertical 
integration from poly-silicon to silicon solar modules. Following HHI, Hanhwa 
Chemical accomplished the vertical integration from ingot/wafer to modules and 
planned to construct a poly-silicon production facility. Samsung and LG also made an 
effort to complete a vertical integration, as shown in Table VII-16.  
 
Table VII-16 Vertical integration in the Korean PV industry 
 HHI Samsung LG Hanhwa 
Poly silicon Production since 
2010 (KAM) 
(JV with KCC)* 
Starting 
(Samsung Fine 
Chemicals) (JV 
with MEMC)** 
Considering (LG 
Chemical) 
Planning 
Ingot/wafer    Production since 
2010 
Cell Production since 
2008 
Production since 
2009 
Production since 
2009 
Production since 
2009 
Module Production since 
2004 
 Production since 
2009 
Production since 
2010 
Source: Korean newspapers (The Korea Energy News; Energy & Environment News) 
* KAM (Korea Applied Material): HHI has 49 per cent of shares of KAM 
** Samsung Fine Chemicals and MEMC have 50 per cent of shares of the JV, respectively. 
MEMC is an American poly silicon manufacturer        
 
On the other hand, local solar cell equipment suppliers grew along with the growth of 
the production capacity of chaebols. At first, chaebols imported PV equipment from 
advanced foreign companies such as Centrotherm GmbH, Roth and Rau AG, and 
Schmid GmbH by turn-key projects. As they experienced expansion of production lines, 
they increased the ratio of supply from local equipment suppliers. For example, HHI 
contracted with Shinsung ENG to construct a second production line in 2009. Shinsung 
ENG, which originally constructed semiconductor equipment, is a subsidiary of 
Shinsung Holdings, which reduced the construction time of a 30MWp production line 
from 18 months to 3 months.  
 
In short, the Korean PV industry started up later than the German and Chinese ones, 
however, it grew fast in the late 2000s in order to compensate for its late entry. 
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3.3.3 Evolution of the PV Industry in the 2000s 
 
From the late 1980s, under the global trend of neo-liberalism, the Korean political 
economy began to model itself on the Anglo-American economic system. During this 
process, there occurred the financial crisis of 1997, following this dismantling of the 
developmental state and the strengthening of the chaebols‟ under the „restructuring 
programme‟. It no longer seemed possible for the Korean government to implement any 
kind of selective industrial policy. On the other hand, the climate change issue has 
become influential since the 1990s, and under these new international circumstances, 
environmental activist groups have emerged and strengthened their pressure on the 
government. Due to collaboration between the environment-oriented coalition and 
industry-oriented coalition, the feed-in tariff scheme was adopted in 2002. Indeed, this 
was a landmark development for the PV sector in Korea.    
 
Similarly to the German case, the feed-in tariff scheme resulted in the expansion of the 
domestic PV market. However, in contrast to the German case, the local PV industry 
was not established even despite the remarkable growth of the domestic PV market. As 
a consequence, imports of PV modules substituted for the growth of local PV firms. 
This caused criticism to grow against the feed-in tariffs, especially in the Ministry of 
Planning and Budget. Furthermore, the budget spent on feeding renewable generators 
was far beyond the level expected. Therefore, the government changed the renewable 
energy support scheme from the feed-in tariff to the renewable portfolio standard 
disregarding strong criticism from the environment-oriented coalition. 
 
On the other hand, although the domestic PV market grew after the introduction of the 
feed-in tariffs, the PV companies, especially silicon solar cell firms, did not enter into 
the PV sector in the first half of the 2000s. Most of the large Korean firms, chaebols, 
were late to respond to the emerging PV market because they were under the 
restructuring programme of the corporate sector after the 1997 crisis. They were 
unlikely to have time to find new businesses due to a concentration on their core 
businesses. In addition, most of the SMEs were too weak to invest in solar cell 
production lines aggressively. Thus, the Korean PV industry did not have a sufficient 
production capacity to cover the expansion of the domestic market. Only after the 
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government loosened the reigns of the chaebols, did they start to find alternative 
engines of growth. In fact, since 2008 chaebols have started to expand the solar cell 
production capacity utilising their advantages of business groups.  
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4. IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE ON THE 
NECESSARY FUNCTIONS 
 
Like the two previous chapters (V and VI), in this section, I shall examine the inter-
relationship between institutional advantages of the Korean political economy and the 
three necessary functions for the development of the Korean PV industry: market 
formation; capital mobilisation; process innovation. 
 
 
4.1 Market Formation 
 
Although „the Alternative Energy Development and Deployment Promotion Act‟ was 
revised to create renewable energy markets in 1997, the demand-pull policy did not 
effective until the 2000s. In 2002, the feed-in tariff was adopted by the cooperation 
between the industry-oriented coalition and the environment-oriented coalition. After 
that, the domestic PV market exploded due to this policy, as described in sub-section 
VII.3.3.1.3 (p. 200). Thus, it can be evaluated that the Korean government succeeded in 
creating a substantial domestic PV market like the German case. 
 
However, unlike the German case, the domestic PV industry was not established, 
responding to the growth of the domestic PV market. The Korean government 
attempted to facilitate to develop a domestic PV industry by building an institutional 
advantage in terms of market formation. Despite this institutional advantage, the 
domestic PV industry did not grow fast in Korea. Why did the PV industry in Korea not 
grow as had happened in Germany under the same condition of the feed-in tariff? In 
order to solve this question other factors will be examined in the next sub-section. 
 
 
4.2 Capital Mobilisation 
 
As I discuss in the German and Chinese case, capital mobilisation is an essential 
function for a development of the PV industry, because the PV industry is a capital-
intensive industry. Furthermore, in the 2000s, capital mobilisation became more 
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important, because it was the best strategy for c-Si cell firms to achieve economies of 
scale through rapid expansion of production capacity.  
 
Since the 1990s, the developmental-state characteristic of the Korean political economy 
such as the state-banks-chaebols nexus has been dismantled under the name of 
liberalisation of the political economy. In particular, after the 1997 crisis, the ability of 
risk taking of the Korean economic system was significantly weakened in investing new 
industries. 
 
Without government support such as policy loans, it was difficult for SMEs to raise 
funds from the banks or stock market. Thus, early PV starters (Nesco Solar and Photon 
Semiconductor) failed to mobilise capital to invest. Furthermore, chaebols had no room 
to invest in new sectors because they had no choice but to concentrate their core 
competence under the restructuring programmes.  
 
Therefore, the Korean PV industry missed the chance to respond the expansion of 
domestic PV market and global market unlike Germany and China. This was mainly 
because Korea had an institutional disadvantage in mobilising capital in a new sector, 
especially in the 2000s.   
 
 
4.3 Process Innovation 
 
As in China, technological learning has been at the heart of the industrialisation in 
Korea, because Korea fell behind more advanced countries in terms of innovation. Thus, 
Korean PV firms have attempted to catch up with foreign leading companies mainly 
through importation of cutting-edge equipment from more advanced countries, like 
China. 
 
Moreover, the well-developed semiconductor equipment industry provides potential for 
development of a PV equipment industry in Korea, because they are close to each other 
in terms of production processes. Indeed, Shinsung Holdings, a medium-sized enterprise 
which originally produced semiconductor equipment, achieved 19 per cent of 
conversion efficiency of mono c-Si cells in November 2010 (Shinsung Holdings, 2010).  
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Furthermore, chaebols have strength in R&D through internal human resourcing, as 
described as one of institutional advantage in terms of innovation in sub-section 
VII.2.2.2. In fact, Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics brought scientists and 
engineers who were involved with PV technology together into their PV business units 
in the 2000s. 
 
As a consequence, the Korean PV industry is catching-up with advanced countries in 
terms of thickness of wafer and conversion efficiency of solar cells, as shown in Table 
VII-17 and Table VII-18.  
 
Table VII-17 Decrease of wafer thickness (unit: μm) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Millinet Solar      200 
Shinsung      200 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report  
 
Table VII-18 Cell efficiency of the new generation of PV firms in Korea (unit: %) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Millinet Solar Poly     15 16.2 18 
Shinsung 
Mono     16 17.4 19 
Poly       17.2 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report and press release 
Poly: Poly crystalline silicon cells 
Mono: Mono crystalline silicon cells 
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5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has aimed to explain the development of the Korean PV industry in the 
context of Korean political economy. In the 2000s, Korea failed to catch up with foreign 
PV industry mainly because of the malfunction of the financial mechanism, although it 
made efforts to create PV markets. 
 
Firstly, I have explored the change of Korean political economy in order to identify 
institutional configuration of Korean economy. During the industrialisation process 
between the 1960s and 1980s, the state-bank-chaebol nexus had played a major role in 
the rapid economic development. Since the 1990s, however, liberalisation of the Korean 
economy has been geared towards the global trend. In the process of liberalisation, the 
1997 crisis took place and the dismantling of the institutional instruments of 
developmental state and the advantages of diversification of chaebols accelerated 
mainly through the restructuring programmes.  
 
Secondly, I have explained the change of policy regime and its impact on development 
of a local PV industry. Under the collaboration of the two coalitions, the feed-in tariff 
was adopted dramatically in 2002. Consequently, it was successful to create domestic 
demand for PV. However, the timing of the boom in the domestic PV market was not 
suitable for the main actors in the Korean economy. In fact, chaebols had little 
opportunity to find new businesses under the restructuring programme in the early 
2000s. Thus, as chaebols responded to the market expansion late, so import penetration 
increased in the domestic market. Eventually, the feed-in tariff was changed to the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard and the Korean PV industry fell behind the other leading 
countries of Germany and China.  
 
Lastly, I have attempted to draw the inter-relationship between institutional advantage 
and necessary functions for development of the PV industry. Korea had an institutional 
advantage in creating PV markets, but it had an institutional disadvantage in mobilising 
capital in a new sector, especially in the 2000s. Thus, unlike Germany, Korea failed to 
facilitate to develop the PV industry through introducing the feed-in tariff. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
COMPARISON OF THE THREE CASES 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I have examined the evolution of the PV industry in the context of Germany, China, and 
Korea in the previous chapters. At the end of each chapter, I have attempted to analyse 
inter-relationships between institutional advantages and the four necessary functions 
within each case. In this chapter, I shall compare the three cases within the conceptual 
framework. 
 
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to identify causal relationships between institutional 
advantages and necessary functions for the development of the PV industry, through the 
comparison of the national growth trajectories in the three countries. By doing so, I 
shall attempt to assess the necessity and relative significance of these functions in 
developing the PV industry. In particular, two questions are answered: one is whether 
market formation is a necessary condition and the other is whether capital mobilisation 
is a core function.    
 
With regard to other two functions, I argue that they are also important to establish the 
PV industry. In terms of innovation, Germany took a lead by division of R&D, while 
China and Korea caught up with more advanced countries mainly by learning by 
manufacturing. In terms of cost reduction, each country utilised its own institutional 
advantage.  
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
2. THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL 
ADVANTAGE AND NECESSARY FUNCTIONS 
 
As I discuss the conceptual framework in chapter III, I shall examine in which countries 
institutional advantage plays a greater role in relation to the four necessary functions for 
the c-Si cell industry. 
 
2.1 Market Formation: Demand-pull Policy 
 
As Jacobbson and Bergek (2004) point out there is a long formative phase of the 
renewable energy sector, I assume that a market formation is one of the necessary 
conditions for establishing a PV industry. In particular, a demand-pull policy is essential 
to form a PV market because the electricity generated by PV systems is more expensive 
than those from other energy sources. In fact, the cost of PV electricity is five or ten 
times as high as that of conventional electricity, as shown in Table VIII-1. Thus, 
without government subsidies, PV energy cannot compete with other energy resources 
in the market. Therefore, a demand-pull policy such as the feed-in tariff can have a 
strong correlation with expansion of the PV market.  
 
Table VIII-1 Costs of electricity production (unit: USD/MWh)  
Energy source USD/MWh 
Wholesale power generation from conventional fuels 40-80 
Wind (on shore) 70-140 
Hydropower (large scale) 30-120 
Biomass (solid fuels) 60-190 
Geothermal (hydrothermal) 30-100 
Tidal and marine currents 150-200 
PV 
(low latitudes, Southern Europe, higher latitudes) 
200-800 
(200-400, 300-500, 500-800) 
Source: „Deploying Renewables‟ (IEA, 2008) 
 
 
2.1.1 The Impact of Demand-pull Policies on PV Markets  
 
In the 1980s, there were few demand-pull policies in the three countries. Thus, their 
demand for PV was very small, as shown in Table VIII-2. 
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Table VIII-2 Market demand for PV in the 1980s (unit: MWp) 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Germany    0.3 0 0 0 0 0.66 0 
China        0.1 0.3 0.4 
Korea 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.016 0.051 0.042 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.10 
Source: KNREC, EPIA, CRED 
 
In the 1990s, however, the demand for PV had increased as shown in Figure VIII-1 and 
Table VIII-3. Firstly, due to the 1,000 roof programme and local-level activities such as 
the Aachen model, the German PV market grew steadily and reached over 10 MWp in 
the late 1990s (V.3.2.3 p. 94). Secondly, even though a smaller increase to that of 
Germany, the demand for PV also increased in China, largely due to the electrification 
programmes and the international cooperation programmes (VI.3.2.3 p. 140). Thirdly, 
there remained little demand for PV in Korea because few programmes were 
implemented at that time. However, although the demand for PV increased in Germany 
and China, the amount was not sufficient to induce investment for mass production of 
PV. 
 
Figure VIII-1 Market demand for PV in the 1990s (unit: MWp) 
 
 
Table VIII-3 Market demand for PV in the 1990s (unit: MWp) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Germany 0.59 1.01 3.1 3.28 3.54 5.35 10.1 14 12.01 15.6 
China 0.5 - - 0.9 1.2 1.55 2.17 2.3 3 - 
Korea 0.17 0.48 0.23 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.39 0.41 0.62 0.52 
Source: KNREC, EPIA, CRED 
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The PV market did not take off until the 2000s. In the 2000s, a substantial growth in PV 
demand occurred in Germany, as shown in Figure VIII-2 and Table VIII-4. This 
enormous expansion of the PV market was mainly due to the revision of the feed-in 
tariff
108
 in 2000. In addition, the 100,000 roof programme was implemented by the 
Red-Green coalition. In fact, the average annual growth rate of the market was around 
100 per cent except in 2006. Similarly, the Korean government adopted the feed-in 
tariff from 2002, thus allowing the PV market to reach 276 MWp in 2008. However, the 
Korean PV market went down in 2009 because the market cap, which can be applied to 
the feed-in rate, was only 50 MWp in 2009. In contrast, the feed-in tariff had not yet 
been implemented in China
109
, with only the rural electrification programme (Song 
Dian Dao Xiang) in place at this stage. Thus, the PV market was still behind in China. 
 
Figure VIII-2 Market demand for PV in the 2000s (unit: MWp) 
 
Table VIII-4 Market demand for PV in the 2000s (unit: MWp) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany 42 78 118 139 670 951 843 1,271 1,809 3,806 
China 5 4 20 10 10 5 10 20 45 160 
Korea 0.53 0.79 0.48 0.56 2.6 5 22 45 276 164 
Source: KNREC, EPIA, CRED 
 
                                                 
108
 To be more exact, the change of feed-in rate for PV electricity was from 17 to 99 pfennig 
(approx. 50 Euro cents) in the Renewable Energy Source Law (see V.3.3.1).  
109
 Although China enacted the „Renewable Energy Law‟ similar to the German one in 2006, 
the feed-in tariff was not yet implemented (CREDP, 2008). Moreover, according to interviews, 
the feed-in tariff has been implemented in Jiangsu Province, but the scale is very limited.  
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2.1.2 Is Market Formation a Necessary Condition? 
 
At a global level, it is clear that the PV industry cannot grow without the creation of PV 
markets. This is because a market is vital for an industry. From this perspective, PV 
market creation is a necessary condition for the PV industry. However, it is not clear 
what the relationship between the creation of a domestic PV market and the 
development of a domestic PV industry is at a national level. This thesis focuses on an 
analysis of the national level and thus I should answer this question more clearly. 
 
In the German case, due to the creation of the domestic PV market, the domestic PV 
industry was able to grow fast in the 2000s. In this case, Germany created not only the 
local PV market but also the global PV market. However, mainly due to the growth of 
the German PV market, China‟s PV industry grew fast without sufficient local PV 
markets in the 2000s. In the Chinese case, it appears that the creation of domestic PV 
markets is not a necessary condition in the development of the domestic PV industry.  
 
However, when we consider the characteristics of domestic PV markets in the formative 
period (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004), the answer becomes more complicated. The PV 
market is different from normal trade goods‟ markets such as wine and clothes. Still, the 
PV market depends heavily on national policies such as the feed-in tariff. Adoption or 
abolition of the policy can affect, to a large extent, the success of the domestic PV 
industry, as discussed in the Korean case. If some countries which have major PV 
markets give up the feed-in tariff, other countries which have a large production 
capacity but without sufficient domestic PV markets can encounter difficulties. The best 
example of this is the Spanish case in which due to the shrinkage of the Spanish PV 
market in 2009, the Chinese PV industry found it difficult to survive.  
 
When it comes to the current status of China‟s PV sector, it is easier to answer the 
question. In 2009, Chinese PV products accounted for around 40 per cent of world PV 
production, whilst the Chinese PV market accounted for around 2 per cent of the world 
PV market (EPIA, 2010; ECJRC, 2010). If the German PV market, which accounted for 
53 per cent of the world PV market in 2009 (EPIA, 2010), shrinks, the Chinese PV 
industry will encounter more difficulties than in the Spanish case. If this takes place, the 
Chinese government may have to create domestic PV markets for its PV industry, as it 
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established the Golden Sun project (500MWp) when the Spanish market fell (VI.3.3.8 p. 
159). Thus, it is necessary for China to create a domestic PV market for the sustainable 
growth of its PV industry.  
 
In short, although domestic market creation is not a necessary condition in the 
development of the PV industry, it is essential for its sustainable growth in China. 
 
 
2.1.3 Sub-conclusions 
 
In terms of market formation, it is clear that Germany has had an institutional advantage 
compared with China and Korea. Germany satisfied the necessary conditions for a 
„change in gear‟ to take place. In other words, Germany successfully constructed a self-
sustaining circular relationship between market formation, institutional change, entry of 
firms, and a formation of technology-specific advocacy coalitions (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004). The feed-in tariff resulted in the growth of the PV market. The 
expansion of the PV market provided the PV industry with opportunities to grow. 
Moreover, the PV industry supported the feed-in tariff. This is the typical virtuous circle, 
expressed as a cumulative causation by Myrdal (1957, cited in Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). 
 
In contrast, China has had an extreme disadvantage in terms of market formation. 
Without sufficient domestic demand, the local PV industry was vulnerable to an 
exogenous impact. In fact, most Chinese PV firms had difficulty doing business after 
the financial crisis of 2008 because they were highly dependent on exports to the global 
market. Furthermore, there has been a tendency toward rising protectionism against PV 
trade such as „Buy America‟. This is another challenge for the Chinese PV industry 
because it does not have a sufficient portion of the domestic PV market.  
 
In this respect, an institutional advantage became an institutional disadvantage in Korea. 
Until 2008, the Korean PV market expanded due to the feed-in tariff, but it shrank in 
2009 mainly because of the abrupt change of the policy. Thus, the Korean PV industry 
was exposed to the same problems as China in terms of market formation. Furthermore, 
the Korean case reveals that market creation is not a sufficient condition for 
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development of the PV industry. Although market creation took place in the Korean 
case, the domestic PV industry was not developed well due to the lack of other 
necessary conditions. This point will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
 
2.2 Capital Mobilisation 
 
In this sub-section, I will focus on the c-Si cell industry in the 2000s, as I mention 
earlier (III.4.2 and IV.1.2). During this period, c-Si cell technology was mature and a 
dominant design was established. Also at this time, production processes were 
standardised, thus making it the best strategy for firms to expand their production 
capacities as quickly as possible so that they could achieve economies of scale. In this 
sense, the ability to mobilise capital was the core competence for firms, because the 
industry was capital-intensive. In other words, rapid capital mobilisation was one of the 
necessary conditions for the industry. Normally, it is said that a 300 MWp of annual 
production capacity was the minimum efficient scale. This scale required at least 200 
billion KW (approx. 200 million USD) of investment excluding the land costs.  
 
 
2.2.1 Financial Markets versus Non-Market Mechanisms 
 
From the viewpoint of investors who are interested in the c-Si cell industry, the period 
of the 2000s can be divided into two sub-periods: one is the period between 2000 and 
2004; the other is between 2005 and 2009. It was said that the former period was an 
uncertain and risky time to invest in this industry, whereas the latter was an optimistic 
time to do so. Thus, I will examine the two periods separately. 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Too Risky to Invest: between 2000 and 2004 
 
Until 2004, normal investors thought of the PV industry as risky and uncertain, mainly 
because the PV market was not large enough to build a mass production facility. 
However, some entrepreneurs entered into this industry regardless of high risk. They 
were Q-Cells, SolarWorld, Sunways, Ersol in Germany; Suntech, Yingli, Trina Solar in 
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China; and Nesco Solar, Photon Semiconductor in Korea. Raising funds was their most 
challenging problem during this period. The German and Chinese firms appear to 
succeed in solving it, whereas the Korean firms seem to fail, as shown in Figure VIII-3 
and Table VIII-5.  
 
Figure VIII-3 Expansion of production capacity, 2000-2004 (unit: MWp) 
 
Table VIII-5 Expansion of production capacity, 2000-2004 (unit: MWp) 
 company 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany 
Q-Cells   22 63 170 
SolarWorld   30 30 30 
Ersol 5.5 10 10 25 25 
Sunways 2.6 5 10 12 16 
China 
Suntech   10 30 60 
Yingli    30 50 
Trina Solar     6 
Korea 
Nesco Solar   2 2 2 
Photon Semiconductor   2 5 5 
Source: Firms‟ annual reports and web sites and interviews 
 
These differences may be explained partly by their entrepreneurship or by their ability 
to convince investors. However, I will focus on the institutional differences between 
nations as the focus of this study is directed not at the firm-level but at the national level. 
More importantly, the financial institutional mechanisms were significantly different 
between the German case and the Chinese one. 
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In Germany, direct and indirect financial markets played a major role in expanding their 
production capacities. Stock markets, corporate bond markets and banks provided them 
with funds to invest. Mainly due to the well-developed financial markets, the German 
PV firms were able to raise funds to invest in their initial growths during this period.  
 
Compared with the German case, differentiated mechanisms worked in capital 
mobilisation in China. In this period, the Chinese PV firms encountered more 
difficulties than the German ones, because they had neither sufficient domestic demand, 
nor did they export their products. For example, in 2003, they had more than a 60MWp 
production capacity (Table VIII-5 p.227), but the domestic demand was only 10 MWp 
(Table VIII-4 p. 223). Furthermore, at this time, the Chinese PV firms hardly exported 
their products because they had no credit in the global market. Thus, investment in the 
PV industry was highly risky in China during this period. However, they gradually 
invested mainly due to the so-called „local state corporatism‟ (VI.3.3.3.1 p. 149). 
Chinese local governments had strong incentives to facilitate the growth of local 
industries because of the fiscal decentralisation and the evaluation system of cadres and 
high officials (Oi, 1999; Arrighi, 2007). In fact, city (shi) governments, banks, and local 
SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) provided them with funds to invest their initial 
production facilities. 
 
In contrast, the Korean companies failed to increase their production capacities during 
this period. Due to the chaebol-dominant economic structure, SMEs (small-medium 
enterprises) had little access to financial markets such as bank loans and the stock 
market (VII.3.3.2.2.2 p. 208). Furthermore, venture capital markets had shrunk since the 
venture bubble burst in 2000 (VII.2.3.2 p. 178). Thus, they could not afford to raise 
funds to invest in the expansion of their production capacities.   
 
 
2.2.1.2 Bright Enough to Invest: between 2005 and 2009 
 
After 2004, investors‟ expectations of the PV industry totally changed. Mainly due to 
phenomenal growth in the European market, especially in the German market in 2004 
(Figure VIII-2 and Table VIII-4 p. 223), they thought that the likelihood of future 
growth in the PV market was high. Not only the investors, but incumbent large firms of 
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other sectors also believed this to be true. Thus, they rushed into the PV industry, as 
shown in Figure VIII-4 and Table VIII-6. They were Schott Group and Bosch Group in 
Germany; China Sunergy, JA Solar and Solarfun in China
110
; and Hyundai Heavy 
Industries (HHI), Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, STX Group, and Hanwha 
Group
111
 in Korea. Significantly, earlier entrants who had a readiness to grow expanded 
their production capacity at an unprecedented rate, such as Q-Cells and Suntech, as 
illustrated in Figure VIII-4. Finally, two firms in Germany and six firms in China went 
over a 300MWp capacity, the minimum efficient scale in the c-Si cell industry, at the 
end of 2009.  
 
Figure VIII-4 Expansion of production capacity, 2005-2009 (unit: MWp) 
 
Table VIII-6 Expansion of production capacity, 2005-2009 (unit: MWp) 
 company 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany 
Q-Cells 292 420 642 860 800 
SolarWorld 60 185 205 260 450 
Ersol (Bosch Solar) 60 100 100 160 160 
Sunways 46 46 46 46 116 
Schott Solar   135 185 185 
China Suntech 150 270 540 1,000 1,100 
                                                 
110
 China Sunergy is a kind of subsidiary of CEEG (China Electric Equipment Group), JA Solar 
is a subsidiary of Jinglong Group (a wafer producer), and Solarfun is a subsidiary of Linyang 
Electronics (an electricity-measuring instrument manufacturer).  
111
 All of them are chaebols. 
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Yingli 100 100 200 400 600 
Trina Solar 6 28 150 350 600 
China Sunergy 32 192 192 320 320 
JA Solar  75 175 600 875 
Solarfun   240 360 420 
Korea 
Photon Semiconductor 5 30 30 30 90 
HHI    15 70 
Millinet    30 100 
Shinsung    50 100 
Samsung     30 
LG     120 
STX     25 
Hanhwa     30 
Source: Firms‟ annual reports, web sites and interviews 
 
Similarly to the first period, the national pattern of response to the market change 
differed from each other in terms of capital mobilisation. In Germany, PV firms utilised 
the financial markets, especially the stock market. For example, Ersol and Q-Cells 
raised about 153 and 240 million Euros respectively through their IPOs on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange in 2005. SolarWorld also raised about 234 million Euros through 
issuing new shares on the stock market in 2006.  
 
From 2005, however, based on the local state corporatism, the Chinese PV firms had 
begun to tap into the US stock markets such as the New York Stock Exchange and 
Nasdaq. By 2007, all of the top 6 PV firms were listed on the foreign stock market 
(VI.3.3.3.2 p. 150). Global financing through foreign stock markets is another 
distinctive feature of the Chinese PV industry. Tapping overseas capital pools enabled 
them to expand their production capacities faster than any other country. Indeed, this 
new way of financing came into fashion not only in the PV sector but also in other 
sectors in China. Due to institutional changes which occurred after joining the WTO, 
Chinese firms were able to get access to foreign stock markets more easily than ever 
before. Therefore, the institutional change in the financial sector was an institutional 
advantage for the Chinese PV sector in terms of capital mobilisation. 
 
In spite of this optimistic market change, Korean chaebols entered late into the PV 
industry. Mainly due to the Korean government‟s restructuring programmes in the 
financial and corporate sectors in the mid-2000s (VII.3.3.2.3 p. 211), chaebols seemed 
to have no room to invest in new sectors such as the PV industry. Although many 
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Korean institutes‟ reports pointed out the lack of alternative engines of future growth, 
they had no choice but to concentrate on their core sectors such as the semiconductor 
and shipbuilding industries. 
 
 
2.2.2 Is Capital Mobilisation a Core Function? 
 
In Germany and China, the PV industry was established in the 2000s, whereas this did 
not happen in Korea. Obviously, many factors have contributed to these differences. 
However, one factor was the most significant in creating these differences, that of 
capital mobilisation. 
 
In fact, Germany and China succeeded in capital mobilisation in the PV sector in the 
2000s, whilst Korea did not. In Germany, relatively well-developed financial markets 
provided the PV industry with capital. Furthermore, the PV industry benefitted from the 
incentive systems introduced after the unification in East Germany. In China, local state 
corporatism played a crucial role in providing the PV industry with capital, especially in 
the initial stage. In addition, the foreign stock market accelerated the speed of fund 
raising in the PV industry. In these two cases, local governments played an active role 
in promoting investment in its localities. However, the government support system was 
dismantled at this time in Korea and moreover, private actors could not afford to invest 
into the PV sector under the restructuring programmes. 
 
Thus, I argue that capital mobilisation was the most important function in establishing 
the PV industry in the 2000s. Moreover, action taken by governments, in particular that 
of local governments, played a decisive role in facilitating this capital mobilisation. The 
three cases provide evidence that capital mobilisation was a core function in the 
development of the PV industry.  
 
 
2.2.3 Sub-conclusions 
 
Gerschenkron (1962) argues that differentiated institutional instruments contributed to 
the industrialisation of Britain, Germany and Russia in the nineteenth century. In terms 
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of capital mobilisation, the investment banks and the state played a major role in 
Germany and Russia, respectively, unlike in Britain (Gerschenkron, 1962).  
 
Similarly to Gerschenkron‟s112 point of view, differentiated institutional advantages 
attributed to the rapid growth of the PV industry in Germany and China. Well-
developed financial markets and incentive systems after the unification contributed to 
the German PV industry, whereas the local state corporatism and the institutional 
change which allowed improved access to foreign financial markets contributed to the 
Chinese PV industry. On the other hand, Korea had a crucial disadvantage in mobilising 
capital for the PV industry in the 2000s. Therefore, capital mobilisation was a core 
prerequisite for development of the c-Si cell industry in the 2000s, as in the iron and 
steel industry in Europe in the nineteenth century.  
 
 
2.3 Process Innovation 
 
In the 2000s, a dominant design was established in the c-Si cell industry. In addition, 
production processes were standardised in eight steps as described earlier (III.4.2.3 p. 
54). Moreover, it is said that a production facility which is built on turn-key based 
imported equipment guarantees about 16% of conversion efficiency of cells. This means 
that cell manufacturers rely heavily on equipment suppliers as sources of innovation. In 
these circumstances, national systems of innovation responded differently, as I will 
explain in this sub-section.  
 
 
2.3.1 National Systems of Innovation 
 
There have been two main issues in the c-Si cell industry in terms of process innovation: 
one is how to make wafers thinner and the other is how to increase conversion 
                                                 
112
 However, there are some limitations in applying the Gerschenkronian three-country 
comparative schema to this comparative analysis. In terms of „the degree of backwardness‟ 
(Gerschenkron, 1962), Korea can be regarded as a moderately backward country, while China 
as an extremely backward one. However, the comparative setting of this study is not entirely 
suited to Gerschenkron‟s three-country paradigm, because Korea had not caught up with the 
German PV industry at this point. 
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efficiency of cells. As shown in Table VIII-7 and Table VIII-8, improvements have 
been made in both fields, thus most of the major cell firms now use 180-200 μm of 
thickness wafers and produce 17-18 percent of conversion efficiency cells. 
 
Table VIII-7 Decrease of wafer thickness (unit: μm) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Q-Cells 330 275 230 200 180  
SolarWorld   240 210  180 
Suntech      180 
Millinet Solar      200 
Shinsung      200 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report  
 
Table VIII-8 PV cell efficiency of the new generation of PV firms (unit: %) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
SolarWorld 
Poly 14 15     18  
Mono       20  
Q-Cells 
Poly      17   
Mono    20.5* 
(100cm²) 
   17.4 
Sunways 
Poly 14 15.7      16 
Mono  16.7      18.4 
Suntech 
Mono 14   15  16.5 17.8 19.2 
(Pluto) 
China 
Sunergy 
Mono        17.5 
Millinet 
Solar 
Poly       15 16.2 
Shinsung Mono       16 17.4 
Source: Each firm‟s annual report and press release 
Poly: Poly crystalline silicon cells 
Mono: Mono crystalline silicon cells 
* a medium sized industrially applicable cell    
 
However, the paths to reach the present status have been different. In Germany, close 
relationships between PV firms and equipment suppliers, and dense networks among 
firms, research institutes and universities enabled the German PV firms to lead 
technological innovation in the world PV sector. Firstly, the German equipment 
industry which was highly competitive in the world market, contributed to process 
innovation in the German PV industry. This was due to the fact that almost all the 
production processes of PV cells are automated by machinery. Secondly, the German 
PV firms have cooperated with renowned research institutes and universities in the 
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research on PV technology such as Fraunhofer Society and Konstanz University. The 
strong partnership with world leading research institutes and universities is one of 
institutional advantages for the German PV industry. Lastly, they have cooperated with 
other PV companies to incorporate Joint Ventures (JVs) and participate in stock holding 
of other firms. These institutional advantages in the innovation of the German PV 
industry cover not only process innovation but also product innovation such as various 
thin-film technologies. 
 
In contrast to the German case, the tradition of cooperation between firms and research 
institutes and universities has not been well established in China. Rather, the main paths 
to innovation were technological learning associated with advanced foreign countries: 
codified knowledge was learned mainly by import of state-of-the-art equipment and 
learning by manufacturing; tacit knowledge was introduced by Chinese returnee 
scientists and experienced engineers in the local PV firms. Although cooperation and 
collaborations between PV firms and universities have increased, they seem not yet to 
be the main factor in contributing to process innovation in the Chinese PV industry.  
 
As in China, innovation in the Korean PV industry has relied heavily on imported 
equipment. However, the well-developed semiconductor equipment industry provides 
potential for development of a PV equipment industry in Korea, because they are close 
to each other in terms of production processes. For example, Shinsung, a medium-sized 
enterprise which originally produced semiconductor equipment, achieved 19.6 per cent 
of conversion efficiency of mono c-Si cells in November 2010. On the other hand, 
chaebols have strength in R&D through internal human resourcing. For example, 
Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics brought scientists and engineers who were 
involved with PV technology together into their PV business units. 
 
 
2.3.2 Sub-conclusions 
 
It is difficult to deny that Germany has an overwhelming institutional advantage 
compared to other countries in terms of innovation. It has a long tradition of strong 
cooperation among firms, research institutes and universities, and the PV sector is not 
an exception. Thus, the German PV industry can be regarded as a frontier in the world 
235 
 
PV sector, not only in its process innovation but also in its product innovation. 
 
Compared with Germany, China has learned basic science and applied technology in the 
PV sector. In this respect, the Chinese PV industry is still a follower of more advanced 
countries. However, as far as c-Si cell manufacturing is concerned, the Chinese PV 
industry has a similar level of technological capability compared to that of Germany. 
Thus, they have caught up with the German PV industry not only in terms of production 
capacity but also in terms of process innovation. 
 
Also, the Korean PV industry is still a follower. Like China, Korea has learned 
advanced technology from foreign countries and has relied on imported capital goods.  
However, in terms of innovation, Korea has an institutional advantage of so called 
„group-based coordination‟, compared to „industry-based cooperation‟ in the German 
case (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 34). 
 
 
2.4 Cost Reduction113 
 
Process innovation is also related to cost reduction, however, other issues such as labour 
and land costs can be included in the concept of cost reduction. Thus, cost reduction 
excluding technological innovation will be examined in this sub-section, because it is 
very important for the PV industry in the context of global competition. 
 
 
2.4.1 Price and Profitability 
 
When it comes to trends of module prices, they have decreased rapidly since the late 
2000s, as shown in Figure VIII-5. This is mainly due to two reasons: one is the falling 
price of poly silicon
114
 and the other is severe competition among cell or module 
manufacturers.  
                                                 
113
 In this part, it is difficult to access cost information of the Korean PV firms, because most of 
them have started PV businesses since 2008. Thus, the Korean case is excluded in this sub-
section.     
114
 The spot price of poly silicon was around 400 USD/kg in 2008, but it dropped to about 50 
USD/kg in 2009. 
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Figure VIII-5 Trends of module prices (unit: USD and Euro per Wp) 
 
Source: Solarbuzz, 2011 (Available: http://www.solarbuzz.com/facts-and-figures/retail-
price-environment/module-prices) [accessed 19
th
 April 2011]. 
 
Due to the heavy global competition, the price of solar cells and modules of the German 
and Chinese PV firms also dropped in 2009, as shown in Table VIII-9 and Table VIII-
10. In particular, the price of Chinese cells and modules fell further than that of the 
German ones.    
 
Table VIII-9 Price of solar cells (unit: USD/Wp) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany 
Q-Cells 1.99 2.11 2.24 2.68 3.03 3.22 2.07 
SolarWorld 2.14 2.16      
China 
Suntech  2.02 3.05 3.23 3.06 2.84 1.03 
Solarfun   3.00 3.07 2.75   
JA Solar    3.32 3.08 3.24  
China Sunergy   3.10 3.22 3.17 3.27 1.47 
Sources: Firms‟ annual reports 
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Table VIII-10 Price of solar modules (unit: USD/Wp) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany SolarWorld 3.28       
China 
Suntech  3.01 3.42 3.89 3.72 3.89 2.40 
Yingli  2.83 3.49 3.82 3.86 3.88 2.00 
Solarfun   3.93 3.99 3.74 3.92  
Trina Solar  3.45 4.02 3.98 3.80 3.92 2.10 
Sources: Firms‟ annual reports 
 
Although the price of the Chinese ones went down more than that of the German ones, 
the profitability of the German firms worsened in comparison with the Chinese firms. 
With regard to the operating income margin, which shows profitability of firms, the 
German PV firms were slightly better than the Chinese PV firms until 2007 except 
Sunways, as listed in Table VIII-11. However, the profitability of the German PV firms 
has decreased since 2008, whereas that of the Chinese firms has remained largely the 
same. Given the further decrease in the price of Chinese cells and modules, compared to 
that of German ones, it is not difficult to infer that cost can be a major factor affecting 
profitability in the German PV firms
115
. In fact, due to higher costs than the Chinese 
firms, Q-Cells and Sunways recorded operating losses in 2009, as shown in Table VIII-
11.  
 
Table VIII-11 Operating income margin (OIM) of the German and Chinese PV firms 
 firms  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany 
(m. Euro) 
Q-Cells 
Revenue 17.3 48.8 129 299 540 859 1,251 802 
OI* 0.9 5.3 19.6 63.2 129 197 205 -486 
OIM** 
(%) 
5 11 15 21 24 23 16 -61 
SolarWorld 
Revenue 109 98.5 200 356 515 690 900 1,012 
OI 2.4 -3.1 32.9 88.6 178 199 263 152 
OIM (%) 2.2 -3 16.5 24.8 34.9 28.8 29.2 15 
Sunways 
Revenue 27.5 38.7 66.9 90.9 152 214 262 178 
OI -1.8 -2.1 3.1 2.1 1.0 4.1 -1.5 -0.5 
OIM (%) -6.5 -5.4 4.6 2.3 0.7 1.9 -0.6 -0.3 
China 
(m. 
USD) 
Suntech 
Revenue 3 14 85 226 599 1,348 1,924 1,693 
OI -1 0.8 20 44 105 184 182 174 
OIM (%) -33 6 24 19 17 14 9 10 
Yingli 
Revenue  2.8 14.5 44 205 556 1,107 1,063 
OI  0.5 1.7 10 46 93 169 46.7 
OIM (%)  17 11 23 22.4 16.7 15.3 4.4 
Trina 
Solar 
Revenue   0.4 27.3 115 302 832 845 
OI   -0.3 4.3 16.9 36 100 135 
OIM (%)   -75 16 15 12 12 16 
Source: Firms‟ annual reports 
                                                 
115
 Profit = revenue – cost, thus the higher costs, the lower profits. 
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*OI (operating income) or EBIT (Earning Before Interest and Tax) 
**OIM (Operating Income Margin) = operating income/revenue 
 
2.4.2 Labour, R&D and Investment Costs 
 
There are many costs associated with a firm‟s activities, but I will focus on three costs: 
labour costs; research and development costs; and investment costs, especially green 
field investment costs.  
 
Firstly, low labour cost is the most important comparative advantage for labour 
abundant countries. Thus, China has an explicit cost advantage over other countries. In 
particular, because a module-manufacturing chain is more labour-intensive than other 
value chains, cheap labour seems to contribute to the competitiveness of the PV 
industry. In fact, personnel expenses per employee of the German PV firms was more 
than seven times as high as those of the Chinese ones in 2009, as listed in Table VIII-12.  
 
Table VIII-12 Personnel expenses per employee (unit: Euro) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany 
Q-Cells 21,831 20,756 28,385 32,940 29,584 29,322 33,022 
SolarWorld 35,501 50,054 49,776 42,871 50,474 49,386 49,892 
Sunways 42,667 44,444 34,390 40,575 42,558 39,623 47,950 
China* 
Suntech  2,735 11,078 6,833 6,117 6,435 4,409 
Yingli   1,910 2,966 5,445 5,553 7,425 
Trina Solar    5,029 3,730 6,075 5,963 
Source: Firms‟ annual reports 
*In the Chinese firms, the real personnel expenses
116
 are smaller than these numbers, because I 
use general administration expenses as a proxy for personnel expenses (general administration 
expenses: salaries and benefits for administrative, finance and human resources personnel, 
depreciation of equipment used for administrative and amortization of rental facilities used for 
administrative purposes, provision for doubtful debts, fees and expenses of legal, accounting 
and other professional services, expenses associated with administrative offices). 
 
Secondly, low R&D costs are another advantage of the Chinese PV industry. The 
traditional PV firms and many local universities have supplied the new generation of 
                                                 
116
 According to interviews, the salary of workers in PV factories was between 1,000 and 1,500 
RMB (approx. 146 and 220 USD) a month in 2009 (In 2009, the official RMB/USD exchange 
rate was around 6.83). 
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PV firms with skilled human resources, such as technicians and engineers. Thus, quality 
control on production processes and in-house R&D were more affordable in China than 
in Germany. For example, considering the large number of science and engineering 
degrees achieved
117
 in China, it is unlikely to be an exaggeration that their initial 
salaries are in the region of 3,000 RMB (approx. 440 USD) a month. 
 
Lastly, with regard to investment costs, the German PV industry has been one of the 
beneficiaries of regional clustering policies such as „SolarValley Central Germany 
(Solarvalley Mitteldeustchland)‟, while the Chinese PV industry has been offered 
preferential treatment by local governments. For example, Solarvalley 
Mitteldeustchland provided firms‟ investments in Thüringen, Sachsen, and Sachsen-
Anhalt with investment grants which are allowed up to 30 to 50 per cent of eligible 
investment costs, while Chinese local governments offered preferential land uses or 
taxation for local PV firms.  
 
2.4.3 Sub-conclusions 
 
In terms of cost reduction, China has explicit cost advantages compared with Germany. 
Labour and R&D costs in China are substantially lower than those of Germany, even 
though there seem not to be significant differences in quality between them. Under 
severe global price competition, cost disadvantages of the German PV firms resulted in 
operational loss in 2009.  
 
Unlike labour and R&D cost advantages, investment cost advantage heavily relies on 
the supportive institutions such as Solarvalley Mitteldeustchland in Germany and local 
state corporatism in China.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117
 In 2002, more than 300,000 scientists and engineers graduated from universities in China 
(Marigo, 2009, p. 180) 
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has compared the three cases in terms of four necessary conditions. In 
terms of market formation, Germany has an overwhelming advantage compared with 
China and Korea. In terms of capital mobilisation, each case has its own institutional 
advantages: a well-developed financial market and incentive systems after the 
unification in Germany; local state corporatism and global financing in China; and 
internal financing of chaebols in Korea. In terms of innovation, Germany has an 
institutional advantage both in process innovation and in product innovation, while 
China and Korea are in the process of catching-up with more advanced countries. In 
terms of cost reduction, China has an explicit advantage over Germany and Korea. 
 
In particular, as far as the three cases are concerned, market creation was not a generally 
necessary condition for the development of the PV industry. In Germany, the growth of 
domestic PV markets led to the development of the PV industry, whereas the PV 
industry grew without a sufficient domestic PV market in China. Thus, it does not 
necessarily follow that a creation domestic market is a necessary condition for the 
establishment of a local PV industry. However, market creation is still important 
because the PV industry cannot survive without it, especially at a global level. This 
point will be examined in the implications for China in the conclusion chapter (IX.3.2 p. 
247). 
 
With regard to capital mobilisation, Germany and China‟s mechanisms have worked 
well and they have succeeded in establishing the PV industry, whilst Korea failed to do 
mainly due to the malfunction of its financial mechanisms. Thus, it can be said that 
capital mobilisation played a crucial role in development of the c-Si cell industry in the 
2000s. Indeed, defects in market formation of the PV industry can be resolved by 
exports, such as in the Chinese case, and process innovation can be achieved by 
technology transfer, such as the Chinese and Korean cases. However, capital 
mobilisation seems to be difficult to deal with, without establishing appropriate 
institutional mechanisms, as described in the Korean case. Therefore, I argue that 
capital mobilisation was the core necessary condition for the development of the c-Si 
cell industry in the 2000s.  
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CHAPTER IX CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This last chapter aims to clarify the arguments and key findings throughout this thesis 
and to outline the contributions, implications and limitations of this thesis. In section 1, 
I shall summarise the theoretical arguments and key findings. In section 2, the 
theoretical and empirical contributions of this study will be identified. In section 3, I 
shall attempt to draw implications for the three countries concerning future development 
of the PV industry. In the last section, I shall point out the limitations of this thesis and 
make suggestions for further research. 
 
 
 
1. KEY FINDINGS 
 
1.1 Theoretical Arguments 
 
This study began with this research question: what are the main factors underlying the 
differences between national PV growth trajectories? In order to answer this question, 
two concepts have been explored: institutional advantage and necessary functions for 
the PV industry. 
 
Firstly, I have argued that a certain type of institutional configuration in a nation is more 
conducive to the development of the PV industry than any other. Moreover, these 
institutional advantages are not general to all industries in any period but specific to a 
certain industry in a particular period. 
 
Secondly, it has been assumed that four functions are required to facilitate the 
emergence and growth of the PV industry: market formation; capital mobilisation; 
process innovation; and cost reduction. These four functions are asserted as being 
necessary conditions for the development of the PV industry. 
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Therefore, a basic argument of this study under the theoretical framework is as follows: 
 
If a country has institutional advantages which are relevant to the four functions, 
this country’s PV industry will be developed faster than any other country. 
 
In order to investigate the validity of this theoretical argument, empirical studies have 
been carried out. 
 
 
1.2 Empirical Findings 
 
Germany, China and Korea were selected for a comparative case study, because these 
countries showed contrasting results in terms of their relationship between market 
formation and industrial dynamics. Through the comparative analysis of these three 
cases, the following empirical findings have been deduced.   
 
Firstly, market creation is not a generally necessary condition for the development of a 
PV industry. More specifically, domestic market creation is not a generally necessary 
condition for the development of a local PV industry at a national level. In other words, 
a local PV industry can be developed without sufficient domestic markets. The Chinese 
case exemplifies this finding. However, domestic market creation is important, because 
the domestic PV industry, national support policy and the domestic market are 
interrelated. If some countries which have major PV markets give up the national 
support policy, other countries which have a large production capacity without 
sufficient domestic PV markets can encounter difficulties. Thus, for China, domestic 
market creation is now required to attain sustainable growth of its PV industry. 
 
Secondly, capital mobilisation is a core function in establishing the PV industry. In the 
2000s, Korea failed to establish its local PV industry despite an institutional advantage 
in creating domestic markets, mainly due to the fact that it had an institutional 
disadvantage in mobilising capital. However, Germany and China succeeded in 
mobilising capital in their PV sectors, governments playing a decisive role in facilitating 
PV firms in raising funds in both cases. Without this institutional advantage in 
mobilising capital, it would have been difficult for the PV industry to emerge and 
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evolve in Germany and China.  
 
Thirdly, national systems of innovation of the three countries responded differently to 
process innovation which was required for the development of the PV industry. Due to 
the competitive equipment industry and the well-organised division of R&D between 
PV firms, research institutes and universities, Germany took a lead in technological 
innovation, not only in process innovation but also in product innovation. China and 
Korea learned and built technological capabilities through their own systems of 
innovation in order to catch up with more advanced countries. In particular, returning 
scientists and experienced engineers played a critical part in encouraging learning by 
manufacturing in China, while incumbent semiconductor and display industries 
provided the PV industry with complementary assets (Teece, 1986) and chaebols took 
advantage of internal human resourcing in Korea.  
 
Lastly, cost reduction became more and more important, as the PV industry reached the 
mature stage within the ILC. Germany achieved cost reduction mainly by technological 
development, whereas China fully utilised its cost advantages such as lower-cost labour, 
lower-cost R&D and lower-cost investment. 
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2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
2.1 Theoretical Contributions 
 
In the literature review chapter (II), I explored national level approaches, industrial 
dynamics approaches and linking concepts between the two levels. This has provided 
valuable insights in understanding different industrial dynamics across nations.  
 
According to the VoC approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001), different PV national growth 
trajectories could be generated by different national institutional frameworks because 
firms are embedded in a nation-specific institutional structure. These national 
institutional instruments can be created through specific institutional responses 
(Gershchenkron, 1962; Shin, 1996). However, these institutional structures are 
differentiated systems in different nations and in different times (Gershenkron, 1962; 
Shin, 1996). The developmental state in Korea between the 1960s and 1970s (Amsden, 
1989; Pirie, 2008) and the local state corporatism in China between the 1980s and 1990s 
(Oi, 1999) are the best examples to illustrate these particular institutional instruments. 
 
From the perspective that regards an industry as a social system, it is argued that 
different subsystems of a new industry specialise in three functions: „technical 
instrumental functions, resource procurement functions, and institutional legitimation 
and governance‟ (Van de Ven and Garud, 1989, p. 206). In addition, it is argued that 
characteristics of the formative period of renewable energy industries are identified as 
follows: „market formation, the entry of firms and other organizations, institutional 
change and the formation of technology-specific advocacy coalitions‟ (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004, p. 819). Germany‟s wind and PV sectors were examined using this 
framework of four features (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). 
 
However, existing literature is limited in providing this research with an adequate tool 
to analyse comparatively the difference between the PV national growth trajectories. 
Linking national political economies and industrial dynamics, I have attempted to 
devise a comparative framework utilising the concept of „comparative institutional 
advantage‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and functions for the emergence of a new industry 
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(Van de Ven and Garud, 1989). Thus, I have proposed a conceptual framework in 
comparative analysis on the PV industry in the 2000s consisting of these four elements: 
institutional advantages relating to market formation, capital mobilisation, process 
innovation and cost reduction.  
 
Thus, it can be said that this study contributes to a better understanding of the nature of 
industrial dynamics in the context of institutional configurations of a national political 
economy. In particular, the concept of „institutional advantage‟ has been applied to 
comparative analysis on the emergence and evolution of the PV industry. Moreover, 
from the perspective of the social system, four necessary functions for the development 
of the PV industry have been proposed and investigated through the three cases. This 
new tool used to analyse the emergence of the PV industry can be equally applied in the 
analysis of industrial dynamics of other industries, especially renewable energy 
industries such as the wind energy industry.     
 
 
2.2 Empirical Contributions 
 
This research contributes to empirical knowledge in two ways: one is a further 
understanding of the development of the PV industry within each case; the other is a 
comparative understanding between the three cases. Comparative empirical findings are 
examined in sub-section IX.1.2, and given special attention original empirical findings 
in each case in this sub-section .  
 
Firstly, many written texts have been utilised to examine the development of Germany‟s 
PV sector (Wolf, 1972; Smits, 1976; Palz, 1978; Palz, 1982; KPMG, 1999; Jacobbson 
et als., 2004; Lauber and Mez, 2004; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Wüstenhagen and 
Bilharz, 2006). In addition to using this literature, this research has explored the impact 
of German unification on the development of the PV industry. Due to the subsidy 
programmes implemented to support the economic development of East Germany, it 
has been easier than ever for German PV firms to mobilise capital. 
 
Secondly, with regard to the Chinese PV industry, Marigo‟s (2009) PhD thesis was the 
first in-depth research to highlight, at firm-level, technological capability and a nation-
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level innovation system. However, her research mainly focused on technological issues, 
and only covered the time up until 2005. Going beyond her work, this research has 
examined not only technological issues but also the institutional framework of China‟s 
political economy and has covered the whole of the 2000s. Indeed, it is important to 
cover the second half of the 2000s for the research about China‟s PV industry, because 
China‟s PV industry surpassed more advanced countries during this period. Thus, this 
research has explained how China‟s PV industry has become the largest PV 
manufacturer in the world in aspects of capital mobilisation, technological caching-up 
and cost reduction.  
 
Lastly, this research is the first in-depth investigation into the Korean PV industry. 
There have been many reports about PV support policy and the PV industry in Korea, 
but these reports are fragmented and not comprehensive in their understanding of the 
development of the PV industry in Korea. In particular, this research has revealed why 
Korea‟s PV industry did not grow fast despite the feed-in tariff and how the feed-in 
tariff was adopted and changed.  
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3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THREE COUNTRIES 
 
3.1 Germany 
 
According to Vernon‟s (1966) product cycle theory, the more a product is standardised, 
the greater the possibility that the industry will relocate to developing countries (see 
II.3.2.1 p. 32). It can be noted that the German PV industry fits this argument in that c-
Si cells and modules are highly standardised. In fact, Q-Cells and Schott Solar moved 
their production facilities to Malaysia and the Czech Republic, respectively, in order to 
reduce production costs.    
 
By moving its production facilities into lower cost areas, the German PV industry 
should be able to build a global value chain based on its institutional advantage of 
innovation. Moreover, Germany should consider how to retain its institutional 
advantage in product innovation and how to keep the equipment industry competitive, 
thus allowing the PV industry to maintain its advantage in developing new PV products 
and using state-of-the-art equipment.   
 
Furthermore, Germany needs to maintain its institutional advantage in market formation 
until it achieves grid parity. The German PV industry has benefitted most from the feed-
in tariff, because it enjoys the largest PV market in the world. Thus, it is important that 
the feed-in tariff is kept until it attains grid parity so that the German PV industry can 
enter the take-off phase, which Van de Ven and Garud (2000) define as the final stage 
of an ILC (see II.3.2.3 p. 34).   
 
 
3.2 China 
 
Considering current trends of rising labour costs in China, no one knows how long 
China‟s cost advantage will continue. Furthermore, local state corporatism, which has 
been a unique institutional advantage in the process of industrialisation in China, has to 
meet the challenge of complying with the rules of the WTO. Therefore, China needs to 
realise that its current institutional advantages are vulnerable and attempt to alter its 
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institutional disadvantages.  
 
Firstly, the findings of this study suggest that China should adopt a strong demand-pull 
policy, such as the feed-in tariff, so that the Chinese PV industry can be independent of 
fluctuations in world PV demand. Although the Renewable Energy Law was enacted in 
2006 and Jiangsu Province started its feed-in tariff in 2009, the scale is very limited and 
a German-like, feed-in tariff has not yet been implemented in China. Thus, it is 
necessary for China to introduce this type of feed-in tariff not only to ensure stable 
growth of the Chinese PV industry, but also to avoid trade disputes with foreign 
organisations such as the US Steel Unions.   
 
Secondly, it is essential to build a technological capability in order to establish a self-
sustaining PV industry structure in terms of innovation. Although China‟s technological 
capability for process innovation in the c-Si cell industry is equal to more advanced 
countries, it is doubtful that this remains the case where thin film technology is 
concerned. In fact, in recent years
118
, CdTe technology, one of the thin film 
technologies, has developed faster in more advanced countries. If PV technology is 
taken to include not only c-Si technology but also thin film technology, product 
innovation becomes crucial for the growth of the PV industry because thin film 
technology is not mature in terms of the ILC theory (Utterback, 1994). Therefore, it is 
necessary for China to strengthen the infrastructure of indigenous innovation: 
promoting basic science in local universities and research institutes; facilitating 
collaboration between firms, universities and research institutes; and providing 
incentives for overseas Chinese scientists to return.   
 
 
3.3 Korea 
 
In respect of market formation, Korea‟s PV industry experienced a cold-turkey type 
policy change from the feed-in tariff to RPS (see VII.3.3.1.4 p. 203). Due to this change, 
the domestic PV market shrank rapidly in 2009, as shown in Figure VII-6 and Table 
VII-7 (p. 200). If domestic PV markets increase sufficiently, a local PV industry will 
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 The market share of CdTe thin film in the world PV market rose from 2 to 13 per cent 
between 2005 and 2010 (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2011)  
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have more beneficial circumstances in which to grow, as shown in the German case. 
Thus, it is necessary for Korea to construct a mechanism to pull demands for PV into 
the RPS scheme, such as by implementing a quota system for PV electricity.   
 
A more serious problem relates to capital mobilisation, not only in the PV sector, but 
also in other sectors in Korea‟s economy. Industrial policy has changed since the 1990s, 
as liberalisation of the political economy has continued and „policy loans‟ are no longer 
made. However, financial markets for new industries were not well developed in 
comparison to those in more advanced economies such as Germany. For example, the 
role of banks was different from that of investment banks in Germany. Furthermore, a 
venture capital system was not properly established because of the collapse of the 
venture boom in the early 2000s. Thus, there remains only one actor who can afford to 
mobilise capital in the Korean economy, the chaebol. Given the chaebol-dominant 
industrial structure, if chaebols are not interested in a certain sector, the sector is 
unlikely to emerge and grow in Korea. In fact, a c-Si cell industry did not emerge until 
chaebols entered the industry. Therefore, it is necessary for Korea to build a financial 
system which can be accessed by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in order 
to overcome institutional disadvantage in terms of capital mobilisation.  
 
With regard to innovation, it should be noted that Korea has experienced great success 
in the semiconductor and display sectors. Because of similar production processes 
between semiconductor and silicon solar cells and between display and thin film 
modules, Korea seems to have a technical advantage in developing the PV industry. 
However, it is necessary to overcome some technical differences between 
semiconductors and silicon solar cells and between display and thin film modules. This 
is illustrated by the fact that Siltron was a wafer manufacturer for semiconductors but 
failed to produce wafers for solar cells in the 1990s (see VII.3.2.3.2 p. 192).      
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4. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This research has adopted the case study as a research method. However, it can be said 
that case studies provide little basis for generalisation or theorising (Yin, 2009). Thus, 
this research may be limited in its ability to generalise its theoretical and empirical 
findings. However, it has not been the aim of this research to identify universal 
prerequisites for the development of the PV industry through generalisation. Rather, this 
research has been carried out to understand adequate causal relationships between 
institutional advantages and the national PV trajectories, as I discuss earlier (III.2 p. 42). 
In fact, this research provides in-depth insights into the understanding of the nature of 
industrial dynamics in the context of institutional configurations.  
 
Although these insights emanate from the case study on the PV sector, it is valid to 
expand the case study to other sectors such as the wind energy industry in order to 
extend the applicability of the conceptual framework. Through examining other sectors, 
more general arguments about industrial dynamics can be inferred.  
 
Theoretically, this research has focused more on the national and industrial level 
approaches rather than the firm or global level approaches. However, it appears that a 
relationship between global and national levels in particular attracts more attention from 
scholars who are interested in domestic institutional changes under globalisation (Weiss, 
2003; Morgan, 2005; Whitley, 2005; Hancké et al., 2007; Pirie, 2008; Streeck, 2009). 
These include recent works which deal with the globalisation-national governance 
debate, and discuss whether current and differing capitalist models converge to neo-
liberal capitalism under global competition.  
 
Although this research has also examined the changes of domestic institutional 
configurations under increasing economic openness in Germany, China and Korea, this 
issue has not been a main focus of this study. Thus, if further research is carried out in 
terms of the relationship between globalisation and national governance, it will 
contribute to this debate.   
 
Lastly, this research has revealed that domestic PV market creation has largely 
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subsidised the development of other countries‟ PV industry. The relationship between 
Germany‟s feed-in tariff and China‟s PV industry is an example of this. That is to say, 
national PV support policy has externalities in terms of economics. In order to 
internalise these externalities, it is necessary to establish an international cooperation 
mechanism. Also this mechanism would be helpful for the planet to cope with global 
warming, because deploying renewable energy is one of the ways to cut could CO2 
emission, as I mention at the start of this thesis (I.1 p. 1). Thus, how to organise 
international cooperation around the feed-in tariff could be another topic of further 
research and could contribute to practical concerns as well as academic knowledge.   
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Appendix 1 Interview Questions 
 
 
 
I. Basic Information 
 
1. The year of establishment 
2. The number of employees and their salaries 
- The number of R&D personnel (scientists and engineers) 
3. Annual sales/ Earnings Before Interest and Tax 
4. The ratio of export 
5. The record of wafer thickness and cell efficiency 
 
II. Establishment and initial period 
 
6. Who were the founders? 
- What were their careers (majors, degrees, former experience, etc.)? 
- What were their motives to found? 
- What were the circumstances when founding? 
 
7. How did finance in expansion during initial period? 
- Banks, stock markets, or self-financing? 
- What was the role of governments in financing? 
 
8. What were the main difficulties during initial period? 
- How did you overcome the difficulties? 
 
III. Expansion of production capacity 
 
9. How did you expand your production capacity? 
- Why did you expand rapidly? 
- How did you finance in each expansion? 
- What was the role of governments in financing? 
- Who were the main equipment suppliers in expansion? 
- How did you cut the expansion costs? 
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IV. Vertical integration 
 
10. Who were suppliers and users in the value chain? 
- Why did you forward or backward integrate in the value chain? 
 
V. Innovation 
 
11. Have you collaborated with universities/research institutes/other firms? 
- What were the relationships with them in R&D? 
- What were the main goals in technological development? 
 
VI. Government support 
 
12. What were the main support from the central government and local governments? 
- Was the feed-in tariff helpful to your business? 
- What were the incentives to invest? 
 
VII. Further Questions 
 
13. What is the strength of your company? (China, Germany, Korea) 
14. How did you start to export? (China) 
15. How many engineers came from the traditional PV firms? (China) 
16. Who did a major role in listing on the foreign stock market? (China) 
17. Was the Jiangsu Province feed-in tariff helpful to your business? (China) 
18. Was the Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland helpful to your business? (Germany) 
19. What were difficulties when Chinese firms grew? (Germany) 
20. Why were you late to enter the PV business? (Korea)  
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Appendix 2 Interviewees 
 
I. Korea 
 
 
 
name careers date 
place (or 
method) 
firm 
Bae, Sang 
Soon 
A senior manager of 
Hanwha Chemical and a 
former CEO of Nesco Solar 
20
th
 December 
2009 and 7
th
 
May 2010 
Email and 
telephone 
Kim, Dong 
Sup 
A director of Samsung 
Electronics 
14
th
 April 2010 Email and 
telephone 
Jung, Jee Won 
A director of LG 
Electronics and a former 
senior researcher of LG 
Chemical 
14
th
 January 
2010 
Telephone 
Oh, Byung 
Doo 
A former manager of LG 
Electronics and LG 
Chemical 
4
th
 January 
2010 
Telephone 
Park, Won 
Kyu 
a former researcher of the 
Goldstar Central Institute (a 
participant of the National 
Project) 
13
th
 January 
2010 
Telephone 
Lee, Woo 
Hyun 
A vice CEO of OCI (a 
poly-silicon manufacturer) 
29
th
 January 
2010 
Email 
Kim, Ki Hong 
A managing director of 
OCI (a poly-silicon 
manufacturer) 
1
st
 February 
2010 
Email 
Han, Sung 
Ryong 
A team manager of S-
Energy (a module 
manufacturer) 
15
th
 March 
2010 
Telephone 
Kim, Woo 
Yeol 
A managing director of 
KISCO (a thin-film 
manufacturer) and a former 
managing director of LG 
Electronics 
18
th
 March 
2010 
Telephone 
Shin, Dong 
Woo 
A general manager of 
Millinet Solar 
23
rd
 March 
2010 
Email 
Cho, An Je 
A former researcher of 
Lucky Materials and Siltron 
(a participant of the 
National Project) 
16
th
 April 2010 Telephone 
Lee, Won Jin 
A manager of solar 
business team, Hyundai 
Heavy Industries 
19
th
 April 2010 Telephone and 
email 
Lee, Pak Il a former CEO of KPE 27
th
 April 2010 Email 
Kim, Jae 
Yoon 
A team manager of 
Shinsung Holdings 
29
th
 April 2010 Telephone 
Lee, Tae Woo 
 
A team manager of KPE 7
th
 May 2010 Email 
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Lee, Jun Sin 
a founder of Photon 
Semiconductor and a 
professor in Sungkyunkwan 
University 
28
th
 June 2010 Telephone 
Policy 
maker 
Kim, Yong 
Tae 
A deputy director, division 
of Energy technology, 
Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry and Energy  
25
th
 May 2009 Munich, 
Germany 
Kim, Bum 
Soo 
a deputy director, division 
of the new & renewable 
energy, Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and 
Energy 
23
rd
 September 
2009 
Email  
Kim, Kang 
Won 
A team manager of Korea 
New and Renewable 
Energy Centre 
23
rd
 September 
2009, 21
st
 
October 2009, 
etc. 
Email  
Lee, Jae Hong 
a former assistant director, 
division of Energy 
Technology, Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and 
Energy (a introducer of the 
Feed-in tariff) 
29
th
 December 
2009 
Email  
Kim, Ki Joon 
A director, division of new 
and renewable energy, 
Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, and Energy 
16
th
 January 
2010 
Paris, France 
Oh, Il Young 
A assistant director, 
division of environment 
technology, Ministry of 
Environment 
22
nd
 February 
2010 
Telephone 
Expert 
Kim, Sung 
Soo 
a PhD researcher of 
Imperial College London 
and an assistant director of 
Education, Science and 
Technology of Ministry of 
Korea 
30
th
 November 
2009 and 22
nd
 
December 2009  
London 
(Imperial 
college) and 
telephone 
Yoon, Kyung 
Hoon 
a Principal Researcher of 
New and Renewable 
Energy Research Division, 
Korea Institute of Energy 
Research in Republic of 
Korea 
11
th
 December 
2009 
Telephone 
Kim, Kang 
Won 
A team manager of Korea 
New and Renewable 
Energy Centre 
23
rd
 September 
2009, 21
st
 
October 2009, 
etc. 
Email  
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II. China 
 
 
name careers date 
place (or 
method) 
firm 
Xu, Honghua 
A vice director, Institute of 
Electrical Engineering, Chinese 
Academy of Science and a former 
independent director of JA Solar 
6
th
 July 
2010 
Beijing 
Lee, Seok Jin  
A vice president of sales & 
marketing in LDK Solar and a 
former Chief Operating Officer in 
Yingli 
7
th
 July 
2010 
Suzhou, 
Jiangsu 
Province 
Chen, Harry 
A director of group office, 
Suntech 
16
th
 July 
2010 
Wuxi, Jiangsu 
Province 
Zhu, Jun 
A manager of domestic market, 
Solarfun 
19
th
 July 
2010 
Qidong, 
Jiangsu 
Province 
Sun, Renbao 
A vice manager of development 
& coordination department, 
China Sunergy 
20
th
 July 
2010 
Nanjing, 
Jiangsu 
Province 
Yang, Colin 
and  
Young, 
Thomas 
A vice president of public affairs, 
Trina Solar  
A director of investor relations, 
Trina Solar 
21
st
 July 
2010 
Changzhou, 
Jiangsu 
Province 
Xia, Collin 
A sales engineer, Shanghai 
Topsolar 
22
nd
 July 
2010 
Shanghai 
Cui, Ri  
A sales manager of sales 
department, Suntech 
27
th
 July 
2010 
Wuxi, Jiangsu 
Province 
Policy 
maker 
Shao, Liqin 
A vice director of National 
Strategy Consulting Committee 
for advanced material industry 
and a professor in Tsinghua 
University 
2
nd
 July 
2010 
Beijing 
Expert 
Ma, Lingjuan 
A director assistant and deputy 
managing director of Chinese 
Renewable Energy Industries 
Association 
5
th
 July 
2010 
Beijing 
Li, Zhu  
A senior associate of IT Group (a 
consulting firm) 
25
th
 June 
2010 
Telephone 
Wei, Qidong 
a secretary general of Jiangsu PV 
Industry Association, a professor 
of Dongnan University  
8
th
 July 
2010 
Nanjing, 
Jiangsu 
Province 
Tang, Hong 
A director of industrial park 
development department, 
Shanghai New Energy Industry 
Association 
15
th
 July 
2010 
Shanghai 
Wang, 
Wenjing 
A professor, Institute of Electrical 
Engineering, Chinese Academy 
of Science 
2
nd
 
August 
2010 
Telephone 
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III. Germany 
 
 
name careers date 
place (or 
method) 
firm 
Ettrich, Klaus 
and 
Lawerenz, 
Alexander  
A director of business unit 
solar, Forschungsinstitut für 
Microsensorik und 
Photovoltaik GmbH 
A head of photovoltaics 
department, 
Forschungsinstitut für 
Microsensorik und 
Photovoltaik GmbH 
18
th
 May 2011 Erfurt, 
Thuringia 
Peschke, 
Matthias 
A Chief Operating Officer, 
Masdar PV GmbH 
19
th
 May 2011 Ichtershausen, 
Thuringia 
Woditsch, 
Peter 
A former CEO of Deutsche 
Solar AG (current 
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